Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

Overview

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, also known as the League of the Righteous, is an Iranian-backed armed organization and political movement based in Iraq. Established in 2006 by the Iranian regime’s Quds Force, it fought U.S. and coalition troops during the Iraq War and remained armed after American forces withdrew in 2011. Its secretary-general, Qais al-Khazali, is a Shia cleric from southern Iraq. The organization is ideologically aligned with the Iranian regime and loyal to Ali Khamenei. It seeks to expand the regime’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over the country, and expel remaining Western military forces.

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq is part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Iranian regime’s Axis of Resistance. It has pursued seats in Iraq’s parliament through the Sadiqun Bloc while retaining an armed organization. That combination has placed it within state security structures and electoral politics without ending its militia role. Its activities have extended into the Syrian civil war and the wider Iran–Israel proxy conflict.

Founding and ideology

The Quds Force, the external operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), established Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq in 2006. Its early ranks emerged from a break with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. The Iranian regime armed and trained Khazali’s fighters for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. Quds Force direction continued after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal. Lebanese Hezbollah also supplied operational expertise: its operative Ali Mussa Daqduq advised Khazali, helped train Iraqi fighters, and took part in the militia’s operations.

Khazali presents Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq as part of the Axis of Resistance and has framed confrontation with Western powers in Shia religious terms. Its loyalty to Khamenei and its links to the IRGC connect its Iraqi political ambitions to the Iranian regime’s regional strategy. At a February 2015 conference in Karbala, Khazali advocated using Iraqi state institutions to advance the Axis. The aim was to make state power serve that regional project, alongside the group’s existing armed capacity.

History

During the Iraq War, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq became a prominent participant in the Iranian-backed campaign against coalition forces. Its best-known operation was the January 20, 2007, assault on the Karbala Joint Provincial Coordination Center. Khazali authorized Adnan Fayhan to launch the attack; Azhar al-Dulaymi led the assault. Iranian regime personnel built a full-scale mockup of the facility inside Iran so fighters could rehearse it. The attackers intended to abduct Americans and exchange them for detained Quds Force members. Five American soldiers were killed, including four executed while bound and blindfolded. Khazali later called his role in the operation an honorable cause. U.S. forces killed Azhar al-Dulaymi that May.

Coalition forces captured Khazali and Daqduq in 2007. Daqduq had been sent by Hezbollah to support the Quds Force’s work with Iraqi Shia militias and served as an adviser to Khazali. He helped organize and train fighters and participated in operations against coalition troops, including the Karbala raid. His role illustrates the direct cooperation among the Iraqi militia, Hezbollah, and the Quds Force during the war.

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq retained its weapons after U.S. forces withdrew in 2011. It subsequently sent fighters into the Syrian civil war. Akram al-Kaabi, an early member, led fighters associated with the group into that conflict from 2011 to 2013 before forming Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba after differences with Khazali’s organization. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq fighters also worked alongside Hezbollah on a base in Lajat, where the IRGC oversaw militia supplies. The construction force cleared several villages and destroyed about 650 homes.

When the PMF was activated to fight the Islamic State in 2014–15, it incorporated Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and other Iranian-backed Shia militias that had fought American forces for years. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq became one of the powerful armed factions inside the PMF, alongside the Badr Organization, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Nujaba, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. Its PMF position gave it a place in an Iraqi state framework while its leadership continued to identify with the Iranian regime’s axis.

The group’s influence also met local opposition. During unrest in Basra on September 7, 2018, Iraqi youths burned its offices as protesters challenged failing services and the Iranian regime’s local influence. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq remained active in local and national politics; in Basra it backed Badr during a confrontation over power. In the Christian town of Bartella in the Nineveh Plains, it opened an office, and residents reported images of Khazali, Khamenei, and PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis displayed on shops.

Structure and leadership

Khazali leads Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq as secretary-general. The organization has armed and political components, an official Al-Ahd media network, and an electoral vehicle, the Sadiqun Bloc. Khazali described the movement as having become a political entity under a different name while remaining under Iraq’s commander-in-chief. Its spokesman Naeem al-Aboudi announced Sadiqun’s participation in parliamentary elections, and the bloc won 15 seats in the 2018 election. Electoral participation expanded the group’s access to state institutions while its armed organization remained in place.

That reach extended to government appointments and competition over security posts. Al-Aboudi became higher education minister in Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani’s government; the ministry subsequently underwent major administrative changes favoring supporters of the Iranian regime’s Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine. Al-Sudani also appointed an Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq affiliate to direct his press office. Khazali demanded that the prime minister refer strategic political, economic, and security decisions to the Coordination Framework. After a new government formed, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement competed for influence over Iraq’s intelligence services.

Funding and sponsors

The Iranian regime has supplied Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq with arms, training, and direction through the IRGC and Quds Force. Hezbollah helped build its operational capabilities during the Iraq War, including through Daqduq’s advisory work and training. In 2023, the IRGC supplied support, training, weapons, technology, or direction to the group and other armed organizations. Its place in the PMF also connected some of its activity to Iraqi state structures. Together, these channels supported an organization able to exercise armed power while seeking influence over ministries, parliamentary decisions, and security agencies.

Attacks and operations

The 2007 Karbala hostage operation remains central to Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq’s record. Its planning, rehearsal in Iran, and participation by Daqduq linked the attack to the Quds Force and Hezbollah. The five American deaths included the execution of four soldiers while bound and blindfolded. More broadly, the militia used attacks on coalition personnel during the Iraq War to advance the Iranian regime’s campaign against Western forces in Iraq.

Following the January 2020 U.S. strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, Iranian-backed PMF groups including Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and Nujaba carried out more than 180 rocket, missile, and drone attacks targeting U.S. military personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The figure describes attacks by the groups collectively, not an individual count for Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. Iranian-backed Iraqi factions have also attacked U.S. forces and the Kurdistan Region over the past decade. In Nineveh, Ahrar Sinjar served as a facade for some rocket and drone attacks by cells trained by Kata'ib Hezbollah and assisted by Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq; its Yazidi imagery did not make those cells an independent Yazidi force.

After an Iraqi election reduced militia representation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah representatives threatened escalation toward armed conflict if the results excluded them. Khazali met privately with UN envoy Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert while his organization challenged the results, and political bureau spokesman Mahmoud al-Rubaie claimed it had presented evidence of fraud to the envoy. During the same period of tension, an Iraqi security source named Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq among principal suspects in the drone attack on Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s residence. An Iraqi intelligence official also accused it and Kata'ib Hezbollah in connection with that attempted assassination and Colonel Nebras’s killing. These were attributed accusations, not findings of responsibility. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq’s political bureau and military wing declined requests for comment on the accusations concerning al-Kadhimi.

Designations and international status

The United States designated Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 10, 2020. The designation identifies Khazali’s organization as an Iran-backed militant group aligned with Khamenei. Its parliamentary activity did not remove its armed wing or its place among the Iranian-backed PMF factions. The group has continued to pursue political influence in Iraq alongside its role in the Iranian regime’s regional network.

Current status

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq’s public position on militia weapons shifted across statements in December 2025 and January 2026. In December 2025, it announced agreement with limiting weapons to Iraqi state control. A January 4, 2026, statement by a committee of Iraqi militias then listed the group among signatories opposing disarmament discussions until Iraq met the committee’s sovereignty conditions. On January 5, the director of its official Al-Ahd network denied any connection between Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and that committee statement. On January 6, the group reaffirmed support for state control of weapons under Iraq’s constitution and expressed support for the army and the PMF. Those statements set out conflicting public positions; the December declaration was an expression of support for state control, not a surrender of the group’s weapons.

The organization continues to seek a role in Iraq’s strategic decisions through both the Sadiqun Bloc and its armed standing within the PMF. Its ties to the Iranian regime and its pursuit of influence inside Iraqi institutions remain defining features of its political and military position.