Kurdistan Regional Government

Overview

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), based in Erbil, administers the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, within Kurdistan. It has a cabinet, parliament and security institutions, including the Peshmerga. Iraq’s 2005 constitutional order recognizes the region’s federal status and its authority over internal security. The KRG’s responsibilities include public services, economic policy and protection of communities living in the region. Its exercise of those powers has repeatedly brought it into conflict with the federal government in Baghdad.

Founding and ideology

The KRG emerged after the 1991 Iraqi uprisings, three years after Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign devastated rural Kurdistan. The Gulf War and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from much of the area created space for Kurdish self-government. Elections in 1992 established regional institutions under a power-sharing arrangement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Their rivalry later produced separate administrations and armed forces. Kurdish self-determination remains a central political aim, although KRG leaders have also governed within Iraq’s federal system.

Kurdish participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq strengthened the KRG’s position after Saddam’s fall. The subsequent constitutional settlement gave the region a recognized place within Iraq while leaving major questions over territory, revenue and federal authority unresolved. Religious minorities gained senior KRG positions; the government also funds mosques and imams and makes funding available to Christian religious establishments.

History

The Islamic State’s seizure of Mosul in June 2014 transformed the KRG’s security environment. As Iraqi army units collapsed and the organization captured sophisticated weapons, Peshmerga forces defended the region’s borders and supported operations against the Islamic State, including the Iraqi advance near Makhmour. The KRG sheltered large numbers of displaced Muslims, Christians, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmens, Arabs and Yazidis. In January 2015, it authorized Sinjar massacre survivor Khatoon Khider to establish an all-female Yazidi Peshmerga battalion. Coalition training for Peshmerga forces also began that month.

On June 30, 2014, President Masoud Barzani announced his intention to seek an independence referendum. The September 2017 referendum, which included Kirkuk, produced an overwhelming vote for independence among participants. The result expressed clear support for self-determination but did not establish an independent state. KRG leaders had pressed ahead without securing international backing and underestimated Baghdad’s response and divisions within Kurdish politics. In October, Iraqi forces and Iranian regime-backed militias advanced into territory previously held by Kurdish forces. Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani helped arrange an agreement between PUK leaders and Baghdad before the Peshmerga withdrew from Kirkuk. Losing the city and nearby oil resources sharply weakened the KRG’s finances and its path toward independence.

Structure and leadership

The KDP and PUK dominate regional politics. Masoud Barzani led the KRG through its formative decades and the referendum. After he resigned the presidency in November 2017, then Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani became its chief executive. Nechirvan later became Kurdistan Region president, while Masrour Barzani became prime minister. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani is a senior PUK figure. A 2017 law redistributed presidential powers among the prime minister, cabinet, parliamentary leadership and judiciary. Disputes over presidential authority and proposals for a parliamentary system exposed persistent divisions between the KDP and reform opponents.

Formal ministries have not meant unified command. Both the KDP and PUK maintained separately controlled Peshmerga, police, Asayish and intelligence forces, including units nominally placed under regional ministries or the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The KRG announced completion of a Peshmerga unification process in September 2026, with support from the United States and the anti-Islamic State coalition. Its new commands inherited leaders from the former KDP-linked Force 80 and PUK-linked Force 70; the announcement alone did not establish how fully party control had ended.

Funding and sponsors

The KRG relies on public revenue, principally its share of Iraq’s budget and income from oil. After a federal hydrocarbon bill stalled in 2007, it passed its own oil law, signed production-sharing contracts and built a pipeline connection to the Iraq–Turkey Pipeline. Direct exports gave it revenue when Baghdad withheld budget transfers, but competing claims over export authority generated a long dispute. Iraq’s Supreme Court declared the regional oil and gas law unconstitutional in February 2022. An arbitration award concerning exports through Turkey preceded a pipeline shutdown that removed a major source of KRG income. A United States-facilitated agreement among Baghdad, Erbil and international oil companies later enabled reopening after more than two years.

Recurring budget cuts and uncertainty over payments have disrupted public salaries and deterred investment. The region has substantial gas potential, but development faces technically demanding sour gas, limited cooperation with international oil companies and no settled benchmark gas price. Reliable agreements with Baghdad matter for projects including the Khor Mor gas field. Fuel shortages have also left some power-station turbines idle despite installed generation capacity.

Attacks and operations

The KRG’s principal military role has been defending the region and fighting the Islamic State. It has also coordinated with Iraq’s army, including an 8,000-fighter joint force intended to protect areas between Sulaymaniyah and Diyala. The KRG sought to keep the Popular Mobilization Forces away from its borders. Its relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is distinct: the PKK is a United States-designated terrorist organization whose forces remained in Sinjar after the Islamic State’s defeat despite KRG demands that they withdraw.

The Iranian regime has struck Iranian Kurdish armed opposition targets in northern Iraq and pressed the KRG to close opposition bases. Those strikes increased tensions in 2022 even as KRG officials maintained trade talks with Iranian representatives. The KRG stated in February 2026 that it would not permit parties to use its territory against neighboring states. During regional attacks in 2026, drones threatened energy facilities including Khor Mor, and one struck near Nechirvan Barzani’s residence in Duhok. The KRG sought radar and counter-drone systems from Baghdad to protect its territory and infrastructure.

Designations and international status

The KRG is a recognized regional authority within Iraq, not a designated armed organization. Its leaders maintain foreign relations while the region remains subject to Iraq’s constitutional framework. The United States has worked with the KRG on security and hosted Masoud Barzani and KRG representatives at the White House in 2015. Relations with neighboring states have combined trade and diplomacy with disputes over independence, borders and armed groups. Baghdad, Iran and Turkey opposed the 2017 independence referendum.

Current status

The KRG continues to administer the Kurdistan Region while negotiating with Baghdad over budgets, oil and gas, security powers and territory. Its defense against the Islamic State and shelter for displaced communities are major parts of its record. So are restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Security forces blocked news coverage of salary protests in 2018; authorities detained protesters, activists and journalists in Duhok and Zakho in 2020 and closed two Nalia Radio and Television offices over protest coverage. Asayish officers arrested teacher and activist Badal Abdulbaqi Abu Bakr without a warrant in 2020, while journalists Omed Baroshki and Islam Kashani were arrested in 2023 after public criticism. During a February 2024 visit to Halabja, the prime minister’s security team barred nine media outlets while admitting two KDP-affiliated outlets.

Human Rights Watch documented the continued prevention of thousands of displaced Arab families from returning to homes in Duhok. Scrutiny has also focused on detention practices and the treatment of children. The KRG took some human-rights steps in 2024, but restrictions on fundamental freedoms remained at levels similar to 2023. Accountability for abuses by government and party-controlled Asayish, Peshmerga and police forces remained inconsistent. Effective governance therefore depends both on durable agreements with Baghdad and on bringing regional security institutions under accountable public control.