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Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada is an Iran-backed Iraqi militia within the Popular Mobilization Forces. It operates in Iraq and Syria, maintains close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and has participated in attacks claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

آخر مراجعة: 15 نوفمبر 2026قراءة في 5 دقيقةالمراجع · 17

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Overview

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada is an Iran-backed Iraqi militia operating in Iraq and Syria. One of the larger Iranian proxy forces in Iraq, it forms the 14th Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and works closely with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran’s ruling regime. It has also operated under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella name used by several Iran-aligned militias. Its state-funded PMF position and its ties to Iran are both central to its role: Iraqi state salaries do not establish Iraqi government control over its operations.[1][2][3]

Founding and ideology

The militia emerged in the early 2010s around Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, a founding member of Kata'ib Hezbollah. After being sidelined within that organization, he focused on the Syrian civil war within the IRGC chain of command. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada fighters in Syria received IRGC pay, and the militia has claimed that 88 of its fighters died in that conflict. Abu Alaa al-Wala’i took over its leadership in 2014. The group’s transnational agenda places cooperation with Iran-aligned armed organizations beyond Iraq alongside its Iraqi military and political activity.[1][4]

Its regional commitments have included threats beyond the immediate Iraq–Syria theater. In October 2014, the militia threatened Saudi Arabia. In 2018, al-Wala’i offered to send fighters to Yemen in support of the Houthi movement. These statements expressed the group’s willingness to serve Iran-aligned campaigns elsewhere in the region; they do not, by themselves, establish that those deployments took place.[1]

History

Following the PMF’s formation during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada became its 14th Brigade. The militia retained its own leadership while gaining a place within Iraq’s official security structure. In 2021, it announced a recruitment drive for confrontation with United States forces and claimed to have registered 49,000 volunteers; that number was the militia’s claim. Its political arm, al-Muntaserun, subsequently entered Iraqi electoral politics through an alliance that also included Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq.[1]

In October 2023, during Israel’s war against the terrorist organization Hamas in Gaza, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada warned the United States against involvement. The militia belonged to the overlap between the PMF and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq that became prominent after October 2023. That umbrella claimed attacks against Israel, though its collective claims do not identify which member carried out every operation.[2][5]

Structure and leadership

Abu Alaa al-Wala’i serves as secretary-general. Sheikh Kadhim al-Fartousi has spoken publicly as the militia’s spokesman. The organization combines its PMF brigade with political representation and media activity. I-News has been identified as a channel affiliated with Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada; documentary producer Talib al-Sayed made programs for E-News and a channel affiliated with Kata'ib Hezbollah. These media connections form part of a wider Iraqi militia communications network.[1][6]

The PMF receives Iraqi state salaries, but its component militias answer only loosely to Iraq’s military chain of command. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s brigade is legally part of the state security structure while remaining under the militia leadership’s administrative and operational control. Its use of official status therefore coexists with resistance to state direction of its armed activity.[1][3]

Funding and sponsors

Iran’s ruling regime supports Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. The IRGC has partly financed it, while the IRGC’s Quds Force and Hezbollah have provided forms of financial and military assistance, intelligence sharing, and leadership support. Iraqi public funding also reaches the organization through its PMF brigade. These funding streams explain why membership in a state-funded force cannot be treated as proof that Iraq’s government commands the militia’s operations.[1][7]

Attacks and operations

The February 15, 2021, rocket attack on Erbil killed an Iraqi and a Filipino and wounded nine others. A fighter arrested after the attack identified Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada as his recruiter. That account raised a possible personnel link, but did not establish that the militia directed the attack. Analysis of the attack’s preparation and claims identified Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq as its driving force; Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada may have supplied personnel. United States forces subsequently struck the militia in Syria in response to its suspected involvement.[8][9][10]

During 2024, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada joined other Islamic Resistance in Iraq militias threatening Israel. Al-Fartousi said Iraqi militias were attacking Israel daily and described the Gaza war and fighting in Lebanon as parts of one regional war. In June, he pledged that Iraqi militias would enter a war between Hezbollah and Israel, while denying that Islamic Resistance in Iraq fighters were already in southern Lebanon. He said Hezbollah possessed the means to deter Israel. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada was among militias interested in fighting beside Hezbollah if wider war began, whereas Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq expressed reservations. Al-Wala’i threatened close-range fighting against Israel if war began against Lebanon and later warned that Iraqi militias could use their full arsenal with greater accuracy if distance ceased to constrain them.[11][12]

In June 2024, the militia announced that operative Abdullah Razzaq al-Safi had been killed in an airstrike it attributed to the United States. Al-Wala’i attended his funeral. The militia’s attribution of the strike remains its own account.[11]

Designations and international status

The United States designated Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and al-Wala’i under terrorism sanctions in November 2023 and designated the militia a Foreign Terrorist Organization in September 2025. In April 2026, the United States sanctioned commanders tied to Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and other Iraqi militias over attacks on American personnel and interests. Those named from the militia included commander Khalid Jameel Abed Albakhatra and senior official Saeed Kadhim Mukhamis. The United States also offered a financial reward for information about al-Wala’i. A United States human rights report identified Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada among terrorist organizations supported by Iran’s ruling regime.[1][7][13][14]

Current status

On January 16, 2026, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada declared full alignment with Iran’s ruling regime against the United States and Israel and urged Iraqi authorities to prevent attacks on Iran through Iraqi airspace. A military assessment that month identified its fighters among PMF personnel reported to have entered Iran to help the regime suppress protests; the reported deployment was based on security-source information and an assessment, not a public admission by the militia. Later in January, al-Wala’i credited militia fighters, Iraqi leaders, and government negotiators for the departure of American forces from Ayn al-Asad Air Base.[15][16]

State control of militia weapons remained unresolved in 2026. In August, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada made its participation in efforts to place weapons under Iraqi state control conditional on demands including withdrawal of foreign forces. Its position underscored the continuing gap between formal inclusion in Iraq’s armed forces and effective government command over its weapons and operations.[17]

المراجع

  1. 1Profile: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhadawashingtoninstitute.org
  2. 2Iraqi Shia militia warns the United States about involvement against Hamasfdd.org
  3. 3Several Iranian-backed militias in Iraq say they accept state control of weaponsfdd.org
  4. 4Iran's Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syriawashingtoninstitute.org
  5. 5The Islamic Resistance in Iraq increases its drone attacks on Israelfdd.org
  6. 6The Goal Behind the Hypocritical Discourse of Iraq’s Militia Mediawashingtoninstitute.org
  7. 7Report on Human Rights Practices for 2023 - Iranjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  8. 8Why Iran’s Proxies Fear Evidencewashingtoninstitute.org
  9. 9Attributing the Erbil Attack: The Role of Open-Source Monitoringwashingtoninstitute.org
  10. 10The Erbil Rocket Cell: Insights from Haidar Hamza al-Bayati's Confessionwashingtoninstitute.org
  11. 11Spotlight on Iran (June 19–26, 2024)terrorism-info.org.il
  12. 12Iraqi Shiite militias join the war between Israel, the US, and Iran with drone attacksfdd.org
  13. 13US Treasury designates 7 Iran-backed Iraqi militia commanders as terroristsfdd.org
  14. 14US offers rewards for 3 Iraqi militia leadersfdd.org
  15. 15Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (January 14–21, 2026)terrorism-info.org.il
  16. 16The Islamic Republic Imports Its Terror Network To Kill Peaceful Protestersfdd.org
  17. 17Iranian-backed militia in Iraq sets ‘conditions’ for disarmamentfdd.org

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