Oman

Overview

Oman is a country on the southeastern Arabian Peninsula, with Muscat as its capital and Salalah as its principal southern city. It belongs to the Gulf Cooperation Council and borders Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Its northern coast faces the Strait of Hormuz and Iran. The strait’s importance to maritime trade, together with Oman’s ports and its border with Yemen, has shaped the country’s security policy and diplomacy.

Since Sultan Qaboos bin Said took power in 1970, Oman has maintained an independent foreign policy amid rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the Iranian regime. Muscat has facilitated American contact with Tehran, worked with the United States on security, and preserved political channels with Israel. These relationships have produced concrete benefits, including negotiations and access to Omani facilities. They have also brought scrutiny: Omani banking and trade links have helped the Iranian regime gain access to funds, while suspected weapons routes toward the Houthi terrorist organization in Yemen have concerned Oman’s partners.

Geography

Oman’s territory extends from the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz southward along the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea to Yemen. The Musandam Peninsula places Oman beside the strait’s narrowest passage, where shipping lanes run between the Omani and Iranian sides. The country ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Oman and Iran nevertheless require foreign warships to provide prior notification before transiting the strait, a requirement the United States rejects. Muscat also seeks to prevent incidents involving vessels near its coast from escalating into a wider conflict.

The southern port of Salalah and the port of Duqm are strategically important because they give American forces access to routes toward the Gulf without requiring transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Salalah is also a commercial gateway. When Qatar reorganized trade routes during its blockade by neighboring states, it shifted transshipment away from Dubai toward Oman’s Salalah and Sohar ports. Oman’s long coast and its mountainous frontier with Yemen create different security demands: maritime patrols must watch busy sea routes, while border forces must monitor difficult terrain adjoining a prolonged civil war.

History

Qaboos came to power in 1970 after removing his father with assistance from retired British officers. His accession began a transformation of Oman’s state institutions and infrastructure. At the time, the country had only three schools and about 10 kilometers of roads. Qaboos directed oil income toward roads, education and other development, drew Oman out of international isolation, and made the sultanate closely identified with his long reign. The changes did not end its vulnerabilities: oil revenues remained central to public finances, and the government later faced pressure to provide jobs and services during periods of lower prices.

Early in Qaboos’s reign, Oman faced an uprising in its southern Dhofar region assisted by Soviet-backed South Yemen. Britain and Iran under the shah supported Oman, while Israel supplied military and political advice and help with water shortages. The conflict tied the new sultanate’s survival to cooperation across regional divisions that would remain a feature of Qaboos’s policy. He subsequently cultivated ties with the Iranian regime after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, while retaining American security cooperation and an Israeli channel.

Economic strains periodically brought public dissent. Higher fuel costs prompted street protests in February 2017, the first such demonstrations since February 2011, and further protests in 2018 called for economic reform and employment. Qaboos had no children or brothers and did not publicly designate a successor during his lifetime. After his death in January 2020, a prepared letter naming his cousin Haitham bin Tariq was opened under Oman’s constitutional succession procedure. Haitham took power just before the COVID-19 pandemic and an oil-price collapse threatened to halve projected annual oil revenue and double national debt. He invited political exiles and dynastic rivals, including the former sultan of Zanzibar and the family of Nizwa’s last imam, to return.

Jewish history

Oman’s documented modern relationship with Jewish national life centers on its contacts with the State of Israel. During the Dhofar conflict, Israeli assistance reached Oman while the two governments kept their relationship discreet. The channel continued for roughly two decades before the 1990s brought public meetings. Oman later became the first Gulf government to permit an Israeli diplomatic mission. These contacts developed without formal diplomatic normalization and remained subject to changes in regional politics.

Antisemitism has also been an issue in Omani public life. In 2019, the Anti-Defamation League identified books promoting Jew hatred listed for sale at the state-run Muscat International Book Fair and urged Qaboos to have them removed. Before the 2020 fair, it alerted Omani officials to specific titles; it subsequently wrote to Haitham after finding that hateful books remained in the fair’s catalog. The concern involved material offered at a public event, distinct from the sultanate’s continuing political contact with Israel.

Government and politics

Oman is a hereditary monarchy headed by the sultan. Qaboos concentrated key government responsibilities in his own office during his long reign. Under Haitham, changes to the Basic Law strengthened provisions concerning the rule of law and citizens’ participation in public affairs while giving the sultan additional constitutional tools to oversee executives and assess their performance. The changes formed part of his effort to manage a state facing financial pressure and a generational leadership transition. They did not remove restrictions on dissent: critics have faced legal consequences for peaceful expression, and the country’s treatment of migrant workers has drawn human-rights criticism.

Oman’s foreign policy relies on maintaining channels among rival powers. Qaboos’s relationship with Tehran gave Muscat room to maneuver against Saudi political and religious influence, while its alliance with Washington supplied security cooperation. Oman did not join the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015 or the blockade of Qatar beginning in 2017. Its relations with the United Arab Emirates have included tension: in 2011, Oman arrested several Emirati citizens and accused them of operating a spy ring targeting a royal palace. Haitham continued ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States while mediating among them. Oman’s role as an intermediary is consequential, but its contacts alone do not establish neutrality in its financial and security dealings.

Muscat was central to diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program. Omani emissaries offered Washington a channel to Tehran early in Barack Obama’s presidency. Oman helped secure the release of three American hikers detained by Iranian security services in 2009 and mediated over Iranians captured in naval skirmishes. Secret American talks with Iranian officials began in Muscat in 2012, helping prepare the negotiations that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Oman continued to host contact between Washington and Tehran under Haitham, including planned talks in 2026. Its diplomatic role served American negotiations even as its economic relationship with the Iranian regime raised separate concerns.

Military and security

Oman’s location makes maritime security and border control continuing priorities. American forces have long used Omani airfields under a facilities-access arrangement. A March 2019 agreement expanded access to facilities and ports at Salalah and Duqm, strengthening the ability of the United States to operate near the Gulf without relying solely on passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Trade in goods and services between Oman and the United States totaled $4.3 billion in 2024, reflecting a relationship that extends beyond defense.

Oman has treated possible cross-border movement by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State members from Yemen as a security threat. Omani and American officials have cooperated on counterterrorism training, crisis management and control of land, air and maritime borders. In 2021, the Sultan’s Special Forces and the Royal Oman Police Special Task Force were its principal tactical counterterrorism response units. Rugged terrain along the Yemen frontier, limited resources and coordination among agencies complicated border enforcement.

Oman has also been a channel for diplomacy involving the Houthis, an Iranian-backed terrorist organization. It helped secure the return of Americans detained by the group and hosted direct talks between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Houthi representatives in November 2016 during ceasefire efforts. Before a later coalition announcement, U.S. Yemen envoy Tim Lenderking asked Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar to convey warnings to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Washington also pressed Oman over suspected Iranian weapons shipments reaching the Houthis through Omani territory or coastal waters. In one interdiction on September 25, coalition forces seized an Iranian dhow carrying antitank guided missiles and other weapons off Oman’s coast. Iranian cargo concealed among a growing number of vessel-to-vessel transfers in the Gulf of Oman has further complicated identification and interception.

Omani officials have expressed their own concern about Iranian conduct. In a 2008 meeting with U.S. Admiral William Gortney, General Ali bin Majid al-Ma’amari warned of the Iranian regime’s deceptive tactics and expansionist ambitions, including interference and support for Shiite militias in Iraq. U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis discussed Yemen and Iranian arms trafficking through Omani territory with Qaboos in March 2018. Oman nonetheless signed a defense cooperation accord with Iran in September 2013, and its military chief discussed stronger defense cooperation with Iranian counterpart Mohammad Bagheri in February 2025. Those decisions illustrate the continuing tension between Oman’s security partnership with Washington and its engagement with Tehran.

Relations with Israel

Oman has maintained a channel to Israel since Qaboos’s early reign. Following the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin flew directly to Muscat and met Qaboos; both governments agreed that the visit could be publicized. Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited in 1996. Oman also carried a Saudi message to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon asking him not to reject the Saudi peace initiative outright. Sharon accepted the request and declined media interviews on the initiative.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Qaboos in October 2018, becoming the first Israeli prime minister to make a public visit to Oman in 22 years. The leaders spent ten hours together at the royal palace, discussing state affairs, dining and attending a musical performance. Photographs released afterward showed them warmly shaking hands. The visit made an established relationship more visible, although it did not produce formal diplomatic normalization.

Under Haitham, Jerusalem and Muscat preserved political contact. Oman continued to tie formal normalization to its stated support for the Arab Peace Initiative, while sensitivity to its relationship with Iran limited prospects for a public breakthrough. Oman’s parliament voted in 2022 to criminalize interactions with Israel, demonstrating the political weight of opposition to closer ties. Israeli contacts therefore remain a real part of Oman’s diplomacy, while its banking, trade and security dealings with the Iranian regime require separate assessment.

Economy

Oil income financed much of Oman’s development under Qaboos, but smaller reserves and weaker fiscal buffers than those of several Gulf neighbors left the state exposed to price declines. Haitham’s 2021–2025 Five-Year Development Plan made foreign direct investment a priority. His government added testing and quality standards and e-commerce platforms to its business-development program. Oman also pursued development of a green hydrogen-based ammonia production facility in Salalah. Its ports gained business when Qatar moved supply routes toward Salalah and Sohar during the Gulf blockade.

Economic ties with the Iranian regime have grown alongside Oman’s diplomatic role. The governments proposed a natural-gas pipeline in 2007 and later revisited the project; during President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Muscat, they also agreed to jointly exploit offshore gas fields. Omani and Iranian institutions sought closer investment and banking links after the 2015 nuclear agreement. Bank Muscat held Iranian oil revenue, and in 2016 U.S. authorities licensed a proposed route for converting Iranian funds into euros. Omani banks helped the regime gain access to foreign reserves after implementation of the deal. Iran’s Bank Melli and Bank Saderat announced renewed operations in Muscat in 2017; both had faced U.S. sanctions, and their continued presence created financial and security concerns.

Under a 2016 arrangement with Tehran, Oman stored Iranian-produced heavy water exceeding the nuclear agreement’s permitted amount pending sale. The arrangement was separate from Muscat’s work as a negotiating channel and showed how cooperation could extend into the nuclear program’s commercial arrangements. In 2026, the U.S. Treasury sent warning letters concerning Omani support for Iranian sanctions evasion under Operation Economic Fury. Bank Melli and Bank Saderat remained operational in Oman that year. Claims from Iranian sources about new Omani trade measures require verification, but the warning letters and continued banking presence establish concrete grounds for scrutiny.

Oman’s relationship with the Iranian regime faced a further test in 2026 after Iranian missiles and drones struck Oman. The Omani government nevertheless became the first to congratulate Mojtaba Khamenei on his appointment as the regime’s supreme leader. Reports of discussions about a toll system for vessels in the Strait of Hormuz brought American objections. In May, Oman’s ambassador assured the U.S. Treasury that Oman had no plans to charge passage tolls. A later U.S.–Iran memorandum called for Iran and Oman to discuss future administration and maritime services in the strait. The distinction between discussing maritime services and imposing tolls remained consequential for free navigation.

Society and religion

Islam is Oman’s state religion, and its population includes Ibadi, Sunni and Shia Muslims. Christian communities in Muscat and Salalah include Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Protestants; Oman’s Christian population includes members of more than 60 Protestant denominations. Hindu and Sikh institutions also serve religious communities. The government has provided land for Catholic and Protestant churches in Salalah and Sohar, and a senior official from the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs spoke at the opening of Salalah’s Catholic church.

Non-Muslim religious groups seeking registration have had to request worship space through a government-recognized sponsor. Recognized sponsors have included Christian, Hindu and Sikh institutions based in Muscat. This framework permits organized worship while leaving access to facilities and formal recognition dependent on state procedures. Qaboos also established a one-month interfaith training and residency program for Omani imams at Cambridge. Religious accommodation has existed alongside limits on public expression: nearly 100 Omanis protested outside Muscat’s Royal Opera House after a visiting performer sang Quran verses to music.

Oman’s public record therefore combines substantial state development, room for several organized religious communities, and restrictions on political freedoms. Human-rights advocates have called for stronger protection of peaceful expression and migrant workers. Its diplomatic record is similarly mixed in concrete terms: Muscat helped open talks between Washington and Tehran and maintained channels with Israel, while Iranian banking activity, suspected weapons routes toward Yemen and the management of navigation near Hormuz continued to test its relationships with regional and American partners.