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Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba is an Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia founded by Akram al-Kaabi in 2013. Its fighters have operated in Syria and Iraq, including within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, while its media apparatus promotes its political and military aims.

Zuletzt überarbeitet am 15. November 20265 Min. LesezeitQuellen · 15

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Overview

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, meaning “Movement of the Party of God’s Noble Ones,” is an Iranian-backed armed organization based in Iraq. Founded by Akram al-Kaabi in 2013, it adheres to Shia Islam and forms part of the Iranian regime’s regional armed network. Nujaba fought in the Syrian civil war and placed many fighters in the 12th Brigade of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Its activities also include attacks inside Iraq, operations against U.S. personnel, threats against Kurdish political leaders, and messaging connected to the Iran–Israel proxy conflict.

Founding and ideology

Kaabi joined the early Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, an Iraqi militia formed with the involvement of Iran’s Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah. From 2011 to 2013, he led Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fighters into Syria under the Quds Force’s administrative and operational control. He broke with the group over differences of approach and founded Nujaba in 2013. The split left Nujaba with both a separate leadership and a continuing place in the network of Iraqi militias aligned with Tehran.

Nujaba’s leadership has openly identified with Iran’s regional agenda. Kaabi has publicized his friendship with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and stated in 2015 that he would obey an order from Iran’s supreme leader to fight abroad or overthrow Iraq’s government. Nujaba maintains close, supportive relations with Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah, although it has also publicly criticized rival Iraqi militias.

History

Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah became major Iraqi volunteer contingents in the Syrian war. Nujaba fought in the major battles around Aleppo in 2015. Photographs circulated that November showed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani with Nujaba fighters at al-Hader, south of Aleppo, and with Kaabi in an operations room nearby. On August 9, 2016, about 2,000 Nujaba fighters arrived in Aleppo alongside Hezbollah’s Radwan battalion to close the Ramouseh corridor. These deployments placed Nujaba within the Iranian regime’s effort to reinforce Syrian government forces at decisive battlefronts.

Nujaba also expanded its role inside Iraq. Its PMF fighters joined attacks on television offices in Baghdad during the 2019 antigovernment protests. After Soleimani’s killing in January 2020, Nujaba visitors received high-profile treatment in Tehran. Russia hosted Kaabi for high-level meetings in Moscow in November 2022. Six Nujaba fighters died at Dibis, near Kirkuk, on December 3, 2023; Nujaba commander Abu Taqwa was killed in Baghdad on January 4, 2024.

Structure and leadership

Kaabi leads Nujaba’s armed and political organization. Its fighters in Iraq include members of PMF Brigade 12, which operates within Iraq’s state-sponsored mobilization structure while remaining under Nujaba leadership. Its branches include Al-Fateyyat al-Nujaba al-Kashfiyah, known as the al-Nujaba Boy Scouts. Antitrafficking organizations documented recruitment by Nujaba and other PMF groups of boys younger than 18 for fighting in Syria and Yemen; this practice was reported in accounts covering 2018 and 2019.

Al-Nujaba TV launched in 2013, shortly after the organization’s founding. Controlled by Nujaba and operating within its Directorate of Media, the channel is managed by Amir al-Quraishi. Nujaba’s wider media apparatus includes radio, video production, and social media outlets. After the United States seized al-Nujaba TV’s website domain in November 2020, the channel changed its address from Alnujaba.tv to Alnojaba.tv. Its continued broadcasting illustrates the organization’s use of media alongside armed activity.

Funding and sponsors

The Iranian regime has supported Nujaba as part of its network of Iraqi and Lebanese Shia forces deployed in Syria. The Quds Force directed Kaabi’s Syrian contingent before Nujaba’s founding, and the organization later operated alongside other Iranian-backed militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. These groups supplied much of the PMF’s combat strength. Nujaba and other Iraqi militias also helped move fighters from Liwa Zainabiyoun and Liwa Fatemiyoun into the Syrian war.

Attacks and operations

On October 5, 2019, fighters from Nujaba’s PMF Brigade 12 and another brigade attacked six Baghdad television stations that continued to cover antigovernment protests: Al-Arabiya, Dijlah, Al-Ghad, NRT, Al-Hadath, and TRT. The offices were ransacked and broadcasts interrupted. Human rights reporting also identified armed groups reportedly affiliated with Nujaba among those implicated in violence against demonstrators during the protests.

After January 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups including Nujaba, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq carried out more than 180 rocket, missile, and drone attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. A drone strike at Kharab al-Jir, also called Rmeilan Landing Zone, in Syria on March 23, 2023, killed one U.S. contractor and wounded five other U.S. personnel. Nujaba was assessed to have carried out the attack; that assessment does not establish that Nujaba publicly claimed it.

Nujaba has also used threats to advance its position in the Kurdistan Region. In its first Kurdish-language video, released March 16, 2022, it called for a change in the political order led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The video appeared three days after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps missiles struck Erbil. Nujaba repeated Iran’s unsubstantiated accusation that party-led authorities permitted Mossad bases in the region. Its message promoted greater influence for Iran-aligned militias there.

Nujaba’s public messages in 2024 addressed both U.S. forces and Israel. In late January, it mocked Kata’ib Hezbollah’s temporary halt to attacks on U.S. forces after American strikes; in June, it mocked Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq over its role in armed attacks. A July 17 Islamic Resistance in Iraq video showed Kaabi beside fighters assembling a Shahed-101 explosive drone and claimed an earlier drone attack on a target in Eilat, Israel, without giving a date for that attack. On October 12, Nujaba Executive Council head Nadhim al-Saeedi threatened attacks on energy facilities if Iranian oil facilities were bombed. The next day, Nujaba affiliate Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds threatened energy infrastructure in several Arab countries.

Designations and international status

The U.S. Treasury designated Kaabi a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on September 16, 2008, before he founded Nujaba. The United States designated Nujaba itself in March 2019 and listed al-Nujaba TV alongside the movement. These measures reflect U.S. treatment of the organization as part of Iran’s armed proxy network, despite its fighters’ formal placement within Iraq’s PMF.

Current status

Nujaba remains active as an Iraqi militia with armed, political, and media branches. Its fighters’ participation in the PMF gives it a role in Iraq’s security apparatus, while its operations in Syria and its messages concerning Israel and U.S. forces connect it to Iran’s wider regional campaign. In November 2024, an Iraqi armed-group attack claim commemorated 36 fighters killed since October 2023, including seven from Nujaba.

Quellen

  1. 1Profile: Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujabawashingtoninstitute.org
  2. 2Profile: Al-Nujaba Satellite Televisionwashingtoninstitute.org
  3. 3How Militia Digital Media Avoid Domain Seizure and Blockingwashingtoninstitute.org
  4. 4Akram Kaabi Shown Pretending to Assemble a Drone Fired at Israelwashingtoninstitute.org
  5. 5Nujaba's Regime Change Threat to the Kurdistan Democratic Partywashingtoninstitute.org
  6. 6Militias Pivot Away from U.S. Targets, Toward Kurdistan and Turkish Baseswashingtoninstitute.org
  7. 7Exposing and Sanctioning Human Rights Violations by Iraqi Militiaswashingtoninstitute.org
  8. 8Who Are Nujaba and Why Did the U.S. Just Strike Them?washingtoninstitute.org
  9. 9Understanding Iran’s Vast Media Network in Arab Countrieswashingtoninstitute.org
  10. 10Profile: The Islamic Resistance in Iraqwashingtoninstitute.org
  11. 11Honored, Not Contained: The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forceswashingtoninstitute.org
  12. 12International Religious Freedom Report for 2019 - Iraqjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  13. 13Report on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Iraqjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  14. 14Iran’s Proxy Strategy and Militias in Iraq: Congressional Testimonyfdd.org
  15. 15Iraq Border Crossing is a Potential Gateway for Weaponsfdd.org

Themen außerhalb des Nahen Ostens verlinken auf die Encyclopaedia Britannica.