Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani

Overview

Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani is an Iraqi politician who served as prime minister of Iraq from October 2022 to 2026. He came to office after a prolonged struggle over the October 2021 parliamentary election. Muqtada al-Sadr’s faction had won the most seats, but its withdrawal from parliament shifted seats to other parties and enabled the Coordination Framework to secure al-Sudani’s appointment. The coalition included factions aligned with Iran-backed militias, giving those groups substantial influence over the government he led.

Al-Sudani’s premiership combined efforts to maintain relations with the United States and Iraq’s neighbors with persistent disputes over armed groups operating within Iraq. His government urged militias to keep the country out of the 2025 war between Israel and Iran, and he reported that Iraqi security forces thwarted 29 attempted launches toward Israel or bases housing American forces. His administration also faced pressure over the captivity of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov, an eavesdropping scandal involving the Prime Minister’s Office, and demands to bring militia weapons under state control.

Career

Al-Sudani began his senior public career in local government. He served as governor of Maysan, an Iraqi district bordering Iran, before holding ministerial posts under prime ministers Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi. A confidant of al-Maliki, he entered the 2022 government-formation contest with substantial administrative experience and political ties to a rival of al-Sadr. Al-Sudani was 52 when he became prime minister.

In the October 10, 2021 election, al-Sadr’s faction became parliament’s largest. Al-Sadr sought to form a majority government without the pro-Iranian camp, departing from the broad power-sharing arrangements used by earlier governments. The ensuing deadlock ended after 73 Sadrist parliamentarians resigned. Their seats were redistributed, largely benefiting militia-aligned candidates. The shift gave the Coordination Framework and its allies the parliamentary strength to select al-Sudani as their candidate and form a government without al-Sadr’s faction.

President Abdul Latif Rashid entrusted al-Sudani with forming a government, and parliament approved his proposed cabinet days later in October 2022. Al-Sudani appointed General Abd al-Amir al-Shammari as interior minister and temporarily took direct command of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service after dismissing its chief. He promised that his government would prepare elections within a year. Soon after taking office, he held discussions with the U.S. secretary of state and the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and Iran, reflecting Iraq’s continuing diplomatic relationships with competing regional powers.

The governing arrangement gave militia-linked parties access to state institutions. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq affiliate Naeem al-Aboudi became higher education minister, and administrative changes in that ministry favored supporters of Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine. Al-Sudani appointed another Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq affiliate to direct his press office. His government also granted the Popular Mobilization Forces permission to establish a contracting company named Muhandis after Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. These decisions increased the institutional reach of groups whose political support had helped bring him to office.

Al-Sudani maintained direct contact with Iran’s leadership. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called him on September 9, 2023, to thank Iraq for its assistance with Arbaeen ceremonies. Al-Sudani met an Iranian media delegation in Baghdad the previous day and called for stronger ties between the countries. He attended the September 2 commencement ceremony for a railway linking Basra to Shalamcheh in Iran. In July 2024, he congratulated Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on his election and invited him to Iraq; he also met Ali Khamenei in Tehran that month. His government separately raised the presence of foreign fighters with Iranian officials.

Ideology and statements

Al-Sudani presented preservation of Iraq’s security and avoidance of regional war as government priorities. That position did not settle the question of who controlled strategic decisions. Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, demanded that al-Sudani refer major political, economic and security decisions to the Coordination Framework. Al-Khazali’s intervention made public the leverage held by factions within the coalition that secured al-Sudani’s appointment.

In December 2025, al-Sudani said disbanding Iraq’s militias would require a political agreement rather than a demand from a government body alone. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein described militia weapons as an internal matter under discussion while stating that weapons ultimately had to come under state control. Al-Sudani also ordered an urgent investigation after an Iraqi decision contained statements his office said went beyond what had been agreed concerning entities and individuals linked to Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.

His relationship with coalition factions came under further strain during an eavesdropping scandal. Reporting identified Mohammed Johi, a senior Prime Minister’s Office administrator, as the figure running surveillance of Iraqi politicians, militia figures and their families on behalf of al-Sudani’s family. The reporting implicated the office but did not establish that al-Sudani personally directed the operation. Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani traveled to Baghdad to contain opposition to al-Sudani within the Coordination Framework and urged its leaders, on behalf of Ali Khamenei, to move past the scandal. During another Baghdad visit in July 2025, Qaani met senior Framework figures but did not meet al-Sudani.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Al-Sudani governed during repeated attacks and threats involving Iran-backed Iraqi militias. His government sought to prevent those groups from drawing Iraq into the 12-day Israel–Iran conflict in 2025. He reported that armed groups had attempted 29 missile launches toward Israel or bases in Iraq housing U.S. forces and that Iraqi security operations had thwarted them. The attempted launches showed the threat posed by armed factions despite the government’s policy of staying out of the war. Kata'ib Hezbollah challenged that policy, while Israel’s military separately reported drone launches from Iraq during the conflict.

American officials pressed al-Sudani over attacks on U.S. personnel and Iraqi infrastructure. During a Baghdad visit in December 2024, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met him amid discussions about developments in Syria. In July 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged him to hold those responsible for drone attacks on energy facilities in the Kurdistan Region accountable and to prevent further strikes. The government’s dependence on militia-aligned parties complicated efforts to impose consequences on armed groups. Al-Sudani also announced that Iraqi security forces, supported by a U.S.-led coalition, had killed Islamic State leader Abdallah Makki Muslih al-Rufay’i, known as Abu Khadija.

The captivity of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov created another test of the government’s authority. Kata'ib Hezbollah held her for approximately two and a half years. In March 2025, the United States warned al-Sudani’s government of political and economic consequences unless she was released. Tsurkov was freed on September 9, 2025. Al-Sudani credited Iraqi security forces with facilitating her release. Her prolonged detention had exposed the difficulty of securing a hostage’s freedom from an armed faction with influence inside Iraq.

Regional changes also required decisions about Iraq’s borders. In December 2024, Ahmed al-Sharaa warned Iraq’s prime minister against allowing Popular Mobilization Forces fighters to enter Syria’s war. On April 16, 2025, al-Sudani confirmed that al-Sharaa had been invited to the May 17 Arab League summit in Baghdad. These contacts took place while Iraqi leaders sought to manage relations with Syria and restrain cross-border activity by armed groups.

Death or current status

Al-Sudani led the largest bloc in Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary election, winning 46 seats, but the result did not itself secure another term as prime minister. He and former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki both sought the position. Coordination Framework factions reunited after competing separately in the election, yet some sought to form the next government without al-Sudani. The Kurdistan Democratic Party was identified as a possible coalition partner for him during the negotiations.

Al-Sudani subsequently left office. After an attack on Masoud Barzani’s home in March 2026, he spoke with Barzani and promised an investigation while still prime minister. By July 2026, Ali al-Zaidi was prime minister and al-Sudani was a former officeholder. Al-Sudani accompanied the reception of Khamenei’s funeral delegation in Najaf on July 7, 2026.

Legacy

Al-Sudani’s rise demonstrated how Iraq’s parliamentary balance could change after an election winner withdrew from the legislature. His government reflected the resulting influence of the Coordination Framework and militia-aligned factions over appointments and institutions. At the same time, his efforts to keep Iraq out of the Israel–Iran conflict, the thwarting of 29 launch attempts, and the release of Elizabeth Tsurkov showed the state exercising authority in consequential security matters. His 2025 electoral lead and failure to secure an assured second term underscored the difference between winning the largest bloc and commanding the coalition needed to govern Iraq.