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Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi led Islamic State from 2010 until his death in a U.S. raid in 2019. He proclaimed its caliphate, directed the organization as it gained and lost territory in Iraq and Syria, and remained its central authority after its territorial defeat.

最終改訂: 2026年11月15日読了時間: 10分参考文献 · 15

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Overview

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971–2019) was an Iraqi jihadist who led Islamic State from 2010 until his death. He inherited the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq, expanded its operations into Syria, and broke with Al-Qaeda over control of the Syrian jihadist movement. In 2014, after his organization captured extensive territory in Iraq and Syria, Islamic State declared a caliphate and named him its caliph. He adopted the name Al-Khalifah Ibrahim. The declaration called for Muslims worldwide to pledge allegiance to him and treated existing national borders as invalid.

Al-Baghdadi was the dominant figure in Islamic State’s leadership. He held final authority over military, religious and governing decisions while the organization expanded and while military defeats later stripped it of territorial control. His sermon in Mosul in July 2014 became its most prominent public display of leadership. His later audio and video messages sought to keep followers active after the collapse of the territorial caliphate, including through branches that Islamic State called provinces. His leadership linked the organization’s rise in Iraq and Syria to its effort to maintain a wider network after battlefield defeat.

U.S. Special Operations forces raided al-Baghdadi’s hiding place near Barisha in northern Syria on October 26, 2019. Cornered in a tunnel, he detonated an explosive vest, killing himself and three children he had taken inside. U.S. President Donald Trump announced his death on October 27. The raid removed Islamic State’s dominant leader and dealt the organization a major operational and symbolic blow. It did not end the organization: Islamic State continued issuing claims of responsibility for attacks and announced a successor within days.

Early life

Al-Baghdadi was born in Samarra, Iraq, in 1971. He was an Iraqi Sunni of Arab origin and studied Sharia, the Islamic legal and governing system, at an Iraqi university. His religious study later formed part of the authority he asserted as leader of Islamic State. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he became a battlefield commander and tactician in the Iraqi insurgency. The organization he would eventually lead developed from the jihadist network known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which fought coalition forces and Iraqi allies after the invasion.

U.S. forces detained al-Baghdadi at Camp Bucca in southern Iraq from 2005 to 2009. The detention was an important period in his path through the Iraqi jihadist movement. Another Camp Bucca detainee, Haji Abdullah, became acquainted with him there and later rose to senior rank in Islamic State. Haji Abdullah would succeed him after his death, under the leadership name Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Their later positions illustrate the continuity of personnel between the Iraqi insurgency and Islamic State’s leadership.

Al-Baghdadi emerged in a movement that had already undergone changes in name and command. After Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006, Abu Ayyub al-Masri led Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The organization became the Islamic State of Iraq later that year, with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi serving as its operational leader. Its violence peaked in 2006–07 and declined during the subsequent U.S. troop surge and wider Iraqi campaign against it. Al-Baghdadi’s eventual ascent came after those setbacks, when the organization needed to rebuild its ranks and reach.

Career

Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in April 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi then took leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq. Under him, the organization shifted toward broader recruitment. This change helped it expand beyond the narrower recruitment practices of its predecessors and prepared it to exploit the conflict that developed in Syria. As leader, he combined the Iraqi organization’s insurgent base with an ambition to command jihadist forces across the border.

The Syrian civil war opened a new arena for Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri regarded Syria as central to his plans for global jihad. Al-Baghdadi challenged his authority by seeking to bring the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra under the Iraqi organization’s command. In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced a union of the Iraqi organization and Jabhat al-Nusra under the name Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, also rendered Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, later known as Ahmed al-Sharaa, rejected the announced merger.

In June 2013, al-Zawahiri annulled al-Baghdadi’s proposed union and designated Jabhat al-Nusra Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch. Al-Baghdadi refused to yield to that ruling. The confrontation widened the split between the two organizations and disrupted al-Zawahiri’s plans for Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra maintained its loyalty to al-Zawahiri, while al-Baghdadi pursued his own organization’s expansion. By breaking with Al-Qaeda’s direction in 2013, he made Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham a rival center of jihadist leadership. Al-Qaeda also opposed the caliphate that he later proclaimed.

Islamic State gained extensive territory in Iraq and Syria under al-Baghdadi’s command. On June 29, 2014, it declared a caliphate across territory it controlled, adopted the name Islamic State, and named him caliph. The declaration invoked an institution abolished after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. It was also a claim of authority over Muslims beyond Iraq and Syria: Islamic State called for worldwide allegiance and urged Muslims to move to its territory. Al-Baghdadi’s project therefore joined territorial rule to an effort to extend the organization’s reach across national borders.

On July 5, 2014, al-Baghdadi delivered a sermon at Mosul’s Great Mosque. His public appearance gave Mosul particular symbolic importance to Islamic State and displayed the authority it claimed for its new caliph. Behind that image, he retained the final word on the organization’s military operations, religious decisions and governing policies. His command mattered to both its battlefield expansion and its administration of territory. The organization’s dependence on him also made his survival and eventual death matters of operational importance.

Islamic State sought allegiance outside its core territory. In November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, becoming part of the network that Islamic State presented as its Sinai Province. In June 2015, after regional fighters pledged allegiance, Islamic State announced a Caucasus Province. These branches gave the organization a way to claim a wider presence than its holdings in Iraq and Syria alone. Their later activity and renewed oaths to al-Baghdadi showed that territorial losses in the core area did not, by themselves, dissolve the network he led.

Ideology and statements

Al-Baghdadi presented Islamic State as a caliphate entitled to govern territory and command allegiance across existing borders. Its program was one form of political Islam: an effort to establish a governing order under its interpretation of Sharia. Its calls for jihad concerned religiously framed struggle, including armed jihad and attacks directed by the organization; terrorism was among the tactics it used. Al-Baghdadi’s claim to be caliph was central to the organization’s identity, recruitment and public messaging, even as Al-Qaeda rejected his authority.

He used recorded messages to direct followers through changes in Islamic State’s military position. In July 2015, he directed its media organization to stop showing the act of execution in graphic videos while allowing footage before and after executions. Ahead of the 2016 Battle of Mosul, he released a 32-minute audio message urging fighters to hold the city. An audio message released on September 28, 2017, called for attacks in the West. Another, released on August 23, 2018, urged followers to continue attacks against Western countries.

As Islamic State lost territory, al-Baghdadi’s messages emphasized persistence. In April 2019, after its defeat in Syria’s Euphrates Valley, he made a rare video appearance. He displayed reports concerning Islamic State provinces beyond Iraq and Syria, presenting their activity as evidence that the organization continued. In September 2019, he portrayed its jihad as expanding through those provinces despite the end of its territorial caliphate. His final audio message, released September 16, called for Islamic State prisoners to be freed. The prisoner issue remained prominent in the organization’s messaging after his death.

Renewed pledges of allegiance reinforced that message. In June 2019, fighters of Islamic State – Sinai Province released a video renewing their oath to al-Baghdadi. Abu Jafar al-Ansari led the pledge, alongside footage of the group fighting, training and carrying out attacks. The video followed a similar renewal by fighters in Islamic State’s West Africa Province. Such statements linked provincial activity to al-Baghdadi’s personal authority at a time when the organization could no longer point to a durable territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Al-Baghdadi’s leadership connected several phases of conflict: the insurgency after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the expansion of Islamic State into Syria, its seizure and rule of territory, and its continued attacks after territorial defeat. His command was broader than that of a battlefield figurehead. He held final authority over military, religious and governing matters, and Islamic State’s leadership was strongly dependent on him. The organization carried out terrorism and fought military campaigns while seeking to sustain the institutions and image of a state.

The capture of Mosul and the 2014 caliphate declaration marked the height of his public authority. Islamic State’s territorial reach in Iraq and Syria enabled it to recruit, govern and project an image of permanence. Al-Baghdadi’s sermon in Mosul tied that authority to a particular city and moment. When the campaign to retake Mosul approached in 2016, his appeal to followers to hold it showed how closely the city’s fate had become bound to the organization’s claim of statehood.

Military defeats subsequently deprived Islamic State of the extensive territory it had controlled. Its defeat in Syria’s Euphrates Valley preceded al-Baghdadi’s April 2019 video appearance. He responded to the loss by stressing the activity of provinces and calling for continued jihad. His appeals for attacks in Western countries in 2017 and 2018 were part of that continuing effort to mobilize supporters beyond the main battlefields. The organization’s shift toward a dispersed network increased the importance of allegiance pledges, recorded statements and claims of responsibility.

For Israel, al-Baghdadi’s death had limited direct security significance. The Islamic State threat within Israel and at its borders was relatively small. His death was nevertheless part of the wider campaign against a terrorist organization with networks in Iraq, Syria and other provinces. The practical question after the raid was whether those networks could continue operating without the leader who had made the central decisions during both its expansion and its retreat.

Death or current status

By October 2019, al-Baghdadi was hiding near Barisha in Syria’s Idlib province, although organizations hostile to Islamic State controlled the surrounding area. U.S. special forces raided his hiding place on October 26. He fled into a tunnel and, when cornered, detonated an explosive vest. The blast killed him and three children he had taken into the tunnel. No American service member was harmed in the raid. U.S. forces recovered sensitive Islamic State documents and other materials, and genetic testing at the site confirmed his identity.

President Donald Trump announced al-Baghdadi’s death on October 27, 2019. The raid eliminated the leader who had declared the caliphate and exercised final authority over Islamic State’s most consequential decisions. It was a significant intelligence and operational achievement for the United States and a symbolic blow to the organization. Al-Baghdadi’s location near hostile groups also showed the extent to which Islamic State’s military losses had constrained the man who once publicly preached in Mosul.

Islamic State did not issue an immediate formal response. As of the morning of October 30, it had continued routine claims of responsibility for attacks by its operatives in Syria, Iraq and provinces in Asia and Africa without mentioning his death. Supporters reacted on social media with praise for al-Baghdadi, calls for revenge and insistence that the organization would continue. The contrast between its silence about his death and its continuing claims of attacks reflected a transition under way rather than an end to its operations.

On October 31, 2019, Islamic State announced that Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi had succeeded al-Baghdadi as caliph. Its Shura Council selected the successor, and its new spokesman called on members worldwide to pledge allegiance to him. The spokesman also urged followers to seek revenge and pursue the release of Islamic State prisoners, carrying forward a demand from al-Baghdadi’s last audio message. The successor was later identified as Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi, also known as Haji Abdullah, the Iraqi Sunni of Turkmen origin who had known al-Baghdadi at Camp Bucca.

Legacy

Al-Baghdadi transformed the Islamic State of Iraq from a weakened insurgent organization into Islamic State, a terrorist organization that held extensive territory in Iraq and Syria and attracted allegiance from groups beyond them. His 2014 caliphate declaration and sermon in Mosul gave its rule a public figure and a central symbol. His defiance of Ayman al-Zawahiri also changed the jihadist landscape by producing a powerful rival to Al-Qaeda’s leadership and to its plans for Syria.

His leadership carried a structural weakness. He was the dominant decision-maker on military, religious and governing questions, so his death removed more than a spokesman or symbolic head. The U.S. raid was a major blow to Islamic State’s command and prestige. Yet the organization retained personnel, networks and provincial branches after losing its territory and its leader. The quick selection of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi showed that its institutions could appoint a replacement, while its continued claims of attacks showed that operatives remained active.

Al-Baghdadi’s final year made that distinction clear. His April 2019 appearance, references to provinces, September call to free prisoners and renewed oaths from Sinai fighters all addressed an organization trying to survive territorial defeat. His death ended his personal command of Islamic State, including the caliphate he had proclaimed. It did not end the organization’s capacity to conduct attacks in Iraq, Syria and other provinces. His legacy is therefore bound to both the rise and collapse of its territorial project and to the network that continued after him.

参考文献

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  2. 2ISIS supporters spontaneously respond to the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while so far there has been no formal responseterrorism-info.org.il
  3. 3ISIS announces appointment of new leader in place of Abu Bakr al-Baghdaditerrorism-info.org.il
  4. 4Profile of Haji Abdullah, who succeeded Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as ISIS’s new leaderterrorism-info.org.il
  5. 5Islamic State’s Sinai province renews allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadifdd.org
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  14. 14How Islamic State Ideology Contributes to Its Resiliencewashingtoninstitute.org
  15. 15How Islamic State Ideology Contributes to Its Resiliencewashingtoninstitute.org

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