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Abraham Accords

The Abraham Accords are United States-brokered agreements that established or advanced relations between Israel and several Arab states beginning in 2020. They created new channels for diplomacy, trade, travel and regional security cooperation.

Última revisión: 15 de noviembre de 202610 min de lecturaReferencias · 16

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Overview

The Abraham Accords are a United States-brokered framework of agreements and declarations that established or advanced relations between Israel and Arab states beginning in 2020. An August 13, 2020, announcement by Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States launched the process by declaring that Israel and the Emirates would establish full diplomatic relations. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Emirati leader Mohammed bin Zayed reached the decision in a telephone call after weeks of confidential diplomacy. The agreements take their name from Abraham, a figure shared by Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the initial Abraham Accords at the White House on September 15, 2020. Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan signed the Israel–UAE peace treaty, while Bahrain signed its own normalization agreement with Israel. The Emirati treaty established peace, diplomatic relations and full bilateral normalization and subsequently received approval from the Knesset. Bahrain’s agreement concerned relations between Bahrain and Israel. These instruments should be distinguished from later steps by Sudan and Morocco, whose declarations and agreements developed on separate dates and under different legal and political conditions.

Morocco revived an older relationship with Israel through a normalization agreement in December 2020. Sudan announced a normalization commitment in October 2020 and signed an Abraham Accords declaration in Khartoum on January 6, 2021, with United States Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin representing Washington. Sudan’s October statement was unsigned and nonbinding; neither it nor the January declaration completed a comprehensive bilateral peace treaty or a full exchange of diplomatic representatives. The Israel–Sudan normalization agreement process thus followed the initial Accords but remained less complete than the Israel–UAE relationship. Within four months of the August announcement, Israel had signed diplomatic instruments with four countries.

The Accords marked a new phase in regional diplomacy after the Camp David Accords and the Israel–Jordan peace treaty. Those earlier agreements established peace with Egypt and Jordan; the 2020 initiative widened Israel’s formal relationships in the Arab world. It also demonstrated that Arab governments could pursue relations with Israel on their own national interests without waiting for an agreement between Israel and the PLO. The shared threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regime, opportunities for economic development and the prospect of closer cooperation with the United States were central drivers. The agreements remained in force through the May 2021 fighting between Israel and Hamas, a terrorist organization, and through the far greater regional crisis that began in October 2023.

Background

Before 2020, Israel had formal peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, while most Arab governments lacked full diplomatic relations with it. The Arab League boycott still shaped parts of regional policy, although its practical effect varied by country. The 2020 agreements weakened that boycott by creating open diplomatic and economic ties between Israel and the Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, alongside Sudan’s declared opening. During the normalization debate, the Arab League recognized each Arab state’s authority to determine its own relationship with Israel. The new approach reflected sovereign decisions by the participating governments and replaced the earlier expectation that wider Arab normalization must await an agreement with the PLO.

Strategic conditions helped make the breakthrough possible. Israel and several Gulf governments faced threats from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regime, including its missile and drone capabilities and its support for armed networks across the region. Following the Emirati normalization announcement, senior Iranian regime officials threatened the Emirates over the prospect of an Israeli presence in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain’s position near Iran, its hosting of the United States Fifth Fleet and its close relationship with Saudi Arabia gave its decision significance beyond commerce. The Trump administration encouraged security cooperation against the Iranian regime while offering economic and diplomatic incentives for normalization.

Mohammed bin Zayed led the Emirati effort during the presidency of Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The August 13 telephone call with Trump and Netanyahu concluded a period of intensive confidential diplomacy and produced a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the Emirates. The statement set out a path toward full normalization and a regional strategic agenda involving diplomacy, trade, security and development. The decision expanded Abu Dhabi’s role in regional peace efforts and enabled the two governments to deal directly with each other. Morocco’s relationship with Israel had existed in earlier forms and was revived through its December 2020 agreement, while Sudan’s opening reversed the rejection of relations associated with the 1967 Khartoum declaration.

The countries entered the process from different starting points. Israel and the Emirates could establish a broad bilateral relationship quickly, while Bahrain faced domestic opposition to normalization and remained sensitive to Saudi influence. Morocco restored ties that had a prior history. Sudan’s transitional authorities made a historic commitment, but its initial joint statement concentrated chiefly on prospective economic and trade relations and had no binding treaty status. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Khartoum in 2020 as regional diplomacy continued after the Emirati announcement. These differences shaped the pace of implementation: by 2021, Israel’s relationship with the Emirates was the strongest of the four initial normalization partnerships, whereas the Sudanese process had produced little significant bilateral change.

Terms

The Abraham Accords comprise related but distinct documents rather than one uniform treaty binding every participant on identical terms. The September 15, 2020, ceremony included an Abraham Accords declaration and separate bilateral agreements. The Israel–UAE peace treaty established diplomatic relations and full normalization. It committed both states to respect each other’s sovereignty and security and to settle disputes peacefully. Bahrain’s agreement established a framework for bilateral relations with Israel. Morocco subsequently signed a normalization agreement, while Sudan signed an Abraham Accords declaration after its earlier, nonbinding normalization announcement. Describing all four relationships as completed bilateral peace treaties would obscure these legal differences.

The framework’s practical aims extended beyond diplomatic recognition. Israel and the Emirates agreed to pursue cooperation with the United States across trade, security, development and regional diplomacy. The participating governments opened channels for official visits, commercial agreements, tourism, cultural exchange and cooperation among businesses and civil society groups. Security work included defense against missiles and drones, cybersecurity and closer contact among military officials. An Abraham Fund was established to encourage economic cooperation between Israel and its Arab partners. Proposals for a land trade route between Israel and Gulf states sought to widen civilian benefits, although such proposals did not themselves constitute completed infrastructure.

The agreements also encouraged religious and cultural contact. The September 2020 declaration called for interfaith and intercultural dialogue, and normalization gave the Emirates’ growing Jewish community greater scope for visible religious and civic life. Abu Dhabi’s Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and the American Jewish Committee launched educational cooperation on Emirati–Israeli relations around the first anniversary. Exchanges among Arab and Israeli civil society leaders later addressed environmental work, culture and tourism. These activities added public and institutional relationships to the formal government agreements, though their scale differed substantially among participating countries.

United States policy treated expansion of the Accords as a continuing diplomatic objective. The Biden administration endorsed normalization between Israel and Arab countries while taking a different approach to the incentives offered by its predecessor. In 2023, the House of Representatives passed legislation proposing an ambassador-level Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords. The proposed envoy would coordinate United States efforts to establish and strengthen diplomatic, economic, security and civic ties involving Israel and other countries. A separate Regional Integration and Normalization Act, introduced shortly before October 7, 2023, sought to support economic and civic programs linking Israelis and Arabs but did not advance in Congress. House passage of the envoy bill alone did not establish that the position had become law.

Implementation

The Emirati relationship developed rapidly after signing. More than 130,000 Israelis visited the United Arab Emirates during the first four and a half months after the Accords were signed. Official visits, tourism and business activity helped turn normalization into a visible bilateral relationship. By the fifth anniversary, annual trade between Israel and the Emirates had risen from zero to more than $3 billion. The two countries also developed cooperation in technology and defense. Bahrain and Israel expanded ties in cybersecurity and defense, although protests against normalization continued in Bahrain and its economic gains fell short of expectations three years after signing. Morocco’s renewed ties likewise developed through diplomacy and security cooperation, while Sudan’s incomplete political transition restricted implementation.

Military cooperation became increasingly public. In 2021, Israel moved into the regional framework of United States Central Command, or CENTCOM, strengthening opportunities for coordination with Arab states under the United States security umbrella. Visits by Israel Defense Forces leaders, joint exercises and agreements involving Israeli defense industries made aspects of cooperation visible. Accords partners developed United States-led work on defense against drones and missiles. Israel’s integration into that regional framework helped repel Iranian regime missile attacks in April and October 2024 and supported Israel during the June 2025 war. These developments showed how the diplomatic opening could support operational security coordination against a shared threat.

In March 2022, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid convened counterparts from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, the Emirates and Bahrain at Sde Boker in the Negev. The meeting established the Negev Forum as a continuing framework for regional cooperation. Its working groups addressed security, energy, tourism, health, education, water and food security. The forum joined countries with different histories of peace with Israel around practical projects. Its activities were later suspended during the war in Gaza that began in 2023, illustrating the effect of regional violence on public diplomacy even as some bilateral security and economic cooperation continued.

Anniversary events reflected efforts to keep the agreements active. At a September 17, 2021, ceremony, Lapid joined United States, Moroccan, Emirati and Bahraini representatives virtually to mark one year since the initial signing. Emirati and Israeli officials also discussed religious coexistence, water and energy. An American Jewish Committee delegation of 80 people joined Emirati officials and local Jewish community members in Abu Dhabi for the second anniversary. By the third anniversary, civil society and business exchanges included environmental, cultural and tourism projects. Bahrain’s ambassador to the United States hosted a September 2023 reception attended by Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Alzayani, who expressed support for a more connected Middle East.

Implementation remained uneven. Sudan’s declaration did not produce a comprehensive peace treaty, and Israel’s relations with Sudan remained limited. After meeting Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Israeli official Eli Cohen said a further formal step would follow a transfer from military to civilian leadership. Bahrain’s partnership carried strategic value but faced domestic opposition and more modest commercial returns than the Emirati relationship. Morocco’s security ties became more institutional: a permanent Israeli defense attaché office in Rabat followed earlier military contacts, with Israel’s Defense Ministry Director General Amir Baram citing shared Jewish heritage and mutual trust. These cases show why participation in the Accords cannot be measured solely by the date of a declaration.

Significance

The Accords changed the diplomatic premise that Arab states had to defer relations with Israel until Israel reached an agreement with the PLO. The Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan each took steps based on national security, economic and diplomatic interests. Their choices expanded Israel’s regional relationships and reduced the practical force of the Arab League boycott. The process also created possibilities for direct travel, business, education and cultural contact that had been limited or unavailable. Its results were uneven: the Emirati partnership became broad and active, Bahrain’s relationship developed under domestic constraints, Morocco restored earlier links, and Sudan’s promised normalization remained incomplete.

Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks presented the framework with its severest test. The massacre, backed by the Iranian regime, disrupted efforts to deepen the Accords and advance United States-brokered Saudi–Israeli normalization negotiations that had been nearing completion. The ensuing war in Gaza damaged public diplomatic ties and led the Negev Forum to suspend activities. Nevertheless, the existing Accords survived, and security and economic cooperation among partners continued and in some areas accelerated. Saudi–Israeli peace remained a potential expansion of the framework, grounded in converging security and economic interests, but no Saudi normalization agreement resulted from the earlier negotiations.

The regional security effects extended beyond the original signatories. CENTCOM provided a framework in which Israel and Arab partners could coordinate against missile and drone threats from the Iranian regime. Cooperation during the attacks of 2024 and the June 2025 war demonstrated the importance of that integration. At the same time, public support and diplomatic activity remained vulnerable to war and domestic politics. The Accords’ durability therefore rests on both government commitments and the continued growth of practical ties among their societies and institutions. Their history shows substantial achievements in trade and defense alongside unresolved limits in Sudan, constrained gains in Bahrain and interrupted regional forums.

On November 6, 2025, Trump announced that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords. Kazakhstan already had diplomatic relations with Israel, making its announced entry different from the original agreements that opened or restored relations. Its participation extended the framework beyond the Middle East and North Africa and created a possible avenue for Israel, the United States and other partners to diversify critical mineral supply chains. The announcement broadened the Accords’ scope from normalization alone toward cooperation among countries that may already maintain diplomatic ties. Whether additional countries join, and how fully existing commitments develop, depends on subsequent decisions and implementation rather than announcement alone.

Referencias

  1. 1A Year since the Abraham Accords: Pick up the Pace of Normalizationinss.org.il
  2. 2The Abraham Accords, Two Years On: Impressive Progress, Multiple Challenges, and Promising Potentialinss.org.il
  3. 3The Abraham Accords at One Year: Achievements, Challenges, and Recommendations for Israelinss.org.il
  4. 4Five Years On: Are the Abraham Accords Here to Stay?inss.org.il
  5. 5Abraham Accordsadl.org
  6. 6State Department Marks One Year Anniversary of Abraham Accordsjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  7. 7House Approves Appointment of Abraham Accords Envoyjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  8. 8Kazakhstan and the Abraham Accords in the Critical Minerals Hedging Gamewashingtoninstitute.org
  9. 9Building Media Cooperation Between Abraham Accords Countrieswashingtoninstitute.org
  10. 10Unfreezing the Abraham Accords: A New Transatlantic Strategy for Greater Peace, Stability and Integration in the Middle Easthenryjacksonsociety.org
  11. 11AJC’s Abraham Accords 5th Anniversary Commemoration Eventajc.org
  12. 12Architects of Peace: The Abraham Accords Story Podcastajc.org
  13. 13Biden Trashes the Abraham Accordsfdd.org
  14. 14The Abraham Accords at Six: How a New Paradigm Outpaced the Old Peacefdd.org
  15. 15State Department Marks One Year Anniversary of Abraham Accordsjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  16. 16Kazakhstan and the Abraham Accords in the Critical Minerals Hedging Gamewashingtoninstitute.org

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