Kurdistan

Overview

Kurdistan is the historic homeland of the Kurds, spanning parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. It is a geographic and national term, not the name of a single sovereign state or government. About 30 million Kurds lived across the Middle East in 2019, making them one of the world’s largest peoples without a state. Communities, political parties, and armed organizations differ across the four countries; no one organization represents all Kurds. Turkish Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan, and Syrian Kurdistan name parts of the wider homeland, while the Kurdistan Region denotes an autonomous federal region in northern Iraq.

The Kurdish national question took its modern form after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres held out a path to Kurdish statehood, but its replacement by the Treaty of Lausanne ended that prospect under the postwar settlement. Subsequent Kurdish movements sought recognition, autonomy, or independence in different political settings. Iraqi Kurdistan gained substantial self-government after the 1991 uprising, survived attacks by the Islamic State in 2014, and voted overwhelmingly for independence in 2017. That vote supplied a mandate to seek statehood but did not establish it: Baghdad’s military response, economic pressure from neighboring states, and the loss of territory and oil resources sharply weakened the effort.

Geography

Kurdistan’s mountains, valleys, and cities cross modern international borders, so its historic extent cannot be equated with the jurisdiction of any one administration. The autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Region comprises Erbil, Duhok, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah governorates. Erbil, called Hawler in Kurdish, is its capital. Sulaymaniyah is another major political center, and Zakho lies within Iraqi Kurdistan near the Turkish border. Kurdish populations also live in cities and districts outside the autonomous region, including areas whose administration and oil resources have been contested between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad.

Geography has shaped both Kurdish survival and regional conflict. Mountain districts afforded refuge during periods of persecution, while borderlands enabled movement among Kurdish communities divided by states. Kirkuk became particularly important because of its population and oil. Saddam Hussein’s regime moved Arab populations into Kirkuk and other localities to dilute their Kurdish character. Later disputes over control of the city and its resources became central to the confrontation between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraq’s federal authorities. The region’s position beside Iran also gives it strategic importance: Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have long operated from Iraqi Kurdistan, drawing threats and attacks from the Iranian regime.

History

Kurdistan’s history predates modern nationalism. In the first century, the rulers of Adiabene, a kingdom in the region, developed a notable connection to Judaism when King Monobaz, his mother Helena, and other inhabitants converted. In the medieval period, the Kurdish ruler Saladin spent more than a decade fighting rival Muslim rulers and consolidating power across Egypt and Syria. In 1187 he defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin, a major battle in the history of the Land of Israel. His empire fragmented after his death. Saladin’s career illustrates Kurdish participation in the wider history of the Middle East without making his short-lived empire a predecessor of a modern Kurdish state.

Ottoman expansion transformed Kurdistan’s political order in the sixteenth century. Kurdish diplomat Idris Betlis persuaded 25 Kurdish princes to transfer allegiance from the Safavids to Istanbul. Kurdish nobles’ support helped Sultan Selim I conquer Mosul in 1517, beginning roughly four centuries of Ottoman control. During those campaigns, the princes of Soran and Cizre seized Kirkuk and Mosul in the Ottomans’ name. Ottoman authority depended in part on arrangements with Kurdish nobles rather than uniform direct rule, allowing local centers of power to endure.

After World War I, Kurdish lands were divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres envisaged a possible Kurdish state, but the Treaty of Lausanne replaced that settlement without creating one. Many Kurds have regarded postwar decisions associated with the Sykes–Picot Agreement as a barrier to independence. After 1925, oil from the Kurdish north of the Mandate of Mesopotamia was assigned to a unified Arab Iraq rather than Kurdistan. The denial of statehood intensified a struggle for national recognition that continued under the four successor states.

A short-lived Kurdish state centered on Mahabad emerged in Iranian Kurdistan in 1946. Its collapse left Kurdish self-determination unresolved. In Iraq, repression culminated in the Anfal campaign, Saddam Hussein’s genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kurdish communities. Iraqi forces destroyed much of rural Kurdistan and used chemical weapons. Their 1988 attack on Halabja killed about 5,000 Kurds and left many survivors with lasting injuries. Some fled into mountain caves. A flight ban subsequently restricted international aid and made travel abroad for medical treatment difficult. Anfal was a sustained effort to destroy communities, not a conventional military operation.

The 1991 Iraqi uprisings created conditions for Kurdish self-government in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan, still devastated by Anfal, became the northern front of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the economic expansion from 2004 to 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government rebuilt rural areas; it reported restoring 65 percent of the countryside destroyed during Anfal. Reconstruction, elected institutions, and security forces gave Iraqi Kurdistan greater autonomy than Kurdish areas elsewhere, although independence remained unachieved.

Jewish history

The history of the Jews in Kurdistan extends from antiquity to the present Kurdish diaspora. The conversion of Adiabene’s royal family in the first century is among its earliest recorded episodes. Around 1170, the Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela encountered more than 100 Jewish communities in Kurdistan. Amadiya became an important center of Jewish learning: from the sixteenth century onward, its rabbis exercised influence across Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Jewish life also developed in market towns and villages whose languages and customs reflected their surroundings.

Before the establishment of Israel, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Jews lived in Kurdistan. Before the great exodus of 1950–51, Jewish communities numbered 146 in Iraqi Kurdistan, 19 in Iranian Kurdistan, 11 in Turkey, and 11 in the Syrian section and other places. These figures describe settlements rather than a precise population count. The 1950–51 migration carried most Jews of Iraqi Kurdistan to Israel as part of the wider Jewish exodus from the Muslim world. By the time Iraqi Kurdistan established a Jewish affairs office in 2015, nearly 300,000 Jews of Kurdish origin lived predominantly in Israel.

Jewish heritage remained part of the region’s public life after the migration. In May 2015, Kurdistan’s parliament created government departments for seven religious minorities, including Jews and Yazidis. Later that year, the Kurdistan Regional Government appointed Sherzad Omer Mamsani as Jewish Affairs Representative to serve local Jews and strengthen ties with Israel and Jewish communities worldwide. These measures connected preservation of Kurdistan’s Jewish past with contemporary relationships among Kurds and Jews.

Government and politics

The Kurdistan Region’s institutions grew from the autonomy secured after the 1991 uprising. Elections following that turning point showed the strength of two secular nationalist parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party received 46 percent of votes and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 45 percent, while the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan received 6 percent. The KDP has historically governed Erbil and Duhok, and the PUK has generally led Sulaymaniyah. Their rivalry, cooperation, and control of separate security institutions have shaped the regional government. The 111-seat parliament reserved 11 seats for Turkmen, Christian, and Armenian minorities.

Nearly 80 percent of eligible voters participated in the July 25 regional parliamentary and presidential elections. The KDP–PUK Kurdistani List retained a majority but fell from its previous 89 seats to roughly 60; Nawshirwan Mustafa’s opposition Change List, known as Gorran, won an estimated 25 to 27 seats. The result demonstrated meaningful electoral competition while exposing dissatisfaction with entrenched party leadership. In 2014, the KDP selected Gorran rather than the PUK as its principal coalition partner, but conflict over presidential power soon strained that arrangement.

As President Masoud Barzani’s term approached its end in June 2015, Gorran proposed amendments to the Presidency Law and a parliamentary method of electing the president. The law remained unchanged, and a governmental body extended Barzani’s term over Gorran’s objections. In October, protesters attacked KDP offices in Sulaymaniyah province; at least five KDP supporters and protesters died. The KDP then barred Gorran’s parliamentary speaker and five ministers from Erbil, ending Gorran’s participation in regional government institutions. On May 17, the PUK and Gorran agreed on a joint political platform, ending nearly seven years of hostility and proposing presidential election by parliament. Elections gave regional institutions legitimacy, but the dispute showed the need to settle powers and share authority.

About two million people voted in the 2024 Kurdistan regional election. The KDP received about 800,000 votes, roughly twice the PUK’s 400,000; the New Generation Movement won nearly 300,000. Electoral participation coexists with concentrated party control: the KDP and PUK have maintained separate Peshmerga units, police, internal security forces, and intelligence services. These divisions complicate accountability and command even as the region remains an important center of Kurdish self-government.

Barzani announced on June 30, 2014, that he would seek an independence vote. In the September 25, 2017 referendum, about 93 percent of voters backed independence. Baghdad opposed the vote. Within weeks, Iraqi forces and Iranian regime-backed militias attacked Kurdish forces and seized nearly half the territory and oil resources previously under regional government control. Iraq, Turkey, and the Iranian regime also imposed economic sanctions. The vote expressed strong support for self-determination but did not secure statehood; territorial losses, diminished oil revenue, and internal Kurdish divisions dealt the effort an immediate setback.

Military and security

The Peshmerga have defended Iraqi Kurdistan against successive threats. In 2014, they fought the Islamic State as it advanced through northern Iraq and attacked vulnerable communities. Islamic State jihadists perpetrated the Sinjar massacre against Yazidis. People rescued from Mount Sinjar crossed through Syria to reach shelter in Kurdistan. Kurdish forces’ defense of the region and aid to Yazidis were major parts of the campaign against the Islamic State, although Kurdish jihadists also joined Islamic State operations. The latter represented specific armed networks, not Kurdish society as a whole.

Jihadist organizations had operated near Iraqi Kurdistan before 2014. After September 11, 2001, Jund al-Islam established itself on Shinirwe Mountain near Halabja and declared its intention to wage jihad in Kurdistan. On September 23, its fighters killed and mutilated 43 members of the secular PUK. Ansar al-Islam emerged that year with a program to establish an Islamic emirate. The Islamic Movement in Kurdistan had connected Kurdish jihadists with Arab global jihadist networks in the late 1990s; Al-Qaeda established its Kurdistan Battalions in 2006, recruiting Iraqi Kurdish and Iranian Sunni jihadists. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi maintained close links with Ansar al-Islam elements. These groups’ programs differed fundamentally from the region’s elected governing parties.

Security pressures also cross Kurdistan’s borders. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, founded by Abdullah Öcalan, is one armed movement with its own program and history; it does not speak for every Kurdish community or party. In Syrian Kurdistan, talks between Ahmed al-Sharaa and a Syrian Democratic Forces delegation left unresolved the force’s integration into Syria’s security institutions and the scope of Kurdish autonomy. Al-Sharaa opposed a federal system and favored centralized rule. Turkish officials, meanwhile, had sought assurances that the war against Saddam Hussein would leave Iraq intact rather than create an independent Kurdish state.

Iraqi Kurdistan’s border with Iran has become a recurring flashpoint. Kurds who fled Iran over decades established opposition organizations on the Iraqi side. Five groups—the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, PJAK, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, Khabat, and one Komala branch—formed a coalition against the Iranian regime on February 22, 2026. Four days later, Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah warned Iraqi Kurdistan against cooperation with foreign forces it deemed hostile. The Kurdistan Regional Government said it would not permit parties to use its territory against neighboring states, but the Iranian regime continued to threaten and strike opposition groups there.

After Israeli and American strikes on the Iranian regime began on February 28, 2026, Iraqi Kurdistan sustained an estimated 196 drone and missile attacks. On March 6, an Iranian regime defense official threatened much broader attacks if Iranian Kurdish opposition groups continued their activities. Strikes on Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces on March 7–8 killed two people and wounded others. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck three Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan during March. The attacks demonstrated how the region’s autonomous institutions, Iranian opposition presence, and links with the United States and Israel intersect in a wider security confrontation.

Relations with Israel

Kurdistan’s relationship with Israel rests on distinct Kurdish national interests and longstanding human ties. Jews of Kurdish origin, most living in Israel, preserve family and cultural links with Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan’s Jewish affairs office was established to serve local Jews and strengthen connections with Israel and Jews worldwide. Israeli humanitarian organization IsraAID also delivered assistance to Yazidis and other refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan with support from the American Jewish Committee.

For Kurdish leaders, a prospective relationship with Israel has offered a possible strategic partnership while their region faces pressure from Turkey, Iran, and Baghdad. Barzani’s independence initiative began as a Kurdish political project in 2014; support for the existing State of Israel did not diminish Kurdish agency or determine the 2017 referendum. An independent Kurdistan would have a strong interest in an enduring relationship with Israel while navigating its neighbors’ demands. The Iranian regime’s attacks on Kurdish opposition groups and Iraqi Kurdistan in 2026 further underscored the region’s strategic importance to Israel, although Kurdish authorities continued to state that their territory could not be used to attack neighboring states.

Economy

Oil, reconstruction, and relations with Baghdad have shaped the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan. The assignment of oil from the Kurdish north to unified Iraq after 1925 made control of resources an enduring political question. Following 1991, relative stability enabled rebuilding; during the 2004–2014 expansion, the regional government restored much of the countryside destroyed in Anfal. New roads and functioning airports strengthened links within the region and beyond it. Yet economic gains remained vulnerable to disputes over federal budget transfers, oil sales, and control of Kirkuk and other producing areas.

The 2017 referendum exposed that vulnerability. Iraqi forces’ advance removed territory and oil resources previously controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government, while sanctions from neighboring states increased pressure. A later dispute over exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline combined Baghdad’s contractual authority over crude movement with the regional government’s dependence on oil income after federal transfers were withheld. A 2023 arbitration ruling was followed by Turkey’s halt of exports, stopping hundreds of thousands of barrels per day and removing almost all regional government income from that route. Restoring predictable revenue required a negotiated export process between Baghdad, the regional government, and Turkey.

Society and religion

Kurdistan is home to diverse Kurdish communities and religious minorities. Most Kurds are Muslim, while Yazidis, Christians, Jews, and other communities form part of the region’s history. The presence of these groups does not erase differences among Kurdish political movements: secular nationalist parties dominated Iraqi Kurdish elections after 1991, whereas Islamist parties and jihadist organizations pursued separate programs. Minority representation in Kurdistan’s parliament and the creation of religious-minority departments in 2015 marked institutional recognition, but meaningful protection also depends on security and access in daily life.

The Islamic State’s 2014 campaign placed Yazidis and other vulnerable people in immediate danger, making shelter and defense central tests of Kurdish institutions. Kurdistan’s elections and its protection of refugees are significant achievements in a region marked by war and authoritarian rule. Party-controlled security forces and reported minority complaints, including restrictions at checkpoints, remain matters of public accountability. Across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, Kurdish communities continue to pursue differing political futures. Their shared homeland and history of denied statehood do not require a single party, armed movement, or governing model.