Kurdistan Region

Overview

The Kurdistan Region is Iraq’s autonomous northern region. It comprises the governorates of Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. Erbil is its capital. The region forms part of wider Kurdistan, the historic homeland of the Kurds, which extends beyond Iraq into neighboring countries. The Kurdistan Region is a defined political entity within Iraq; wider Kurdistan is a geographic and cultural region without a single government. Its elected parliament and Kurdistan Regional Government exercise substantial authority over regional affairs, while the division of powers with Iraq’s federal government remains a recurring source of conflict.

The region’s autonomy grew from Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein’s rule and the collapse of his authority in northern Iraq after the 1991 Iraqi uprisings. It later gained standing under Iraq’s 2005 constitution. Regional forces resisted the Islamic State, and the region sheltered people escaping its 2014 offensive. Its relative stability has also drawn millions of Arabs from elsewhere in Iraq for business, tourism and refuge. These achievements coexist with deep rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, whose separate security forces complicate efforts to build unified institutions.

Geography

The Kurdistan Region stretches across Iraq’s mountainous north. Erbil and Duhok have historically formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s principal strongholds, while Sulaymaniyah has generally been led by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Halabja, near the Iranian border, is closely associated with Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack on the town. Other important places include Akre and Zakho in the north, and the Qandil Mountains along the frontier. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party has established its own governing system in hundreds of villages within its Qandil-controlled area, adding another armed authority to a complex border landscape.

The boundaries separating regional from federal authority have long been a central Iraqi issue. Kirkuk lies outside the region’s four-governorate core, but its oil resources, mixed communities and position on the most direct highway between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah have made control of the city especially consequential. The Iraqi constitution provided for a process to determine Kirkuk’s status, yet a referendum scheduled for December 2007 did not take place. Poorly defined boundaries elsewhere have also confused the jurisdiction of security forces and courts. The Islamic State exploited gaps in these areas, using Kirkuk as an entry point for car bombers and attack cells seeking to penetrate the region.

The region is inhabited by Kurds and communities including Yazidis, Arabs, Iraqi Turkmens, Christians and Mandaeans. Turkmens include Sunni and Shia communities with differing political affiliations. Their representation extends beyond the Turkey-backed Iraqi Turkmen Front, whose post-2003 political focus narrowed toward Sunni Turkmens in Kirkuk. The Nineveh Plains, beside the region, are home to major Christian communities. Kurdish security forces exercised effective control over Christian areas there before the Islamic State’s 2014 offensive; after liberation, Iraqi government forces, Kurdish forces and local Christian and Shabak militias divided control.

Jewish history

Jewish communities lived in Kurdistan for centuries, forming part of the broader history of the Jews in Kurdistan. Many Jews from Iraqi Kurdistan moved to Israel in the twentieth century. A later Israeli connection was humanitarian: after the Islamic State’s 2014 onslaught, the Israeli relief organization IsraAID assisted Yazidi, Christian and other persecuted religious refugees in the Kurdistan Region. An American Jewish Committee grant in September 2014 supported aid to Christian and Yazidi families, while further assistance helped provide blankets, mattresses and clothing ahead of winter.

Modern history

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqi campaigns against Kurds brought mass killing, displacement and destruction. The Anfal campaign of the late 1980s and the Halabja massacre, in which Iraqi forces used chemical weapons, are essential to the history of Kurdish self-rule. Campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s also destroyed Christian villages in Duhok province and displaced many residents to Baghdad. Regional authorities later supervised the rebuilding of some villages and provided stipends to some returnees. For Halabja’s survivors, financial hardship persisted; Baghdad’s withholding of regional budget transfers from 2014 worsened conditions for people living with the effects of the chemical attack.

Following the 1991 uprisings, Saddam Hussein’s government lost effective authority over much of northern Iraq. Kurdish authorities filled the vacuum and expanded their control beyond the Zakho-centered safe haven. Local Kurdish authorities and the United Nations administered northern Iraq’s share of oil-sale proceeds, while Saddam controlled proceeds elsewhere in Iraq. Political parties published newspapers and operated television stations. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan consolidated autonomy during Baghdad’s twelve-year absence from the area, although their competition also divided Kurdish administration and armed forces. Iraq’s 2005 constitution recognized the Kurdistan Region and its institutions within the federal state.

Masoud Barzani, the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader, played a leading role in building regional autonomy. During disputes with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, his leadership pressed for implementation of Iraq’s constitution and a balance of power among state institutions. At the same time, the powers of the regional presidency became a focus of domestic opposition. Gorran, also known as the Change List, emerged as a major electoral force and sought a parliamentary system and changes to the 2005 Presidency Law. Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party opposed those reforms. The contest showed that the region’s constitutional dispute with Baghdad did not settle questions of accountability within its own government.

On June 30, 2014, Barzani announced that he would seek a referendum on Kurdish independence. The 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum sharpened conflict with Baghdad. Iraqi government forces subsequently regained control of Kirkuk, a major economic and strategic loss for the region. Iran’s Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani helped broker an arrangement involving Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leaders and the Iraqi government for the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces from the city. The outcome exposed divisions between the two principal Kurdish parties and reduced the region’s ability to pursue independence. Despite his close relationship with Barzani, Joe Biden did not support Barzani’s independence campaign.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan continued to dominate regional politics after the referendum. Their joint Kurdistani List retained a parliamentary majority despite electoral losses, while opposition movements challenged party control. Regional elections in 2024 drew around two million voters; the Kurdistan Democratic Party received about 800,000 votes, and overall turnout was about 72 percent, with lower participation in Sulaymaniyah. A Federal Court ruling against eleven reserved parliamentary seats weakened the Kurdistan Democratic Party because its allies had historically filled them. Following Barzani’s petition over the election, Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council required five seats to be allocated to minorities. Elections provide meaningful political competition, but party control over security and administration remains a substantial constraint on institutional accountability.

Security

The Peshmerga resisted the Islamic State’s 2014 offensive and helped defend the Kurdistan Region. Their operations took place across a landscape in which federal and regional authority overlapped and jihadist cells exploited weak coordination. United States support for the Peshmerga was formalized in a 2016 agreement between the Department of Defense and the regional Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. A 2022 renewal supported operations against the Islamic State as part of Iraq’s security forces and reforms within the ministry. In 2026, a proposed end to direct American military support raised concern in the region as United States forces prepared to withdraw from Iraq.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan each maintain separate armed, police, Asayish and intelligence structures. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan directly controls Peshmerga and police units as well as its own internal security and intelligence services. The Kurdistan Democratic Party likewise maintains an intelligence service nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council. Both parties have exercised extensive influence over bureaucracy, education and security. Their longstanding disputes concern political power, economic resources and command of forces. Nominal regional oversight has not removed party control, making security reform a central issue for the government and its American partners.

The Islamic State’s assault forced many Yazidis and Christians to seek refuge in the Kurdistan Region. In 2019, Iraq’s largest remaining Christian population, including Syriac Orthodox Christians, lived in the Nineveh Plains and the region. Protection has been significant, yet minority communities have also reported abuses and exclusion. Yazidi political representatives described religiously based restrictions at Peshmerga-controlled checkpoints during travel from Baghdad to their communities. Yazidis in displacement camps faced severe conditions and inadequate aid. In 2022, Chaldean Patriarch Cardinal Louis Raphael Sako identified Hazar Jot in Akre district among places where political parties had confiscated Christian property. Such complaints require scrutiny alongside the region’s role as a refuge.

Armed groups linked to neighboring conflicts have also operated in or targeted the region. In May 2022, regional security officials accused four Yazidi suspects of smuggling rockets intended for a political office, dams and electricity facilities. The case arose amid attacks claimed under the name Ahrar Sinjar against Turkish positions. Turkey has built permanent military bases and posts in the region through successive campaigns beginning in 2018, while maintaining major economic ties with its authorities. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s presence in northern Iraq makes the region part of a wider conflict spanning Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

Pressure from Iran and Iran-backed Iraqi militias has grown. Iranian Kurdish parties established themselves in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan during the 1980s after losing their struggle against the Islamic Republic following the 1979 revolution. The Iranian regime has treated their presence and border security as priorities in its dealings with regional leaders. Its strikes on Iranian Kurdish armed opposition targets in northern Iraq intensified tensions in 2022. Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have repeatedly attacked United States forces and the Kurdistan Region. On February 26, 2026, Kata’ib Hezbollah warned the region against cooperation with hostile foreign forces while Iranian Kurdish groups were based there.

Energy facilities became prominent targets in 2025. Drone attacks struck the Khurmala oil field near Erbil on July 14 and the Sarsang field in Duhok province on July 15. On July 16, two explosive-laden drones targeted a DNO oil field at Peshkhabur in the Zakho Independent Administration, completing three consecutive days of attacks on regional energy infrastructure. The Kurdistan Regional Government blamed Iran-backed militias within the Popular Mobilization Forces for the wave of attacks. United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio pressed Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani to hold those responsible accountable. On August 9, 2026, Barzani reported more than 1,000 attacks on the region by Iran and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq since February. Iranian regime strikes on the night of September 1–2 included a camp near Erbil housing families of Iranian Kurdish dissidents.

Present day

Oil and gas are central to the region’s finances and its relationship with Baghdad. In early 2014, Turkey began allowing regional crude exports through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline without authorization from Iraq’s federal Oil Ministry. Iraq challenged Turkey’s transport, storage and loading of that crude at Ceyhan through arbitration. After a March 2023 ruling, Turkey halted pipeline operations and loading pending Iraq’s permission. The shutdown stopped nearly 500,000 barrels per day of exports, including about 420,000 marketed by the region and 80,000 by Iraq. It removed almost all regional government income, deterred investment and sharply reduced northern-field production. The dispute joined federal contractual authority to the region’s need for revenue after budget transfers had been withheld. Under the reopened export process, Iraq’s federal oil organization exclusively markets the northern crude carried through the pipeline.

Gas development offers another potential source of revenue and electricity, but faces limited cooperation with international oil companies, technically demanding sour gas and the absence of a benchmark gas price. One assessment identified potential annual production of 40 billion cubic meters by 2035, compared with roughly 5 billion at the time of assessment. Meanwhile, fuel shortages have left several regional power-station turbines idle despite installed capacity sufficient to share electricity with the rest of Iraq. Basic services also remain uneven. In poorer Erbil neighborhoods, residents have bought expensive tanker water during summer shortages. Those shortages make household access a pressing priority when authorities consider water-intensive luxury projects such as Erbil Hills, with its artificial lakes and irrigated golf course.

The region’s religious and linguistic diversity is reflected in public institutions. Aramaic-language public schools, overseen by a ministry division staffed by Christians, have operated since the late 1980s; in 2019, the region had 48 Syriac-language schools. The government pays imams’ salaries and funds mosques while making support available to Christian religious establishments. In 2015, it also provided a monthly stipend for Sabean-Mandaean temple maintenance and cultural activities. Christian and Yazidi ministers served in the regional Council of Ministers during the 2010 reporting period. These measures have supported minority life, although complaints over property, checkpoint access and representation show that formal inclusion does not resolve every local dispute.

The Kurdistan Region remains an arena for diplomacy and competition among neighboring states and major powers. Turkey combines trade with a lasting military presence. China’s Communist Party has cultivated ties with both principal governing parties. Iranian officials have sought influence over regional leaders while pressing them to curb Iranian Kurdish groups and prevent Israeli activity. Regional leaders have engaged Tehran over disputes with Baghdad even as the Iranian regime and allied militias have attacked Kurdish targets. The region’s future therefore depends on effective federal arrangements, secure energy exports, protection of its communities and progress toward institutions whose authority extends beyond the parties that built its autonomy.