Hussein of Jordan

Overview

Hussein bin Talal was the Hashemite king of Jordan from 1952 until his death in 1999. He inherited the throne as a teenager and governed through repeated threats to his kingdom’s security. His decisions shaped Jordan’s relations with its Arab neighbors, the United States and Israel. Three episodes defined his regional role: Jordan’s entry into the Six-Day War in 1967, his campaign against armed PLO factions during Black September in 1970, and his conclusion of peace with Israel in 1994. His reign also encompassed a change in Jordan’s approach to Judea and Samaria, from a proposed federation under his crown to a formal separation in 1988.

Hussein’s policy toward Israel changed over time. In 1967 he joined Egypt’s military command and ordered attacks on Israeli cities despite an Israeli offer to keep Jordan’s front out of the war. Afterward, he maintained clandestine contact with Israeli leaders while seeking an arrangement that would protect Jordan’s interests. The contacts became public diplomacy in the 1990s. On 25 July 1994, Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Washington Declaration, ending the state of war between their countries. Their governments signed a peace treaty three months later, on 26 October.

Early life

Hussein was born in Amman on 14 November 1935, the son of Talal bin Abdullah and a member of Jordan’s Hashemite ruling family. His grandfather, King Abdullah I, had established the dynasty’s rule in Jordan. Hussein grew up as the monarchy faced both the demands of governing a newly independent state and the consequences of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The conflict left Jordan in control of Judea and Samaria and part of Jerusalem, placing its ruler at the center of future decisions about war and peace with Israel.

Hussein became king in 1952 after his father’s reign ended. Because he was still a minor, he assumed full constitutional powers in 1953. His long reign began amid rivalry among Arab governments and pressure on Jordan from larger states. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser promoted an assertive Arab nationalism, while Jordan’s monarchy depended on preserving its independence and authority. Relations between Hussein and Nasser were often hostile before their abrupt reconciliation in May 1967. That reversal proved decisive for Jordan’s role in the war that followed.

Career

Hussein’s first decades on the throne required him to preserve Jordanian state authority while managing its exposed position beside Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Armed organizations operating from Jordan increasingly challenged his government after 1967. He also pursued contacts across the border with Israel, even while the two states formally remained at war. Fifteen years after Israel’s War of Independence, he renewed dialogue with Israeli leaders. Such contacts remained unofficial for years, allowing discussion of security and possible political arrangements without a public agreement.

After the Six-Day War, Hussein proposed a federation linking Jordan with Judea and Samaria. His plan treated Amman as both the kingdom’s central capital and the capital of its Jordanian region. It sought to preserve a Jordanian role in the area after Israel had entered it during the war. Israel rejected the federation proposal. Hussein nevertheless continued to explore political arrangements, and his position changed further during the uprising that began in 1987. In 1988 he announced Jordan’s unilateral separation from Judea and Samaria, relinquishing its claims there and ending important Jordanian social services in the area. The decision marked a major retreat from his earlier federal vision.

Hussein’s contacts with Israel continued through these shifts. He met clandestinely with Shimon Peres in the 1980s and held secret talks in London with Rabin before the peace treaty. The discussions formed part of a longer pattern of quiet exchanges between Israeli and Jordanian officials. His relationship with Israeli leaders did not depend on a single negotiation or administration: he dealt with Rabin and Peres, later met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Amman, and visited Tel Aviv for talks with Peres. Hussein sought American assistance to modernize Jordan’s military as he pursued peace, linking national security to his diplomatic strategy.

Jordan’s decision to make peace also carried economic and regional considerations. Hussein hoped American diplomacy would help reopen Gulf markets and reduce Jordan’s dependence on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. During the 1990–91 Gulf War, Hussein had refused to join the coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait, leaving Jordan in a difficult position with several Arab governments. President Bill Clinton promised relief from Jordan’s $700 million debt to the United States and undertook to seek additional relief from American allies. These incentives accompanied, rather than replaced, Hussein’s long effort to secure a stable relationship with Israel.

Public diplomacy accelerated in 1994. Hussein and Rabin agreed on the text of a treaty and, with Clinton in Washington, signed the Washington Declaration on 25 July. It proclaimed the end of the state of war that had persisted between Israel and Jordan since 1948. Israel and Jordan then opened a border crossing north of Eilat; Hussein met Rabin in Aqaba during the period of new cross-border contact. The Israel–Jordan peace treaty, signed at the Arava crossing on 26 October 1994, established peace and provided for diplomatic relations, security arrangements, borders and cooperation over water. Hussein made his first public visit to Israel after the treaty.

Ideology and statements

Hussein’s public positions reflected the requirements of ruling Jordan through war, internal revolt and changing regional alliances. His agreement with Nasser in 1967 placed Jordan in an Arab military coalition against Israel. His later negotiations with Israeli leaders demonstrated a different judgment: Jordan’s security could be advanced through direct agreement with the neighboring state. These choices were separated by years of clandestine dialogue, his confrontation with the PLO, and his abandonment of Jordan’s claims to Judea and Samaria. Taken together, they show a ruler who repeatedly revised policy in response to the kingdom’s circumstances.

Hussein later acknowledged that entering the Six-Day War had been a grave error. He also recognized a decisive military imbalance: Israeli pilots possessed detailed intelligence on Arab air bases that his forces lacked. His assessment followed the destruction of Jordan’s air force and Israel’s entry into Judea and Samaria. It did not erase Jordan’s responsibility for opening its front in 1967, but it helps explain why Hussein subsequently treated direct communication with Israeli leaders as an important instrument of state policy.

Jerusalem retained religious and political importance for Hussein after 1967. He pledged $8.25 million to restore Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount. The 1994 treaty recognized Jordan’s special role in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem and provided for freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance. Hussein’s involvement in their restoration continued a Hashemite connection to the site while the treaty placed that role within a formal relationship with Israel.

Role in attacks or conflicts

On 30 May 1967, Hussein flew to Cairo and met Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The two leaders reconciled despite longstanding hostility and signed a mutual defense pact. Hussein placed Jordanian forces within a joint military command with Egypt, and an Egyptian general took command of Arab forces on Jordan’s front. Nasser pressed Hussein to enter the approaching war against Israel. By 5 June, Hussein had summoned foreign mission chiefs in Amman and told them Jordan was at war and its forces were under Egyptian command.

Israel had offered to refrain from military action against Jordan if Hussein kept his forces out of the fighting. Its message gave him a chance to avoid opening a Jordanian front. Hussein ignored the warning. On 5 June, Jordanian artillery began bombarding Jerusalem and other Israeli cities, and Jordanian infantry invaded Jewish Jerusalem. Israel sent a second message offering to forgo retaliation if Jordan stopped its bombardment; Hussein ignored that appeal as well. Jordan’s attacks killed scores of Israelis and wounded hundreds. Israel subsequently entered Judea and Samaria. The order of events matters: Jordanian shelling and the invasion of Jewish Jerusalem preceded Israel’s entry into the area.

The fighting was costly for Jordan. Israel’s air campaign destroyed its entire 28-plane air force, and an Israeli aircraft struck Hussein’s office in the royal palace in Amman on 5 June. Israeli forces took control of Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria during the war. Jordan lost the territory it had held since 1948, along with a strategic position overlooking Israel’s populated center. The defeat transformed Hussein’s choices for the following decades: it prompted his federation proposal, strengthened the relevance of secret contacts with Israel, and altered the setting in which armed PLO groups operated from Jordan.

The most serious internal challenge of Hussein’s reign came from armed PLO and Fatah factions. They developed an independent power structure in Jordan, carried weapons openly and challenged government authority. Hussein survived assassination attempts as the confrontation deepened. In September 1970, the PFLP hijacked passenger aircraft; three were diverted to Jordan, and four hijacked planes were destroyed after their passengers had been evacuated. The episode accelerated Hussein’s decision to remove the armed organizations from Jordan and restore his government’s control.

On 16 September 1970, Hussein declared martial law and sent Jordanian troops into areas controlled by the PLO’s armed factions. The resulting conflict became known as Black September. Syria sent tanks into Jordan on 19 September to support the factions fighting Hussein. Two days later, fearing for his government’s survival, Hussein asked Britain to intervene and to seek Israeli help. Britain declined to intervene and passed his request to the United States. Hussein also asked Washington for airstrikes in support of Jordanian forces. Israel did not enter the fighting, though its readiness to respond to the Syrian intervention affected the crisis.

Jordanian forces repelled the Syrian incursion and continued their campaign against the PLO. A ceasefire was arranged in Cairo on 27 September, but fighting between Hussein’s forces and PLO supporters continued until July 1971. Approximately 3,000 people died in the confrontation. Surviving PLO cadres, including members of Fatah, moved to Lebanon, where the organization built a new base. Hussein’s victory preserved Hashemite rule in Jordan. It also ended the independent armed structure that had challenged his authority within the kingdom.

Peace with Israel did not end Hussein’s involvement in violent incidents affecting the relationship. On 13 March 1997, a Jordanian soldier murdered seven Israeli schoolgirls at Naharayim. Hussein visited their families to offer condolences and later sent $1 million to compensate them. His response gave a personal expression to the obligations of peace at a moment when the killings had caused profound grief in Israel. Later that year, after an unsuccessful Israeli operation against Khaled Mashal in Amman, Hussein arranged a prisoner exchange that secured the October release of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin. Hamas is a terrorist organization; the exchange was a diplomatic outcome of the crisis between Israel and Jordan.

Death or current status

Hussein died in Amman on 7 February 1999, ending a reign of nearly 47 years. His son Abdullah II succeeded him that day and was ruling by March 1999. Hussein’s death removed the leader who had personally guided Jordan through its 1967 defeat, the 1970 struggle for state authority, its 1988 separation from Judea and Samaria, and its treaty with Israel. The succession preserved the Hashemite monarchy and left Abdullah II responsible for carrying forward the peace Hussein had concluded.

Legacy

Hussein’s legacy includes both a consequential wartime decision and a durable diplomatic achievement. His decision to join Nasser in 1967, followed by Jordanian attacks on Israeli cities and Jewish Jerusalem, brought Israel into Judea and Samaria and changed the territorial and political setting of the region. His suppression of armed PLO organizations in 1970 secured his rule over Jordan at a heavy human cost. His 1988 separation from Judea and Samaria closed the path he had pursued through his federation proposal. Each decision shaped the conditions under which Jordan could later negotiate with Israel.

The 1994 treaty remains Hussein’s defining diplomatic accomplishment. He and Rabin moved from years of secret contact to a public declaration ending war, then to a formal agreement between their states. Their relationship acquired additional force after Rabin’s assassination in 1995: Hussein attended the funeral in Jerusalem with a large Jordanian delegation and delivered a eulogy for the Israeli prime minister. Hussein also attended ceremonies for agreements between Israel and the PLO, underscoring his continuing role in regional diplomacy. The treaty established a framework for borders, security, water and diplomatic relations that outlived both leaders. It stands alongside the memory of their earlier conflict as a central measure of Hussein’s long reign.