Fall of the Assad regime

Overview

The fall of the Assad regime was the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government during the final offensive of the Syrian civil war. Armed opposition groups began their advance on November 27, 2024, and entered Damascus in the early morning of December 8. Assad fled to Moscow. His departure ended 53 years of family rule, begun under his father, Hafez al-Assad, and dissolved the political order that had commanded the former Syrian Army. Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), emerged as Syria’s dominant new leader after an 11-day campaign that combined advances in the north with a separate opposition drive from the south.

The collapse followed more than a decade of civil war that began with the 2011 uprising. Assad had retained power with substantial help from Russia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah, the terrorist organization that supplied thousands of fighters to his war effort. By late 2024, Russia’s war against Ukraine and Hezbollah’s losses in its conflict with Israel had weakened two pillars of that support. Israeli strikes against Hezbollah’s leadership, infrastructure and weapons transfers, as well as operations against senior Quds Force figures, further reduced the Iranian regime’s ability to reinforce Assad during his final crisis.

The overthrow ended a government responsible for extensive repression and opened a difficult transition. Former HTS leaders assumed control of state institutions, while armed factions retained differing interests and degrees of independence. The new authorities faced the tasks of forming a national military, rebuilding security services and protecting communities that feared violence or exclusion. Assad’s fall also changed the balance around Israel: Syria could no longer serve openly as the Iranian regime’s protected corridor for supplying Hezbollah, although financial networks linked to the organization survived.

Background

Assad family rule combined authoritarian control at home with a regional alliance centered on Tehran. When the Syrian uprising began in 2011 and developed into civil war, Russia, the Iranian regime and Hezbollah supplied military support that helped Assad survive. Their assistance enabled major reversals for opposition forces, including the recapture of Aleppo in 2016. Hezbollah provided offensive strength that Syrian government forces lacked. At its peak, the organization deployed roughly 10,000 fighters in Syria, while Syrian territory carried weapons, money and logistical support toward Lebanon.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also organized foreign formations for Assad. Its Quds Force armed, trained and funded Liwa Fatemiyoun, composed mainly of Afghan Shia fighters, and deployed it to Syria in 2013. Fatemiyoun helped oversee routes carrying Iranian weapons, drones and missile components to Hezbollah. Liwa Zainabiyoun, a Pakistani Shia formation estimated at 2,500 to 4,000 fighters, supported Assad’s operations in several parts of Syria. These forces made the country both a battlefield and a supply corridor within the Iranian regime’s regional network.

Assad’s rule imposed severe costs on civilians. His government used chemical weapons, sponsored attacks against the United States and Israel, pursued nuclear weapons and trafficked illegal narcotics. The regime and forces aligned with it committed widespread abuses, including killings, detention and attacks on civilian property. The Assad regime was responsible for 356 documented civilian killings between January and September 2024, including the deaths of 92 children and 40 women. Before its fall, it took no credible steps to punish officials responsible for human rights abuses. The scale of repression was central to the conflict that ultimately ended its rule.

The opposition that defeated Assad was neither a single army nor a unified political movement. Al-Sharaa had previously commanded Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, and formed HTS in 2017. HTS governed territory in northwest Syria before the final offensive. Its earlier rule included confiscation of at least 550 Christian properties, a practice that began in 2015. Al-Sharaa began openly engaging with Christians in the Idlib area in July 2022. Turkey backed the Syrian National Army and other opposition groups, while Qatar maintained contact with HTS. These different organizations would cooperate against Assad, then face the separate challenge of governing together.

Course of the war

On November 27, 2024, HTS led Operation Deterrence of Aggression against Syrian government forces and their allies in northwest Syria. Its advance captured dozens of villages and entered Aleppo as regime forces retreated. Turkey-backed groups conducted a parallel offensive in the Aleppo area. Hezbollah fighters and Russian aircraft supported Assad’s forces during the campaign, but neither halted the advance. The speed of the reversals exposed the weakness of an army long dependent on outside assistance.

HTS-led forces took Hama on December 5 despite Russian air power and fighters backed by the Iranian regime. Homs then became a strategic pivot on the route to Damascus. It resisted for only a few days. As government positions collapsed, the Syrian army’s Alawite pillar did not mount an effective defense, and HTS took the Alawite coastal stronghold without resistance. The loss of major cities in succession deprived Assad of the positions needed to organize a durable response.

The offensive also pressed toward the capital from southern Syria. Opposition fighters seized positions in Daraa on December 6. The Southern Operations Room, which included the Eighth Brigade, captured Daraa city and nearby towns after Syrian forces and allied pro-Assad militias withdrew. HTS participated in the operation alongside other factions. The southern coalition advanced toward Quneitra Governorate and claimed full control there during the regime’s collapse. Its gains increased pressure on Damascus while the northern offensive moved through Syria’s central cities.

By December 8, the opposition had reached Damascus. Assad fled Syria and received asylum in Russia. The rapid disappearance of the former government ended the 11-day military operation and Assad family rule. Al-Sharaa, who had resumed using his birth name as he moved toward a civilian leadership role during the offensive, became the most prominent figure in the transition. HTS leaders took control of government institutions, appointed an interim prime minister and established de facto authority in the capital. By the end of December, HTS controlled Damascus and led Syria’s interim administration.

The collapse did not make every armed organization subordinate to Damascus. The groups that had joined the campaign differed in command structure, ideology and territorial base. Several factions in Daraa continued to operate with substantial autonomy after Assad’s departure. Their cooperation in an offensive against a common opponent left unresolved questions over local authority, weapons and the composition of a new national military.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

As Syrian forces deserted their positions, the Israel Defense Forces entered the UN-monitored buffer zone beside the Golan Heights, part of the State of Israel and the historic region of Bashan, most of which lies in Syria and is today occupied by Syria. This was the first such entry since the 1974 disengagement agreement. Israeli forces also secured the highest summit of Mount Hermon. The deployments responded to abandoned Syrian positions and the risk that armed groups could exploit the sudden loss of control near Israel. During the upheaval, the IDF directed schools in Buq’ata to hold classes online.

Within 48 hours of Assad’s collapse, Israel launched Operation Arrow of Bashan against strategic weapons held by the former regime. Israeli aircraft struck military facilities, weapons depots and other assets, including sites in Homs. The operation destroyed much of the former army, navy and air force’s weaponry to prevent advanced systems from reaching hostile armed groups. Israeli forces continued searching the buffer zone for weapons left behind by Assad’s troops in February 2025. Israel’s security concern persisted beyond the regime’s fall because surviving Hezbollah networks and other hostile groups could still operate in or near Syria.

Protection of Syrian civilians became an immediate test for the new authorities. Assad’s overthrow removed a government responsible for extensive abuses, but it did not end armed violence. Christians continued to live and worship under the post-Assad administration, while some faced targeted attacks and wider vigilante violence. The torching of Christmas trees in December 2024 prompted concern, and the new administration deployed security personnel to celebration sites. For Syria’s Druze communities, insecurity and the independence of local armed groups complicated relations with Damascus. Violence in majority-Druze areas, including Shahba, intensified fears about safety under al-Sharaa’s leadership.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

The fall of Assad changed the position of several organizations with records of terrorism and jihadist activity. Assad’s government had sponsored attacks against the United States and Israel, while Hezbollah’s fighters and the Iranian regime’s Quds Force had helped sustain its army. HTS, the leading force in the victorious offensive, emerged from al-Sharaa’s earlier command of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. That lineage and HTS’s confiscation of Christian property remain relevant to judging the new leadership’s conduct, even as its officials seek to govern state institutions and engage Syria’s communities.

The Iranian regime’s allied formations also faced an abrupt loss of position. Liwa Fatemiyoun had maintained routes for weapons and other equipment moving to Hezbollah, while Liwa Zainabiyoun supported Assad’s operations. After the collapse, fighters from both groups crossed into Iraq, including through al-Qaim; Iraqi authorities sheltered and materially supported some members. The movement of these forces showed that the destruction of Assad’s command structure did not dissolve every armed network connected to Tehran.

Claims that the overthrow itself had produced a secure and inclusive Syria were tested by events after the offensive. HTS leaders gained state authority, and the new leadership awarded senior military ranks to commanders from organizations that had helped topple Assad, including foreign jihadi fighters. The record of property seizures under HTS rule and subsequent attacks on Christian and Druze communities made protection, accountability and consistent control of armed men more meaningful measures of the transition than its leaders’ declarations.

Outcome

Assad’s flight transferred control of Damascus to a new leadership dominated by former HTS figures. On December 24, 2024, al-Sharaa met allied armed organizations, and they agreed to dissolve their formations and unite under a new Ministry of Defense. Senior defense and intelligence appointments followed. The new intelligence chief announced the dismantling and restructuring of the former regime’s security branches. On January 29, 2025, the authorities dissolved Assad’s Syrian Arab Army and began building a national military from armed factions. These decisions established a framework for state control, although local autonomy and differences among the factions remained substantial obstacles.

The transition also required civilian institutions. A National Dialogue Conference convened in Damascus to lay groundwork for a temporary constitution and a new governing order. The authorities had to replace institutions shaped by decades of Assad rule while controlling armed organizations that had entered the capital as victors. Al-Sharaa’s leadership faced particular scrutiny because HTS’s al-Qaeda lineage stood alongside its claim to govern all Syrians. In February 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with al-Sharaa and offered assistance, demonstrating that even Assad’s former principal backer sought a relationship with the new government.

For the Iranian regime, Assad’s defeat was a major strategic loss. It removed a state partner, disrupted a principal corridor for arms transfers and deprived Hezbollah of open military access and political protection in Damascus. Israeli operations had already damaged Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities; losing Syria made rebuilding them harder. The collapse sharply reduced Hezbollah’s visible military presence, but commercial networks linked to its former financiers remained. Israel therefore continued to face security risks despite the Iranian regime’s diminished position.

Aftermath and legacy

Security remained unsettled in the months after the offensive. In February 2025, Syria’s General Security Directorate began an operation in the Daraa countryside against Assad regime operatives and arms and drug traffickers. In March, Assad loyalists ambushed new government security forces near Jableh in Latakia governorate, killing at least 15 personnel. Convoys from Idlib moved into Latakia to reinforce the authorities, and curfews were imposed in Latakia, Tartus and Homs amid clashes. These events showed the difficulty of turning battlefield victory into effective state control.

Druze leaders approached the new government cautiously. Defectors led by Tareq al-Shoufi formed an al-Suwayda military council days after Assad’s overthrow and sought a decentralized Syrian state; major Druze factions distanced themselves from the council. Men of Dignity and the Mountain Brigade presented a joint roadmap for Syria’s next phase, while Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri called for a comprehensive national conference. Al-Sharaa met Druze representatives in February 2025. The community’s position reflected both concern over local security and resistance to surrendering authority without confidence in national institutions.

Christians faced a similarly consequential test of the transition. They remained able to worship, and al-Sharaa’s earlier engagement with Christian residents suggested an effort to improve relations. Yet HTS’s history of confiscating homes and shops, followed by targeted incidents and broader vigilante violence after its rise to power, left protection dependent on the new authorities’ actions. Alawites, whose community had held a privileged place under the Assad family’s rule, also faced fears of retribution. Preventing attacks across these communities became central to the credibility of the new government.

Regional governments adjusted to the collapse. Gulf states that had pursued normalization with Assad, beginning with the United Arab Emirates in 2019, were surprised by the speed of his defeat. Qatar, which had supported Syrian rebels and maintained contact with HTS, was positioned to engage the new leadership. Riyadh backed Syria’s new authorities and established an air bridge for humanitarian aid. Jordan faced concern about instability on its northern border, alongside an opportunity to disrupt drug and arms routes and pursue the return of Syrian refugees. Iraqi officials visited Damascus to discuss shared security threats.

The fall of the Assad regime ended a long period of family dictatorship and a central state partnership in the Iranian regime’s regional network. It also began a more uncertain phase of the Syrian civil war’s aftermath. The durability of the new order depended on whether Damascus could bring armed factions under accountable institutions, restrain former regime loyalists and other violent groups, and protect Druze, Christians, Alawites and other civilians. Israel’s continuing operations near the Golan Heights and against abandoned strategic weapons reflected the security consequences of a neighboring army’s sudden collapse. Assad’s departure settled who ruled Damascus in December 2024; it did not by itself settle how Syria would be governed or kept secure.