Red Sea crisis

Overview

The Red Sea crisis is a campaign of missile, drone, vessel-seizure and maritime attacks begun by the Iran-backed Houthi movement during the Gaza war. The Houthis launched their first direct missile and drone attack against Israeli cities on 19 October 2023. In November 2023, they began attacking commercial vessels they identified as linked to Israel. Successive Houthi announcements widened the vessels considered targets. By late 2024, the group had carried out more than 100 attacks against commercial ships and warships. The campaign made maritime commerce another front in aggression by Iran and its regional proxies.

Attacks concentrated around Bab-el-Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and extended into the Gulf of Aden. Ships passing through this gateway can continue north to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Before the attacks, the Red Sea carried about 15 percent of global merchant shipping traffic and around 30 percent of seaborne container traffic. Houthi attacks and the threat of further strikes caused shipping companies to divert vessels around southern Africa, adding time, expense and uncertainty to voyages serving countries far beyond Israel. The crisis therefore threatened freedom of navigation on a major international trade route.

Background

The Houthis captured Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, in 2014. At the time of the Red Sea campaign, they controlled about one-quarter of Yemen’s territory and roughly half its population. Their territorial control gave them a base for launching missiles and drones toward Israel and for threatening vessels approaching Bab-el-Mandeb. A command facility in Sanaa coordinated attacks against American warships and commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Mahdi al-Mashat led the group’s political council during the campaign.

The Houthis formed part of the network of armed organizations backed by the Iranian regime. Iran also maintained an intelligence ship and operated warships in Red Sea waters while supporting Houthi operations. Its renewed interest in Sudanese ports added to regional security concerns. The Houthi campaign reached well beyond a local conflict in Yemen: its missiles and drones targeted Israel, while its maritime attacks endangered crews and cargoes from many countries. The group’s slogan explicitly calls for death to America and Israel and includes a curse on Jews. Those words place its anti-American and antisemitic aims alongside its hostility to Israel.

The campaign followed the October 7 attacks by the Hamas terrorist organization and the start of war in Gaza. The Houthis presented attacks on Israel and threats against international shipping as support for Hamas. That explanation did not confine their operations to Israeli ships: the group threatened vessels by destination, ownership history and alleged commercial connections, including ships without a reliable current Israeli link. Control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast allowed the Houthis to pressure an international chokepoint while presenting the campaign to audiences abroad as part of the wider war.

Course of the war

The first phase began with missiles and drones directed toward Israel in October 2023. On 19 November, Houthi terrorists hijacked the civilian car carrier Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea and seized its 25-member multinational crew. The seizure demonstrated that a claimed connection to Israel could be used to target a ship and take civilian seafarers captive. It also raised concern among insurers and operators whose vessels had complex chains of ownership. Another Israel-linked vehicle carrier, Guardian Leader, sailed from Thailand toward Spain around the Cape of Good Hope that November rather than using the Suez Canal. Its longer voyage illustrated how the threat could change routing even before a vessel was attacked.

Houthi operations intensified in December. On 4 December 2023, United States Central Command recorded four attacks against three commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea. On 9 December, the Houthis threatened every Israel-bound ship crossing the Red Sea, regardless of nationality. They also threatened to shut Bab-el-Mandeb. A French warship shot down two Houthi drones over the Red Sea on 10 December, and Houthi missiles targeted two cargo ships on 15 December. The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on 18 December to protect navigation on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The attacks around Bab-el-Mandeb had already continued for roughly two months when China addressed regional maritime security on 21 December.

As the campaign developed, Houthi restrictions expanded from ships described as Israel-linked to wider categories of vessels and companies trading with Israeli ports. Attacks reached commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden as well as the southern Red Sea. Some ships serving ports in Saudi Arabia continued to use the route, but successive attack phases caused increasing numbers of other vessels to avoid it. During the Gaza and Lebanon wars, the threat turned Bab-el-Mandeb into an area-denial zone for many operators. By April 2024, several global companies treated the northern Red Sea as safer than its southern approaches, where the Houthi threat kept them away.

The attack on the tanker Andromeda Star on 26 April 2024 exposed serious flaws in Houthi targeting. The Houthis fired three antiship ballistic missiles at the vessel while it carried Russian crude oil toward India. Its automatic identification signal broadcast “no contact with Israel,” yet the group described it as British on the basis of outdated ownership information. The tanker had formerly been linked to a British company but had changed registered ownership before the attack. Other tankers carrying Russian oil were likewise struck after the Houthis relied on old shipping records. In December 2024, Andromeda Star changed its name first to Feng Shou and then to Apar, and changed its flag from Panama to Djibouti. The episode showed how complex ownership histories and stale records could put ships without a reliable Israeli connection in danger.

Houthi attacks continued through 2024. On 13 April, the group launched drones against Israel in coordination with the Iranian regime and other regional proxies. In July, it attacked an Israel-owned commercial vessel and a separate crude oil tanker in the Red Sea. By late April, additional companies trading with Israeli ports had begun avoiding Bab-el-Mandeb. Although vessels associated with China, Greece, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey remained active on the route, continued passage did not guarantee safety when Houthi information about a ship’s ownership or trading history was wrong. The group also claimed a strike in the Mediterranean against a ship tracked off Port Said; that reported strike was unsubstantiated.

Defensive operations grew alongside the attacks. Operation Prosperity Guardian brought together naval forces to protect navigation. The European Union formed Operation Aspides as a separate defensive mission, while Combined Task Force 153, established in 2022, continued work on maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. Western navies intercepted Houthi weapons, escorted some merchant vessels and salvaged damaged ships. United States and British strikes under Poseidon Archer targeted Houthi weapons stocks and launch sites. Those strikes reduced immediate launch capacity at particular sites, but had not deterred the Houthis as 2025 approached.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

Israel faced Houthi missile and drone launches while the maritime campaign disrupted civilian trade. Its southern port at Eilat shut down as the attacks impeded access through the Red Sea. Before the Gaza war, Eilat handled about 2 percent of merchant ship traffic docking in Israel. Its importance exceeded that share: it served as a southern reserve port if threats endangered access to Israel’s Mediterranean ports. The loss of reliable southern access therefore affected both current shipping and a contingency route for Israeli commerce.

Ships trading between Israel’s Mediterranean ports and the Far East also faced longer routes around Africa. Extra sailing time and higher insurance rates raised maritime transport costs, including for vessels that never intended to call at Eilat. Israeli air defenses intercepted many Houthi projectiles aimed at the country. Israel also struck Houthi port facilities and other infrastructure after attacks on Israeli territory. The maritime danger to civilians extended beyond Israel: the Galaxy Leader crew remained captive, while merchant seafarers faced missiles, drones and possible vessel seizure on a route used by many nationalities.

Naval protection addressed some of that danger without restoring ordinary passage. Warships could intercept incoming weapons or escort selected merchant vessels, and salvage operations assisted damaged ships. They could not accompany every ship or eliminate the risk of attack across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The continued need for escorts and diversions showed the limits of immediate defensive action. Houthi attacks on civilian vessels and crews were not justified by the group’s stated opposition to Israel; they exposed international shipping to violence regardless of the people aboard or the cargo carried.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

The Houthis combined missiles, one-way attack drones, threats of seizure and changing rules about which vessels they would attack. Their announcements first emphasized ships linked to Israel, then widened to Israel-bound ships regardless of nationality and later to other vessels associated with companies serving Israeli ports. Such categories were difficult to apply reliably to ships with changing owners, flags, managers and destinations. The attacks on Andromeda Star and other tankers carrying Russian oil demonstrated that inaccurate records could produce attacks on vessels outside the group’s stated targets.

The seizure of Galaxy Leader also had a propaganda role. Armed Houthi personnel took control of a civilian vessel and its multinational crew, then displayed the ship while the crew remained detained. The act publicized the group’s claimed maritime blockade while imposing direct costs on seafarers who had no role in deciding the war in Gaza. Threats issued through public statements had a wider effect than individual strikes: shipowners and insurers had to assess whether any past ownership, cargo movement or port call could be interpreted as grounds for attack.

The Houthis used social media to build international attention and support during the war between Israel and Hamas and the subsequent Red Sea crisis. A January–February 2024 survey identified 98 Houthi-affiliated websites and social media accounts, including 60 official and 38 supporter entities. Online messaging framed the maritime campaign as solidarity with Hamas, while attacks and shipping diversions affected vessels and economies far beyond Israel. The gap between the stated rationale and the ships actually endangered became a defining feature of the campaign.

Outcome

The campaign caused a large, measurable shift in trade. By April 2024, Red Sea container shipping had fallen by approximately 90 percent. Overall Suez Canal traffic declined by at least half in one measure, while other reports recorded a 30 percent year-on-year drop. In September 2024, Maersk reported a 66 percent decline in Suez Canal traffic and warned that Red Sea diversions were disrupting its global shipping network. These figures describe different periods and measures, but each reflects the effect of attacks and avoidance on a route that had carried a substantial share of world commerce.

Egypt bore a direct economic cost because Suez Canal tolls supply important foreign currency. Houthi attacks disrupted canal traffic and contributed to a reported 70 percent drop in canal revenue during a period examined after 2023. Egypt regarded the attacks as a serious threat to national security but declined to join Operation Prosperity Guardian. The crisis also entered regional diplomacy: during a 2024 visit to Cairo, Kuwait’s Emir Mishal discussed both Israel’s planned Rafah operation and the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Saudi Arabia’s response showed that commerce did not stop everywhere in the Red Sea. Crude oil exports from its Red Sea terminals rose from about 392,000 barrels per day in December 2023 to about 818,000 in March 2024. Much of the oil went to Ain Sokhna in Egypt and then crossed the country through the Sumed pipeline to the Mediterranean. Saudi company Folk Maritime and France’s CMA CGM also launched an upgraded North Red Sea Express connecting Jeddah, NEOM, Ain Sokhna, Aqaba and Yanbu. On 9 April 2024, the Chinese-flagged Jin Shun He left Jeddah for NEOM on that service. These northern routes remained active while threats near Bab-el-Mandeb pushed some tankers sailing from the Persian Gulf to Europe around southern Africa.

International responses differed. China declined to join the United States-led protective task force and issued no official condemnation of Houthi attacks during the first three months of the shipping crisis. Chinese warships also failed to answer distress calls from attacked vessels. Western naval missions protected some shipping and struck Houthi equipment, yet the persistence of attacks through late 2024 showed that protection of selected voyages had not restored freedom of navigation across the route.

Aftermath and legacy

The crisis continued beyond its first year. In January 2025, the Houthis released the 25 crew members seized aboard Galaxy Leader after holding them for more than a year. A temporary decline in attacks did not settle the threat to shipping or Israel. After the June 2025 ceasefire, the Iran-backed Houthis resumed attacks on Israeli territory and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. July attacks on merchant ships again caused deaths and showed that earlier naval operations, airstrikes and ceasefires had not secured lasting passage through the southern Red Sea.

The Red Sea crisis demonstrated how an armed group controlling part of a coastline could disrupt a trade route used by the wider world. Its consequences included the shutdown of Eilat, higher costs for Israeli trade with the Far East, lost Suez Canal income for Egypt, altered Saudi shipping patterns and longer voyages around Africa. The attacks also exposed civilian crews to seizure and lethal force even when their ships lacked a reliable Israeli connection. Bab-el-Mandeb remained central to the crisis because threats at that narrow gateway affected access to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and international commerce beyond them.