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Leviathan gas field

Leviathan is a major Israeli natural gas field in the eastern Mediterranean. Discovered in 2010 and brought into production on the last day of 2019, it supplies Israel and supports gas exports to Jordan and Egypt.

עודכן לאחרונה: 15 בנובמבר 20264 דקות קריאהמקורות · 16

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Overview

Leviathan is an Israeli offshore natural gas field in the eastern Mediterranean, within Israel’s exclusive economic zone and beyond its territorial waters. Discovered in 2010, one year after the nearby Tamar gas field, it was among the region’s largest gas finds and was described at the time as the largest natural gas discovery in two decades. An estimate placed its reservoir at about 600 billion cubic meters of gas; a 2012 partnership announcement estimated recoverable gas at 17 trillion cubic feet. Its scale made Leviathan central to Israel’s plans for domestic energy security and regional exports, although developing and transporting the gas required substantial investment.

Leviathan began producing gas on December 31, 2019. Tamar had entered production in 2013 and was already supplying much of the gas used to generate Israel’s electricity. That earlier domestic role left Leviathan positioned to serve both Israeli consumers and export customers. Contracts were arranged to send Leviathan gas to Jordan and Egypt. Bringing the field into production cost approximately $3.75 billion, illustrating the difference between a large discovery and a commercially operating supply system.

Geography

Leviathan’s undersea deposits lie about 80 miles off Israel’s coast, west of Tamar. Gas travels from the reservoir to a processing platform built approximately six miles offshore, then reaches the mainland at Dor and enters Israel’s national gas grid. The platform was placed closer to shore partly for security reasons. Unlike Tamar’s more distant platform, it is visible from beaches and towns around Mount Carmel. Its proximity to populated areas made pipeline flushing and fears about emissions part of domestic opposition to development.

The field lies in a part of the eastern Mediterranean where offshore resources and maritime boundaries became closely linked. Israel and Cyprus signed an exclusive economic zone delimitation agreement in December 2010, after Leviathan’s discovery underscored the area’s gas potential. Cyprus announced commercially significant gas in its nearby Block 12 in 2011. Lebanon submitted exclusive economic zone coordinates in 2010 and amended them in 2011, creating a separate maritime boundary issue near Israel’s offshore gas development. Leviathan remains within Israel’s exclusive economic zone, where Israel has the right to develop its natural gas resources.

Modern history

Leviathan’s size did not produce an immediate development decision. Israeli domestic politics, regulatory disputes and legal challenges delayed progress for years. The government’s proposed gas framework addressed Tamar’s production as well as development of Leviathan and other fields. Gas sale contracts associated with Tamar helped finance development plans for Leviathan and the smaller Tanin and Karish gas field. After an 18-month delay, Israel’s government reached a development agreement with a consortium led by Houston-based Noble Energy. Environmental concerns, including opposition surrounding pipeline flushing, remained part of the public debate as production approached.

Potential foreign investment also depended on export policy. In December 2012, Australia’s Woodside and Leviathan’s partners announced an agreement in principle under which Woodside would acquire a 30 percent interest. The proposed payment schedule was tied to Israeli legislation permitting natural gas exports. The arrangement showed how decisions about domestic supply, export rights and investment shaped the pace of development. Leviathan’s first development phase ultimately began without exports to Turkey, while a second stage faced delays as its expected profitability remained uncertain.

Export routes presented additional commercial and political obstacles. One proposal called for Leviathan gas to be sent to Egypt, converted into liquefied natural gas and shipped by tanker. Existing Egyptian liquefaction facilities offered access to distant markets, but weak liquefied natural gas profit margins limited the appeal of that route. A seabed pipeline carrying Israeli and Cypriot gas toward Europe faced high construction costs and maritime complications. Turkey objected to aspects of eastern Mediterranean gas development, and its November maritime boundary agreement with Libya complicated the proposed European route. Unresolved political differences over Cyprus also complicated plans to export Leviathan gas to Turkey. These obstacles affected proposed export corridors; they did not alter Israel’s rights to develop Leviathan.

Security

Leviathan’s offshore wells, processing platform and coastal connections form part of Israel’s critical energy infrastructure. The Iranian regime’s precision-guided missiles posed a major security concern for offshore facilities. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supplied with sophisticated missiles by the Iranian regime, also threatened Israeli energy targets. During an earlier clash involving Gaza, a rocket struck an area just north of Leviathan’s landfall. The platform’s location and the concentration of gas infrastructure along the coast made defense of production and transmission facilities a continuing concern.

The October 2023 shutdown of Tamar demonstrated the value of having more than one producing field. Leviathan supplied most of Israel’s domestic gas demand during that shutdown, reducing the disruption to consumers. Energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt mostly continued after the October 7 attacks, despite threats from the Iranian regime and its proxies against Israeli gas facilities. Redundant infrastructure strengthened Israel’s ability to maintain supply while protecting offshore assets remained essential.

Present day

Leviathan’s importance to Egypt grew as Egyptian gas production declined sharply in 2024. An energy crisis that summer brought frequent power outages and increased demand for imported Israeli gas. Energy cooperation accounted for approximately 86 percent of Israel–Egypt trade during the period examined after October 7, 2023. Jordan remained another market for Leviathan’s exports, while Israel continued to draw on both Leviathan and Tamar for its own needs.

On December 17, 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced an Israeli gas deal with Egypt valued at approximately $35 billion. Leviathan’s majority owners, NewMed Energy and Chevron, had reached an agreement to expand a preexisting 2019 export arrangement. The expansion included plans for a new transmission pipeline through the Israeli town of Nitzana. Together, the existing export contracts and proposed expansion increased Leviathan’s role in regional energy trade. Its commercial returns nevertheless depend on development costs, gas prices, export infrastructure and the security of the routes carrying gas to customers.

מקורות

  1. 1The Obstacles Still Facing Israel’s Leviathan Gas Fieldwashingtoninstitute.org
  2. 2Israel's Leviathan Gas Field: Politics and Realitywashingtoninstitute.org
  3. 3Israel Science & Technology: Oil & Natural Gasjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  4. 4Will Israel Sell its Natural Gas to China?inss.org.il
  5. 5Light in the Darkness: How Can Israel-Egypt Energy Relations Be Strengthened?inss.org.il
  6. 6The European Green Deal: Challenges and Opportunities for Israelinss.org.il
  7. 7CIA: Israel Facts and Figuresjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  8. 8Spotlight on Iran (May 1-8, 2024) - The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Instituteterrorism-info.org.il
  9. 9Turkey's Threat to Israel's New Gas Richeswashingtoninstitute.org
  10. 10Between Maritime Law and Politics in the East Mediterraneanwashingtoninstitute.org
  11. 11Israel and Egypt Sign Record $35 Billion Gas Dealfdd.org
  12. 12Israel Plans to Hike Gas Output Despite Hezbollah Threatswashingtoninstitute.org
  13. 13Political Feasibility of Israeli Natural Gas Exports to Turkeyinss.org.il
  14. 14The Gas Framework: Regional and International Aspectsinss.org.il
  15. 15Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean: Will Economic Wisdom Prevail?inss.org.il
  16. 16Securing or Insecuring Israel? Assessing the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreementwashingtoninstitute.org

נושאים שמחוץ למזרח התיכון מפנים ל-Encyclopaedia Britannica.