Najaf

Overview

Najaf is a holy city in Iraq and a major destination for pilgrims in Shia Islam. It lies in Mesopotamia, within the Middle East. The city centers on the Shrine of Imam Ali, one of Shia Islam’s holiest sites. Religious study and pilgrimage give Najaf significance well beyond Iraq: its theological schools have international standing, and its senior clerics guide followers across the Shia world. The shrine and seminaries also make control of the city a matter of political consequence. Iraqi governments, armed movements and the Iranian regime have all sought influence over Najaf’s institutions, while its religious establishment has defended an authority rooted in scholarship rather than state office.

Najaf is a principal starting point for the Islamic pilgrimage of Arbaeen. Pilgrims travel from the city to Karbala to mark the end of the forty-day mourning period for Imam Husayn. The route links two of Iraq’s most important Shia shrine cities. It has also been a point of confrontation: Saddam Hussein’s government restricted the walk and used security forces against people attempting it. In later years, large numbers of pilgrims from Iran traveled through Najaf, making access to its airport and the overland pilgrimage route significant to the city’s religious and economic life.

Geography

Najaf and Karbala form a linked pilgrimage landscape in central Iraq. The walk between them is especially associated with Arbaeen, although both cities receive visitors for other observances. Najaf’s airport serves pilgrims arriving from abroad, particularly from Iran. The flow of visitors supports hotels, transport and other local businesses. An analysis of religious tourism in Iraq identified Najaf and Karbala as its most popular destinations and described the exposure of their visitor economies to changes in Iranian travel. During a period of sanctions and falling value of Iran’s currency, flights between Najaf and Iran declined and hotels in Najaf offered reduced rates to attract guests.

The city’s sacred sites have repeatedly shaped its security arrangements. Routes into Najaf and onward to Karbala have been guarded or closed during periods of unrest. Iraq deployed large numbers of soldiers and police to the two cities for Ashura in December 2009 to protect pilgrims. These measures reflected both the scale of religious travel and the vulnerability of crowded shrine districts. Najaf’s geography as a pilgrimage hub therefore connects local streets, regional roads and international air service to developments across Iraq and Iran.

Modern history

Najaf’s clerical institutions developed under Ottoman rule and remained a major center of Shia learning after the empire’s collapse. Its seminaries have long stood alongside those of Qom as centers of religious authority. Tensions between the two developed after the Ottoman period and intensified following Iran’s 1979 revolution. During the 1970s, while living in Najaf, Ruhollah Khomeini delivered lectures setting out Wilayat al-Faqih, or rule of the jurist. That doctrine became central to the Islamic Republic’s governing system. Najaf’s senior school under Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani follows a different course: Sistani holds religious authority without serving as a state official and opposes placing a supreme clerical ruler above elected civil officials.

Under Saddam Hussein, Najaf’s scholars and schools faced sustained repression. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq deported tens of thousands of Shia Arabs and Kurds to Iran. Religious scholars and merchants who financed Najaf’s schools were among the principal targets. During the Iran–Iraq War, the government expelled foreign scholars and denied visas to thousands of prospective students. It manipulated the theological schools and subjected scholars to arrest, assault and harassment. Restrictions on worship included government material for mosque sermons and bans on prominent clerics leading prayers.

The repression intensified after the 1991 Iraqi uprising. Security forces occupied positions inside the Shrine of Imam Ali and at Najaf’s theological schools. The shrine closed for approximately two years. The adjoining al-Khathra mosque closed in 1994 and remained closed in 2002. Although the government briefly eased restrictions on attendance at theological schools after the uprising, their revival was followed by a renewed crackdown on the Shia religious establishment. By 2000, attempts on Sistani’s life had left him confined to his Najaf home, and the government barred him from leading prayers. Authorities also barred Ayatollah Mohammed Sayeed al-Hakim from leading prayers at the Imam Ali shrine.

Attacks on clerics added to the pressure. Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi, his son and his son-in-law were shot on the road from Karbala to Najaf on June 1, 1998. In February 1999, Saddam Hussein’s agents killed Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr and two of his sons. His surviving son, Najaf-born Muqtada al-Sadr, later built an armed movement. The government also restricted pilgrimage. In May 2000, security forces opened fire on people attempting to walk from Najaf to Karbala for the forty-day mourning ritual. More than 15,000 Republican Guard troops were deployed on roads into the two cities to enforce a pilgrimage ban. The Ba’ath Party again prohibited the walking procession in May 2001.

Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003 opened Najaf’s religious and political institutions to new competition. Pro-U.S. cleric Abd al-Majid al-Khoi was murdered outside the Imam Ali Mosque shortly after returning from exile. Followers of Muqtada al-Sadr then surrounded Sistani’s home. Sistani, a rival of al-Sadr for influence in Najaf, temporarily went into hiding and reemerged after reinforcements strengthened his position. These events showed how quickly violence around the shrine could threaten both clerical leadership and civic order.

Security

In April 2004, al-Sadr’s supporters seized positions in Najaf, Kufa and other Iraqi cities. His Mahdi Army gained partial control of Najaf. Fighting near shrines complicated coalition operations in the city’s dense streets. A spring ceasefire and the militia’s withdrawal from the streets of Najaf and Kufa reduced immediate pressure but left the organization intact. Renewed fighting later that year showed that its armed challenge had continued.

The confrontation escalated in August 2004 as the Mahdi Army attacked U.S. positions in Baghdad, Najaf and Basra. Militia fighters operated close to sacred sites, including the Imam Ali shrine. A U.S. helicopter was downed in Najaf without loss of life. By mid-August, U.S. forces had killed up to 400 militia fighters in the city, while two U.S. Marines had died there. Despite these losses, combat and negotiations had not settled the standoff. Iraqi authorities, coalition forces and al-Sadr had failed to reach a durable resolution.

Sistani’s intervention ended the confrontation. On August 27, 2004, he brokered an agreement between American-led coalition forces and al-Sadr’s forces. Armed men who had used the Imam Ali Mosque as a base handed its keys to Sistani. Mahdi Army fighters left Najaf’s streets, and other religious authorities took control of the shrine. The outcome demonstrated the reach of Najaf’s senior clerical authority in a crisis that military force alone had not resolved. It did not mean the Mahdi Army had been dismantled: the militia survived the spring ceasefire and August battle.

Najaf’s security and sovereignty remained linked to the influence of Iranian-backed armed groups. Sistani-aligned Holy Shrine Units resisted pro-Iran dominance within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. Their 2021 break from that umbrella organization signaled opposition to Iranian regime influence and alignment with Najaf’s religious school and Iraq’s national army. The Iranian regime’s interest in Najaf extends to its seminaries: their independent authority limits Tehran’s claim to political supremacy over Shia communities. Succession to Sistani’s senior position could take months or years under Najaf’s traditions, leaving an opening for attempted interference by Iran and its proxies.

Present day

Sistani remains Najaf’s highest source of emulation, or marja, and a leading figure in its nonpolitical Shia school. His office holds the highest clerical rank in Shia Islam, marjaiya. His authority differs from that of the Iranian regime’s supreme leader: Sistani does not hold state office and has supported political reconciliation and constitutional government in Iraq. Najaf’s senior religious establishment urged Iraqis to vote before the September 2021 parliamentary elections. The same year, the Tishreen Movement and secular independents made substantial electoral gains in Najaf and other southern Iraqi cities, reflecting opposition to the established political class and foreign influence.

Najaf has also hosted major encounters beyond Shia politics. Pope Francis’s 2021 trip was the first papal visit to Iraq and included a meeting with Sistani in Najaf. The meeting drew attention to Iraq’s religious diversity and the situation of its Christian communities. Before the visit, church leader Louis Raphaël Sako sought a joint declaration defending human life. The meeting placed Najaf’s clerical leadership in an international discussion of coexistence after years of violence against religious minorities.

Relations with Iran continue to affect the city. Protesters torched the Iranian consulate in Najaf in November 2019 amid wider demonstrations in Iraq; staff had apparently left before the attack, and no casualties were reported. Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, visited Najaf in September 2021 for the funeral of senior cleric Mohammed Saeed al-Hakeem. During later visits to Iraq, Qaani appeared at Shia shrines and at the Najaf grave of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. He returned to Najaf for Arbaeen ceremonies in September 2023 and prayed at the Imam Ali Mosque. Such visits underline the city’s importance to Iranian officials and militia networks even as Najaf’s senior school maintains its distance from Tehran’s model of clerical government.

Air travel has provided another measure of that connection. After flights between Iran and Iraq were suspended in September amid U.S. sanctions pressure, Najaf seminary students and professors protested the interruption. A narrow U.S. Treasury license permitted Iraqi Airways to carry Iranian pilgrims between Iran and Najaf through October 28, subject to limits on passengers and cargo. Iranian carriers subsequently resumed service; Najaf airport’s October 4–9 schedules listed 75 arrivals from Iran, including flights by ten U.S.-sanctioned airlines. The dispute showed how pilgrimage access, local economic interests and sanctions policy can converge in Najaf.

Najaf’s role in Iraqi-Iranian relations was also visible during the July 2026 funeral procession for slain Iranian regime leader Ali Khamenei. His body arrived in Najaf on July 7 and was taken to Najaf and Karbala for rites on July 8. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi received the delegation alongside former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Iran-backed militia leaders Qais Khazali and Rayan Kildani attended the airport reception. Iraqi authorities limited official ceremonies to Najaf and Karbala and barred senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, including Qaani, from participating. Sistani did not attend the Najaf ceremony or lead its prayers; his office cited his health. Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Hakim led prayers at the Shrine of Imam Ali. The procession brought Iranian political figures and Iraqi militia leaders to Najaf while leaving the city’s senior clerical authority institutionally separate from the Iranian regime.