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Overview
The United Arab Emirates is a federation on the southeastern Arabian Peninsula, bordering Saudi Arabia and Oman and facing the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Its seven emirates are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah and Umm Al Quwain. Abu Dhabi holds the federal capital, most of the country’s oil wealth and its leading political position. Dubai developed into a center for trade, finance, transport and tourism. Together, they have shaped the federation’s economic reach and foreign policy.[1][6]
Founded in 1971 under Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the country grew from a group of British-protected Trucial States into a regional power. Its rulers have used oil revenue, commercial infrastructure and military investment to extend Emirati influence across the Middle East and the Red Sea. The federation is a partner of the United States, cooperates with Saudi Arabia while competing with it for regional standing, and regards the Islamic Republic of Iran as a major security threat. Its 2020 Abraham Accords treaty established peace and full diplomatic relations with Israel.[2][3][4][11]
Geography
The UAE occupies a largely arid landscape of coastal plains, desert and mountains. Most of its population and commercial activity are concentrated in cities along the Persian Gulf coast. Abu Dhabi comprises most of the federation’s land area, while Dubai’s ports and airports connect the country to markets across Asia, Africa and Europe. Sharjah extends to both the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman; Fujairah’s coast lies on the Gulf of Oman, beyond the Strait of Hormuz. These locations give the federation access to a maritime corridor central to global energy trade.
Geography also creates strategic exposure. The Iranian regime controls the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz and has developed missiles, drones and allied armed groups capable of threatening Gulf infrastructure and shipping. Saudi land routes and Emirati ports outside the strait offer partial alternatives for oil exports, but they could not carry the required volumes during the spring 2026 disruption. Fujairah has served as a point for tanker transfers, including a two-million-barrel crude shipment carried toward China aboard the Cospearl Lake. Emirati participation in Gulf of Oman tanker shuttle operations reflects the importance of keeping regional exports moving.[3]
The islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs remain a central territorial dispute between the UAE and the Iranian regime. Iran took control of the Tunbs in 1971 and established a presence on Abu Musa under a separate arrangement. In 1992 it restricted Emirati access to Abu Musa and expanded its military presence on the islands. Their position near the strait makes the dispute both a sovereignty issue and a continuing security concern for Abu Dhabi.[3]
History
Before federation, the emirates were known collectively as the Trucial States. British protection and maritime agreements shaped their external affairs, while individual rulers retained authority over local government. Britain’s withdrawal from areas east of Suez in 1971 accelerated negotiations among the rulers. Six emirates formed the United Arab Emirates on December 2 of that year; Ras Al Khaimah joined in 1972. Sheikh Zayed, ruler of Abu Dhabi, became the founding president and used Abu Dhabi’s resources to build federal institutions, infrastructure and public services. His leadership helped hold together territories with distinct ruling families and economic interests.[1][11]
Sheikh Zayed’s nation-building record also includes his principal funding of the Zayed Center, which circulated Holocaust denial and Jew hatred in 2002. The UAE closed the center in 2003. Its closure ended the institution, but the falsehoods it published remain part of the record of a center funded by the country’s founder.
After Zayed’s death in 2004, his son Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan became president. Oil income supported further development, while Dubai expanded commercial and financial services. Khalifa announced a limited electoral reform in 2005. It allowed an appointed electorate to choose half the members of the advisory Federal National Council; emirate rulers continued to appoint the other half. The council could review and recommend changes to legislation but could neither draft nor reject laws. Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, exercised most executive authority during Khalifa’s later presidency and succeeded him as president in 2022.[6][7]
The uprisings that began with the Arab Spring drew the UAE into regional contests over governments, armed groups and the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh backed Egypt after President Mohamed Morsi was removed in 2013; Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplied Egypt with $23 billion in grants, deposits and fuel over the following 18 months. The UAE also supported eastern forces during the 2014–2020 Libyan civil war. Its approach placed it opposite a Turkey–Qatar camp that supported western Libyan factions and Brotherhood-aligned movements. The rivalry was wider than a contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran: Turkey and Qatar formed a third center of influence in several post-Arab Spring conflicts.[12][13]
Jewish history
Jewish contact with the area predates the modern federation. During his travels between 1165 and 1173, Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela passed through areas now within the UAE and recorded a Jewish community at Kis, identified in the cited account with Ras Al Khaimah. The medieval record does not establish an uninterrupted local community, but it places Jewish life within the longer history of the Arabian Peninsula.[1]
A small modern Jewish community emerged largely through expatriates. In 2008, two Jewish families arriving in Dubai from London encountered other Jews working in fields including finance, law, energy and diamonds. Residents initially practiced with little public organization. Shared holidays and gatherings gradually became more visible, and the Jewish Council of Emirates formed in 2019. An estimate for 2020 placed the country’s Jewish population at approximately 200 to 300. The community’s growth preceded the formal agreement with Israel, while normalization gave Jewish residents and visitors greater scope for open religious and civic life.[1][2]
New institutions followed the accords. The American Jewish Committee opened an Abu Dhabi office in 2021, its first office in an Arab capital, to support dialogue and cooperation. In 2023, Jewish visitors completed work on a Torah scroll at Abu Dhabi’s Abrahamic Family House and celebrated at its Moses Ben Maimon Synagogue. Mohammed bin Zayed and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed also advanced interfaith initiatives involving Jewish and Muslim representatives. These developments gave the community public gathering places and connections to Jewish organizations abroad.[9][10]
Visibility brought security risks. In November 2024, Rabbi Zvi Kogan, a Chabad emissary, was murdered in the UAE. His killing exposed the vulnerability of Jewish life even after normalization and prompted renewed attention to antisemitic extremism and protection of the community. The country’s Jewish institutions remain significant achievements of the post-2020 period, but their public presence does not remove the need for security.[8]
Government and politics
The rulers of the seven emirates constitute the Federal Supreme Council, the federation’s highest legislative and executive body. It selects the president and vice president from its members; the president appoints the prime minister and cabinet. Abu Dhabi has supplied the presidency since federation, reflecting its size and resources. Dubai’s ruler has held the vice presidency and premiership. Individual emirates retain considerable authority over local matters: Dubai, for example, operates local and appellate courts for cases outside federal jurisdiction.[6][7]
National political participation is tightly limited. The Federal National Council has 40 seats, with half filled through voting by an appointed electorate and half by appointment from the emirate rulers. It is a consultative body rather than a legislature able to make or block laws. Political parties are absent, and the country has no general national election. Traditional forums provide one channel for citizens to raise concerns with rulers, but they do not replace electoral accountability. In 2018, the population was estimated at 9.4 million, with citizens accounting for about 11 percent; the large noncitizen majority had no role in choosing federal leaders.[6][7]
Mohammed bin Zayed’s authority expanded while Khalifa remained president, making him the federation’s principal executive figure before his formal succession in 2022. His administration has emphasized security capacity, foreign partnerships, technology and economic diversification. In 2024, he and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed on wording for a memorandum concerning artificial intelligence cooperation. His brother Tahnoun bin Zayed, the national security adviser, headed technology company G42 during U.S.–UAE discussions over advanced technology and the company’s ties with China.
Military and security
The UAE has built a capable military for a state of its size, purchasing advanced aircraft and missile defenses and providing U.S. forces access to al-Dhafra Air Base for surveillance of Iranian activity. Abu Dhabi became the first customer outside the U.S. military to order the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain together ordered roughly $25 billion in military equipment during an earlier phase of Gulf defense procurement, initially focused on air and missile defense. By 2012, Mohammed bin Zayed was asking Emirati officials to plan for an attack by a hostile regional power and its agents inside the country.[3]
Iranian missiles, drones, proxies and activity near Emirati territory have remained central concerns. The UAE’s response combines defenses and U.S. security cooperation with continued diplomatic and commercial contact with Tehran. Following normalization with Israel, senior officials of the Iranian regime threatened the Emirates over a potential Israeli presence in the Persian Gulf. In January 2022, the Houthi terrorist organization launched ballistic missiles at a UAE base housing American service members. In October 2023, Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq, a group linked to Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah, threatened U.S. targets in the UAE and Kuwait. Regional missile and drone attacks in April 2026 also affected Sharjah: an interception fragment caused a fire at Khor Fakkan Port, while a missile strike on a Thuraya Telecommunications Company building injured two Pakistanis.[3][14]
The UAE joined Saudi Arabia in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Saudi and Emirati ground support helped forces loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the Southern Resistance recapture Aden on July 17, 2015. Emirati and Qatari aircraft later delivered mobile air traffic control equipment to restore civilian and humanitarian flights at Aden’s airport. Emirati-backed brigades also advanced near Hodeidah. A proposed operation to retake the port aimed to restrict Iranian arms deliveries, weaken Houthi forces, improve negotiating leverage and restore capacity for humanitarian imports; an earlier amphibious plan required protection against anti-shipping missiles, mines and drone boats.
The UAE developed facilities around the Bab-el-Mandeb, including in Eritrea, Somaliland, on Perim and in the Socotra archipelago. These positions supported its effort to protect navigation and obstruct weapons smuggling to the Houthis. A 2019 military drawdown reduced its direct role in Yemen, though Emirati special operations personnel continued working with Yemeni and international partners against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The drawdown left Riyadh with greater responsibility for managing tensions among coalition partners.[11]
Saudi Arabia favored restoration of a unified Yemeni government, while the UAE backed southern independence aspirations associated with the Southern Transitional Council. Council-aligned forces seized Hadramawt and Al Mahrah in early December 2025, extending their control across the former South Yemen governorates. On December 30, Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashid al-Alimi ordered Emirati forces to leave within 24 hours and Saudi-backed Homeland Shield Forces to take camps in those governorates. Three southern council members and STC-aligned Tariq Saleh rejected the decree, arguing that it lacked the council’s required collective approval. Southern control of Aden and other ports could constrain Houthi smuggling and Iranian maritime influence, but the Houthis retained their northern base; fighting among their opponents weakened a common front.
In Libya, the UAE supported Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and conducted airstrikes against opponents backed by Turkey. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also assisted eastern forces, while Turkey, Qatar and Sudan supported western militias during the 2014–2015 fighting. Turkish military intervention later reversed Haftar’s advance in 2020. Foreign support and direct intervention were central to the war’s course, alongside Libya’s domestic divisions.[12][13]
Relations with Israel
On August 13, 2020, Mohammed bin Zayed joined U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a telephone call that sealed full normalization between the UAE and Israel. Their governments announced the agreement that day. The subsequent Abraham Accords treaty established peace, diplomatic relations and full normalization of bilateral ties. It made the Emirates a central Gulf partner of Israel and weakened the practical reach of the Arab League boycott as the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan developed ties with the Jewish state.[2][15]
The relationship grew beyond formal diplomacy. Israeli and Emirati officials agreed to pursue a regional agenda with the United States covering security, trade, development and diplomacy. By 2021, their bilateral relationship was the strongest among the four initial normalization partners. On the accords’ fifth anniversary, annual trade between Israel and the UAE exceeded $3 billion, compared with no official bilateral trade before normalization. Mohammed bin Zayed and Biden discussed stronger commercial and personal ties among Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, alongside cooperation with Egypt and Jordan.[2][15]
The UAE also joined wider forums. Foreign ministers from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain and the Emirates met at the March 2022 Negev Summit. The Negev Forum Steering Committee held its inaugural meeting in Manama that June. India, Israel, the UAE and the United States formed the I2U2 Group at an October 2021 foreign ministers’ meeting. Emirati and American investment supported a proposed Israel–Jordan arrangement linking solar energy and water. These efforts placed bilateral peace within a broader network of regional economic and security cooperation.
Normalization also sharpened the UAE’s security dilemma. The Iranian regime viewed possible Israeli military, intelligence and security activity in the Persian Gulf as a threat and warned Abu Dhabi after the agreement. The UAE continued its relationship with Israel while retaining channels to Tehran to limit its own exposure. Its approach joined a firm assessment of Iranian threats with practical efforts to avoid a direct confrontation.[3]
Economy
Abu Dhabi’s oil and gas resources finance much of the federation’s public spending, foreign investment and defense capacity. Dubai has built a different economic role through ports, aviation, finance, real estate and services. Its commercial networks connect Gulf producers and consumers to markets well beyond the region. The two emirates therefore anchor a federation with both substantial energy wealth and a diversified trading infrastructure.
Dubai has long been a major center of trade with Iran. Bilateral trade exceeded $11 billion in 2017; reported trade fell from about $13 billion before the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement to about $7 billion during the subsequent pressure campaign. These ties persisted despite the UAE’s security conflict with the Iranian regime. Dubai’s commercial role also created routes for sanctions evasion, including through trade, banking and air links. Effective export controls require enforcement at ports, banks and airlines. The UAE adopted a national security export control law in 2007, and Dubai announced plans for closer regulation of its dhow port.[3]
Regional competition affects economic policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cooperated on investment and security while competing for prestige, business activity and influence over energy markets. In 2022, Gulf states pledged $22 billion to support Egypt’s economy, including a $15 billion Saudi pledge and a $2 billion Abu Dhabi investment agreement. The UAE has also expanded ties with India and China. In 2019, Mohammed bin Zayed announced that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would receive the Zayed Medal for strengthening bilateral relations; in 2024, he attended the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum. China’s Gulf interests are tied to its demand for oil and its substantial trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not chiefly to its relationship with Iran.[4]
Society and religion
The UAE’s population includes a large majority of foreign residents. In 2018, citizens represented an estimated 11 percent of approximately 9.4 million residents. Arabic is the official language, while English is widely used in commerce and daily life. Islam is the official religion; Christian, Hindu, Jewish and other communities form part of the country’s religious landscape. The federation’s approach to public worship has allowed visible non-Muslim institutions, including the synagogue at Abu Dhabi’s Abrahamic Family House, while political participation remains restricted.[7][10]
Individual emirates retain distinct social policies. In January 2022, Sharjah introduced a four-day workweek, while the rest of the federation adopted a four-and-a-half-day schedule. Such differences coexist with federal institutions and a shared international profile. The country’s rapid urban growth and reliance on migrant labor have made citizenship, representation and the treatment of noncitizen residents important questions in assessing its development.[6][7]
The UAE’s regional role combines cooperation and rivalry. Alongside Saudi Arabia it confronted the Houthis in Yemen and opposed Brotherhood-aligned movements; in March 2014 the two states and Bahrain withdrew ambassadors from Qatar, and in 2017 they severed diplomatic and commercial ties with Doha. Their interests have since diverged over Yemen and Sudan. Saudi Arabia has favored Sudan’s army and mediated in its civil war, while the UAE has supported the rival Rapid Support Forces. The Emirates has simultaneously developed peace with Israel, maintained trade with Iran and built partnerships across the Gulf. Those choices reflect the opportunities and security pressures facing a commercially connected state in a contested region.[4][5]
তথ্যসূত্র
- 1United Arab Emirates Virtual Jewish History Tourjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 2Abraham Accords Peace Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and Israeljewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 3From the Abraham Accords to the War in Yemen: The United Arab Emirates and the Iranian Threatinss.org.il
- 4Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Contest and Cooperation in the Arabian Gulfinss.org.il
- 5Sudan as a Quiet Arena of Confrontation Between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emiratesinss.org.il
- 6Report on Human Rights Practices for 2010 - United Arab Emiratesjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 7Report on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - United Arab Emiratesjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 8The Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Middle East Minorities Condemns the Murder of Rabbi Kogan in the United Arab Emiratesadl.org
- 9American Jewish Committee Opens Office in Abu Dhabi, Ambassador Marc Sievers Named Directorajc.org
- 10AJC Leadership Delegation Conducts Meetings in United Arab Emiratesajc.org
- 11West of Suez for the United Arab Emirateswashingtoninstitute.org
- 12The United Arab Emirates: Turkey’s New Rivalwashingtoninstitute.org
- 13The Ruthless Realpolitik of the United Arab Emiratesfdd.org
- 14Kataib Hezbollah's Facade Group Threatens Gulf States Againwashingtoninstitute.org
- 15How the Abraham Accords Look Forward, Not Backwashingtoninstitute.org
- 16American Jewish Committee Will Open Office in the United Arab Emiratesajc.org
- 17Farce: Meet 2018 Membership of U.N. Human Rights Councilunwatch.org
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