Operation Prosperity Guardian

Overview

Operation Prosperity Guardian is a United States-led multinational maritime security operation formed in response to attacks by the Houthis, a terrorist organization backed by the Iranian regime, on commercial shipping and naval vessels. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the operation on December 18, 2023. The United States launched it the following day to defend freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The operation forms part of the wider Red Sea crisis. It operates under the Combined Maritime Forces, with Combined Task Force 153 leading the mission.

The mission protects ships using a route vital to trade between Asia and Europe. Vessels entering the Red Sea through Bab el-Mandeb can continue north through the Suez Canal. At the time the coalition formed, this route carried approximately 12 percent of global maritime goods trade, including energy, raw materials and consumer products; about 10 percent of the world’s oil passed through Bab el-Mandeb. Houthi attacks therefore threatened far more than shipping connected to Israel. They endangered crews and cargoes from many countries, disrupted supply chains and reduced traffic on a waterway central to Egypt’s economy.

Coalition forces intercepted missiles and drones and protected individual merchant vessels. Those tactical successes did not restore normal commercial traffic. Major shipping companies continued to divert vessels around Africa as the Houthi campaign persisted, adding distance, time and cost to voyages that would otherwise have used the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

Background

The operation followed the October 7 attacks by Hamas, a terrorist organization, and the ensuing Gaza war. As Israel fought Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis escalated missile and drone attacks against Israel and began attacking maritime traffic off Yemen. The Houthis presented their campaign against ships as a response to Israel’s operations in Gaza and declared vessels directly or indirectly linked to Israel to be targets. Most ships damaged in the attacks had no link to Israel. Their actual targets and effects made the campaign a threat to international navigation, regardless of the Houthis’ stated rationale.

The Houthis brought a varied arsenal to the maritime campaign: explosive drones, anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. Their methods also included the threat of helicopter assaults and attempts to seize ships. Before Operation Prosperity Guardian was announced, attacks had already involved international merchant shipping and U.S., British and French warships responding to danger in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Houthi attacks on Israel formed another part of the wider aggression that prompted the maritime response. The Iranian regime’s support supplied the Houthis with weapons and expertise and helped sustain their ability to threaten both naval forces and commercial traffic.

Combined Task Force 153 predated this crisis. Established in April 2022, it was created to improve maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. Its 39 member nations constituted a standing cooperation framework; membership in that task force did not automatically mean participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian. The United States used the existing framework to organize a separate response to the intensified Houthi attacks. Before the coalition’s formation, U.S. special envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking asked Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar to convey warnings to the Houthis. The attacks continued.

By mid-December 2023, several large shipping lines had suspended or reduced passages through the southern Red Sea. Some vessels sailed around the Cape of Good Hope instead of entering Bab el-Mandeb and continuing toward Suez. This diversion affected voyages serving Israel and many other destinations. It also showed why naval defense of the route concerned exporters, importers and seafarers far beyond the immediate conflict between Israel and Hamas.

Course of the war

Austin announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on December 18, 2023, as a multinational initiative under the Combined Maritime Forces and the leadership of Task Force 153. The United States launched the operation on December 19. That day, Austin urged ministers, defense chiefs and other representatives from 43 countries to help restore security in the Red Sea and deter further Houthi attacks. The operation’s declared purpose was to protect international shipping and preserve freedom of navigation through the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and adjoining Gulf of Aden lanes.

The initially named participants alongside the United States were the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain. Australia and Greece also joined. Other countries contributed without publicly naming their participation, and the coalition grew to more than 20 nations by 2024. Contributions varied: naval vessels, intelligence, surveillance and other support did not amount to identical operational roles. The coalition’s membership must also be distinguished from the broader membership of Task Force 153, which existed before this operation and included countries that made separate decisions about joining it.

Bahrain was the only Arab or Muslim country to participate publicly in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Its decision reflected a longstanding defense and maritime-security partnership with the United States: the kingdom hosts the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Fifth Fleet. Bahrain also presented its participation as consistent with international agreements and its commitment to regional security. Bahraini officials viewed the Houthi escalation as serving the Iranian regime’s agenda for a wider regional conflict. Egypt, despite the threat to its national security and Suez Canal traffic, declined to join the operation. China, whose navy had long maintained a regional presence to protect navigation, remained publicly silent when Washington announced the coalition and welcomed Chinese cooperation.

Coalition warships and aircraft monitored threatened sea lanes, intercepted airborne weapons and helped commercial vessels pass through dangerous waters. U.S. and British destroyers played a prominent role in defeating incoming drones and missiles. By January 4, 2024, 22 nations were contributing; U.S. and partner forces had shot down 19 drones and missiles since the operation began, while about 1,500 merchant ships had transited the Red Sea. In late December, U.S. forces also stopped an attempt by Houthi boats to seize the merchant ship Maersk Hangzhou, sinking three of the attacking boats as a fourth escaped. These actions demonstrated the operation’s ability to protect ships within reach of coalition forces.

The Houthis continued their campaign despite the coalition’s formation. Mohammed Al-Bukaiti, a member of the Houthi ruling council, declared that assembling an American-led alliance would not stop Houthi military operations. After a major Houthi attack on U.S. forces and international shipping in January 2024, President Joe Biden ordered allied strikes against Houthi targets. The U.S.- and British-led strike campaign, known as Operation Poseidon Archer, ran alongside Operation Prosperity Guardian. It targeted Houthi military assets ashore, while Prosperity Guardian remained the multinational maritime defense operation. Participation in one effort did not make every coalition member a participant in the other.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

Israel’s operations against Hamas in Gaza were the event the Houthis invoked to justify their shipping campaign. That justification did not confine Houthi attacks to Israeli vessels: crews aboard ships with no Israeli connection faced missiles, drones and attempted seizures. Defending commercial navigation thus protected civilian mariners of many nationalities as well as Israel’s maritime access. The U.S.-led naval coalition’s immediate work was to keep ships and their crews safe while they crossed threatened waters, rather than to direct Israel’s military operations.

Israel also faced direct Houthi attacks. The Houthis fired drones and missiles toward Israeli territory while striking shipping in the same wider campaign. In 2024, a Houthi drone strike on an apartment in Tel Aviv killed one person and injured others; Israel subsequently struck Houthi infrastructure at the port of Hodeidah. Those Israeli actions were distinct from Operation Prosperity Guardian’s command structure and its mission of defending international vessels. Keeping the operations separate clarifies the different threats at issue: attacks on people in Israel, attacks on merchant crews at sea and attacks on the naval forces protecting them.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

The Houthi campaign combined long-range weapons with attempts to intimidate shipping companies and seize vessels. Missiles and drones could be launched from Houthi-held territory in Yemen toward ships in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden. The group’s seizure of the vehicle carrier Galaxy Leader in November 2023 illustrated a different danger: a commercial ship and its multinational crew could be captured and held. Small-boat attacks, including the later attempt against Maersk Hangzhou, added a close-range threat. Warships protecting merchant traffic were themselves exposed to Houthi weapons.

Houthi messaging centered on supposed Israeli connections and solidarity with Hamas during the Gaza war. The record of damaged ships did not support a narrow Israel-linked target category: most had no link to Israel. A ship’s flag, ownership, operator, cargo, crew and destination can belong to different countries, and the attacks created risk across those distinctions. This gap between declared targets and actual victims matters to understanding the operation. The coalition defended a shared commercial route because the Houthi campaign endangered international shipping broadly, not merely vessels trading with Israel.

The Houthis’ ability to threaten passage also produced an effect beyond the ships they struck. Shipping companies had to decide whether each voyage justified exposure to unpredictable attacks, higher insurance costs and possible delays. A defended transit by one vessel did not remove that calculation for the next. By maintaining the threat, the Houthis could impose costs on trade even when coalition forces intercepted particular weapons.

Outcome

Operation Prosperity Guardian achieved measurable defensive results without ending the Red Sea crisis. Coalition forces protected individual ships, intercepted drones and missiles, and enabled many merchant vessels to transit. Their presence reduced the immediate danger to vessels within defended areas. U.S. and British forces also carried out strikes under a separate campaign against Houthi military targets, but those strikes had not deterred the Houthis as 2025 approached.

The continued diversion of commercial traffic marked the operation’s principal limit. Major carriers sent vessels around the Cape of Good Hope rather than through Bab el-Mandeb and Suez. By early 2024, Suez Canal traffic had fallen sharply; the longer voyages raised fuel, insurance and shipping costs and disrupted supply chains. Egypt lost canal revenue, while Israel and other countries faced altered maritime access. Protection of a ship during one passage and restoration of confidence in an entire trade route were different outcomes. The coalition delivered the former while the Houthi threat prevented the latter.

The broader toll further demonstrated that the attacks were a sustained maritime campaign. By 2024, Houthi weapons had damaged numerous ships, killed sailors and sunk the Rubymar and Tutor. These losses occurred despite naval interceptions and the expansion of the coalition. Operation Prosperity Guardian therefore cannot be described either as a failure to defend any shipping or as an end to the disruption: it kept particular vessels moving through threatened waters while many others remained on longer routes.

Aftermath and legacy

The operation established a large multinational response to an attack on one of the world’s principal maritime corridors. It also showed the difference between a standing naval framework and a mission assembled for a particular crisis. Task Force 153 supplied command arrangements and existing cooperation; governments still chose whether to contribute to Prosperity Guardian and what support to provide. Bahrain’s public participation stood out among regional states. Egypt’s decision to remain outside the coalition, despite direct exposure to lost Suez Canal traffic, showed that a common interest in safe navigation did not produce uniform political or military commitments.

Bahrain’s decision also prompted domestic dissent. Opposition figure Ebrahim Sharif was arrested in December 2023 after social-media posts criticizing Bahrain’s participation and encouraging support for Houthi actions. He had been released by December 27. The episode placed the kingdom’s maritime-security partnership alongside its restrictions on political expression; support for defending shipping did not erase scrutiny of its treatment of critics.

Operation Prosperity Guardian’s lasting measure is the gap between defending vessels and making a shipping lane reliably usable for commerce. Its forces saved individual ships from immediate threats, yet continued Houthi attacks kept many operators away from the Red Sea. The crisis affected Israel’s maritime access, Egypt’s canal income, international supply chains and crews with no connection to either country. Secure passage through Bab el-Mandeb remained a shared interest requiring sustained protection against the Houthi campaign.