Israel–Jordan peace treaty

Overview

The Israel–Jordan peace treaty is the agreement signed by Israel and Jordan on October 26, 1994. It ended the state of war between the two countries and, after ratification, established full diplomatic relations. The treaty defined an international boundary, addressed shared water resources and created obligations to prevent violence directed against either country from the other’s territory. Its annexes also set special land-use arrangements in two border areas. The agreement followed decades of discreet contact between Israeli leaders and Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy, and formalized cooperation that served both countries’ security interests. Like the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty, it addressed the aftermath of armed conflict. The later Abraham Accords, including the Bahrain–Israel normalization agreement, centered on establishing new bilateral relationships rather than ending a state of war. ^[3][5][6]

King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made their commitment to peace public in the Washington Declaration of July 1994. They proclaimed an end to the state of war, then agreed on the treaty’s text before its formal signing in the Arava three months later. President Bill Clinton supported the process, including through a promise to relieve Jordan of $700 million in debt to the United States and to seek further relief from American allies. Rabin’s government and Jordan turned a long-running, largely private relationship into a public diplomatic one. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres helped engineer the treaty and subsequently pursued wider relations with Arab countries in North Africa and the Persian Gulf. ^[4][5][6]

The treaty has endured through political crises and periods of cold public relations. Its twentieth anniversary prompted assessments that found little warmth between the societies or their governments in public, yet recognized continuing cooperation on matters vital to both countries. Border security, water management and other practical ties give the agreement significance beyond its ceremonial signing. Jordanian political pressure and hostile official rhetoric have strained public diplomacy, while security cooperation has continued. The distinction between public relations and practical cooperation is central to the treaty’s history: neither limited public warmth nor an unresolved regional dispute ended the bilateral framework created in 1994. ^[1][3]

Background

Contact between the Hashemite monarchy and Jewish leaders preceded Israel’s independence. King Abdullah I held secret talks with Jewish leaders before the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Fifteen years after that war, King Hussein renewed dialogue with Israeli leaders. Their contacts continued despite Jordan’s participation in the June 1967 war against Israel, which Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had pressed Hussein to join. During Jordan’s rule in Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967, Jews were barred from the Western Wall, and Jewish religious sites were desecrated. Israel’s control of the Old City after 1967 brought a different arrangement for access to its holy places. ^[9][10][12]

Israeli and Jordanian interests also converged when the Hashemite government faced armed threats. In 1970, Israel came to Jordan’s defense as Syrian forces entered the country to support armed groups fighting the monarchy. Quiet contacts survived successive regional crises, and Hussein later held secret talks in London with Rabin. Such exchanges gave both leaders a basis for negotiations before public agreement became politically possible. Jordan’s decision to make peace also reflected economic and diplomatic concerns: its leaders hoped American diplomacy would reopen Gulf markets, reduce dependence on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and help modernize Jordan’s military. A proposed Gulf petroleum safety net did not materialize, but American debt relief formed part of the setting in which Hussein made his decision. ^[5][6][7]

The Oslo Accords accelerated the move toward an open Israeli–Jordanian agreement. Within twenty-four hours of the September 13, 1993 Oslo signing, Israel and Jordan initialed a common agenda for peace that had been ready for almost a year. The timing allowed the two countries to disclose progress after Israel and the PLO had begun their own public process; it did not mean their contacts began in 1993. Hussein and Rabin then made peace public through the Washington Declaration in July 1994. The formal treaty, signed in the Arava in October, marked the culmination of their personal diplomacy and decades of earlier exchanges. Hussein, and later King Abdullah II, also attended agreement-signing ceremonies between Israel and the PLO, including the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. ^[3][5][6]

Terms

The treaty committed Israel and Jordan to refrain from acts of belligerency, respect their common boundary and establish normal diplomatic relations. It replaced the 1949 cease-fire lines with an international boundary delimited by reference to the British Mandate boundary. The agreement also required each country to prevent threats of violence against the other from originating on its territory and to cooperate against terrorism. These provisions gave formal standing to shared border-security interests. Jordan admitted travelers from Israel under the treaty and Jordanian law, while subsequent bilateral arrangements addressed trade, science, culture and other areas of cooperation. The treaty thus supplied both a legal settlement of war-related issues and a continuing framework for ordinary relations between neighboring states. ^[1][3][4]

Water provisions addressed shortages on both sides of the border. The water annex allocated Israel 12 million cubic meters from the Yarmouk River during each summer period, with Jordan receiving the remaining flow. Jordan permitted Israel to pump another 20 million cubic meters from the Yarmouk in winter in exchange for a summer transfer from the Jordan River. The parties committed themselves to seeking an additional 50 million cubic meters of drinkable water each year for Jordan. Neither country may artificially change the course of the Jordan or Yarmouk rivers without mutual agreement. These allocations and commitments made water cooperation a practical response to shared scarcity, requiring coordination after the signing ceremony. ^[8]

Annexes 1.B and 1.C established corresponding special arrangements for Naharayim, also called Baqura, in the north and Zofar in the south. Jordan held sovereignty over both areas. The special regime nevertheless preserved Israeli ownership or agricultural cultivation rights, allowing Israeli farmers to continue using land under renewable 25-year arrangements. Naharayim/Baqura covered about 200 acres, while Zofar covered about 500 acres. The provisions distinguished sovereignty from use of land and specified how the arrangements could be renewed or ended. Their later nonrenewal was therefore a treaty-governed change to the special regime, rather than an end to the peace treaty itself. ^[1]

The treaty also recognized Jordan’s monarch’s special role concerning Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount. Israel maintains overall security responsibility there, while the Islamic Waqf manages the site’s daily affairs. Under the status quo, Jews may visit the Temple Mount at designated times but may not pray there. A visit to the site does not mean entry into its mosques. Jordan’s recognized role, Waqf administration and Israeli security responsibility are distinct parts of the arrangement; the treaty gives the monarch a special role without transferring Israel’s security responsibility. ^[9][10][12]

Implementation

Ratification established full diplomatic relations, and the treaty opened paths for trade and cross-border travel. Israel submitted more than 100 proposals for joint projects after peace, including a shared airport at Aqaba and a Red Sea tourism corridor. In the early years, officials discussed expanding Aqaba’s airport so Israeli aircraft could land there and arranging transfers for passengers bound for Eilat. Those plans did not proceed. Construction of another airport near Eilat cost Aqaba business, and the joint airport and other major projects in Israel’s proposal catalog remained unrealized. The proposed Gulf petroleum safety net for Jordan likewise did not emerge. The scale of those unfulfilled plans helps explain why the economic expectations surrounding peace exceeded some of its visible results. ^[3][5][6]

Cross-border economic activity nevertheless produced concrete benefits. When the treaty’s first twenty-five years were reviewed, about 2,000 Jordanians crossed from Aqaba to work in Eilat each morning. Travelers could pass between the countries under the treaty and applicable law, and water arrangements required regular coordination. The difference between daily employment and unrealized infrastructure proposals illustrates the uneven implementation of economic peace: smaller, routine forms of cooperation took hold even where ambitious regional projects did not. Security links also developed away from public view. Israeli–Jordanian military and police equipment deals proceeded with American support, and the two countries maintained regular security cooperation along their border. ^[3][5][7]

The special land-use regime became a prominent political issue under King Abdullah II. One year before the annexes’ automatic renewal, he announced that Jordan would not renew the arrangements for Naharayim/Baqura and Zofar for another 25 years. His decision relied on clause 6 of Annexes 1.B and 1.C, which provided for ending the special regime. Domestic pressure was substantial: 87 of Jordan’s 130 parliament members signed a petition seeking its termination. Economic and demographic pressures and public protests added to the political force of the issue. The decision asserted Jordan’s sovereignty over the areas while ending the particular rights that had allowed Israeli cultivation under the annexes. ^[1]

The annex dispute strained relations but did not halt cooperation along the peaceful border. Israel and Jordan continued full security cooperation, and their armies maintained regular training ties during the disagreement. The episode showed that the treaty could accommodate a sharp disagreement over one set of provisions while its broader security framework remained in operation. Public diplomacy stayed colder than those working relationships suggested. Abdullah also used diplomatic contact with Israeli leaders to press his approach to Jerusalem and a two-state settlement, alongside discussion of water and energy. Such political demands have remained part of the bilateral relationship created by the treaty. ^[1][3]

Significance

The 1994 agreement was Israel’s second peace treaty with a neighboring Arab state, following its 1979 treaty with Egypt. For Jordan, it formalized a relationship that its monarchs had explored privately for decades; for Israel, it established a recognized international boundary and a durable channel for cooperation with its eastern neighbor. The treaty’s security commitments, water allocations, diplomatic recognition and provisions concerning Jerusalem connected major strategic questions to practical obligations. Its endurance has depended less on public enthusiasm than on institutions and shared interests that allow officials to keep working together through crises. ^[1][3][5]

Limited warmth has remained a defining feature of the peace. Major proposed projects around Aqaba were left unfinished, and domestic opposition in Jordan helped bring the Naharayim and Zofar special regime to an end. At the same time, cross-border employment, water coordination and continuing military and border-security cooperation demonstrate lasting practical value. The agreement did not by itself settle every regional conflict or remove hostility toward Israel. It did establish a durable legal and diplomatic basis on which Israel and Jordan could manage their boundary, cooperate on essential services and protect interests shared by both states. ^[1][3][8]