Masoud Pezeshkian

Overview

Masoud Pezeshkian is an Iranian physician and politician who won the presidency of Iran in July 2024. His career took him from heart surgery and university administration to the health ministry under President Mohammad Khatami, parliament and the presidency. Often identified with Iran’s reformist camp, he campaigned amid economic distress and public disillusionment with the regime. His election followed a mass voter boycott and took place within a system in which the Guardian Council controlled access to the ballot and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei retained authority over sensitive appointments. Those limits shaped Pezeshkian’s government from its formation.^{[1][2][3][14]}

Pezeshkian favored economic reform and a nuclear settlement with Western governments that could ease sanctions. He also ruled out including Israel in any détente. Immediately after his victory, he reaffirmed the Iranian regime’s support for Hezbollah, the terrorist organization in Lebanon, and subsequently met leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Tehran. His presidency thus joined a stated interest in negotiations with Western governments to continuity in the regime’s regional policy. In June 2026, he and U.S. President Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding addressing Iran’s nuclear program.^{[6][7][8][12]}

Early life

Pezeshkian was born on September 29, 1954, in Mahabad, in northwestern Iran. His mother was Kurdish and his father Azerbaijani. His family background later formed part of the public account of a politician whose 2024 electoral support was particularly strong in several ethnic minority provinces. Analysis of the runoff found that support in three Azerbaijani provinces, one Kurdish province and one Baluch province contributed substantially to his margin over Saeed Jalili. His birthplace and parentage are biographical facts; the geographic pattern of his vote does not, by itself, explain every voter’s choice.^[2][14]

Before entering national politics, Pezeshkian built a medical career. He taught surgery at Tabriz University of Medical Sciences, earned his surgical specialization in 1990 and later completed a subspecialty in heart surgery at Iran University of Medical Sciences. In 1994, he became chief administrator of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. His medical training, teaching and administrative work preceded his appointment to the national health ministry and remained central to his public biography during his later political career.^[2]

Career

President Mohammad Khatami appointed Pezeshkian deputy health minister in 2000. Following Khatami’s reelection in 2001, Pezeshkian became health minister after securing a vote of confidence in parliament. He survived an impeachment attempt in 2003. His progression from university administration to the cabinet gave him experience running a major public institution before he sought elected office. It also placed him within the political circle associated with Khatami’s presidency, although his subsequent career unfolded under different presidents and changing alignments within the regime.^[2]

In 2008, Pezeshkian won a parliamentary seat representing Tabriz. He served as deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament from 2016 through 2020. The parliamentary years gave him a national platform and experience dealing with factions that held differing views on domestic policy, government appointments and relations with Western countries. He registered three presidential bids before his successful campaign in 2024. His eventual victory followed years in both executive and legislative office, rather than a direct move from medicine into the presidency.^[2]

The 2024 presidential election took place after the death of President Ebrahim Raisi. Candidates required approval from the 12-member Guardian Council, an institution under Khamenei’s authority. Pezeshkian reached the July 5 runoff against Saeed Jalili, a former nuclear negotiator, and defeated him. The regime’s official count gave Pezeshkian 53.3 percent and Jalili 44.3 percent. More than 600,000 runoff ballots were voided. At least 60 percent of eligible voters boycotted the June 28 first round, while at least half boycotted the runoff. Khamenei congratulated Pezeshkian on July 6 and blamed low turnout on the regime’s enemies. The official victory established Pezeshkian as president, while the boycott showed the scale of public refusal to participate in the contest.^[3][14]

On August 11, 2024, Pezeshkian submitted his proposed cabinet to parliament. Seven nominees had served as ministers or deputy ministers under Hassan Rouhani, and six came from Raisi’s government. Eleven of the 19 nominees held doctoral degrees. The selection mixed figures from different administrations and avoided placing distinctly reformist ministers in major ministries regarded as sensitive by the conservative establishment. Pezeshkian’s nominees for foreign minister, intelligence minister and interior minister required Khamenei’s approval as well as parliamentary approval. The cabinet’s composition reflected both Pezeshkian’s preference for economic changes over political and civic reform and the authority of other centers of power over his administration.^[1]

Pezeshkian continued to address domestic strains after taking office. When hardliners passed a new hijab law, he and parliamentary speaker Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf refrained from enacting it. In October 2025, Pezeshkian warned that moving the capital out of Tehran had become necessary. These positions concerned different pressures on the state: enforcement of social restrictions in one case and the long-term viability of the capital in the other. Neither changed the constitutional position of the supreme leader or the institutional limits under which Pezeshkian governed.^[1][11]

Ideology and statements

Pezeshkian’s response to the 2022 protests showed both his willingness to criticize aspects of the regime’s conduct and the limits of his political opposition. After Mahsa Amini died in police custody, protests spread across Iran under the Women, Life, Freedom slogan. Pezeshkian expressed support for the movement but criticized calls to remove Khamenei from power. His position separated support for protesters’ demands from support for replacing the supreme leader. The protests and the subsequent crackdown contributed to the public disillusionment visible in the 2024 election boycott.^[2][14]

As president, Pezeshkian placed greater emphasis on economic reforms than on political or civic reforms. The proposed cabinet included experienced figures from both Rouhani’s and Raisi’s governments, but he did not put distinctly reformist ministers in the most sensitive major ministries. Khamenei’s approval was required for key security and foreign-policy nominees. Pezeshkian’s reformist label therefore described a political alignment and some domestic priorities; it did not give him independent control over candidacy rules, sensitive appointments or the regime’s regional network.^[1][13]

Pezeshkian favored negotiations over the nuclear program of Iran as a means of easing sanctions and addressing the country’s economic crisis. During the July 5, 2024, election, however, he explicitly excluded Israel from any détente with Western countries. Days later, in a message to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, he reaffirmed the regime’s support for Hezbollah against Israel. He tied that support to the Islamic Republic’s founding ideology and Khamenei’s direction. His stated interest in a nuclear settlement was therefore accompanied by an explicit commitment to continue support for an armed organization fighting Israel.^[4][6]

After Trump’s election to the U.S. presidency, Pezeshkian said Iran’s system relied on its own strength and people regardless of who won the American vote. His government nevertheless remained interested in negotiations. On June 17, 2026, Pezeshkian and Trump signed a memorandum of understanding addressing Iran’s nuclear program. Its language left open legal questions, including whether it was binding on either country. The signing marked a diplomatic development in Pezeshkian’s presidency without erasing his earlier exclusion of Israel from détente or Khamenei’s continuing authority within Iran’s political system.^[8][11]

Role in attacks or conflicts

Pezeshkian’s early contacts with the Iranian regime’s regional partners emphasized continuity. In July 2024, he told Nasrallah that Iran would maintain its support for Hezbollah. He assured Bashar al-Assad on July 9 that the regime would continue supporting Syria and their regional alliance. He also spoke with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid on July 8 about deeper ties between Iran and Iraq; Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani congratulated him and invited him to Iraq. These exchanges joined routine relations between states to Iran’s policy of supporting the armed network it calls the Axis of Resistance.^[4][5]

Pezeshkian also spoke in July 2024 with Mahdi al-Mashat of the Houthi movement in Yemen. He invoked Iran’s longstanding ties with Yemen, promised efforts to expand his administration’s relations with the Houthis and praised Houthi operations against Israel-linked ships. Those maritime attacks formed part of the wider Red Sea crisis. His remarks placed support for the Houthis alongside his pledges to Hezbollah and other members of the regime’s regional network.^[4][5]

Leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad traveled to Tehran for Pezeshkian’s July 30 inauguration. Both are terrorist organizations supported by the Iranian regime. Pezeshkian met Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah on July 29 and pledged continued Iranian support for his organization’s cause. He met Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on July 30. Pezeshkian also held meetings with other senior figures from the Axis of Resistance and pledged continued support for the network. Haniyeh and al-Nakhalah met Khamenei during their visit, underscoring that the inauguration brought together the presidency, the supreme leader and leaders of Iran-backed armed organizations.^[5][7][15]

Haniyeh was killed in Tehran during the night of July 30–31, 2024, hours after meeting Pezeshkian and while visiting for his inauguration. The killing prompted emergency meetings among Iranian officials. Pezeshkian threatened retaliation against Israel and pledged stronger ties between the Iranian regime and Hamas’s cause. Haniyeh’s presence as an inauguration guest made the attack a direct challenge to the regime during a presidential transition. Pezeshkian’s response affirmed continuity in support for Hamas rather than a change in the policy he had expressed during the election and the inauguration meetings.^[5][9]

The regional network faced further conflict during Pezeshkian’s presidency. His pledge to Hezbollah came as the organization fought Israel, and his praise for Houthi operations concerned attacks on shipping linked to Israel. His meetings with Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders were political engagements with terrorist organizations, not evidence that he personally directed a particular attack. The significance of those engagements lies in the support he promised as president and in the alignment of his statements with the Iranian regime’s established regional policy.^[4][5][6][7]

Death or current status

Pezeshkian remained active as president through the events described in 2026. In early August 2025, he made his first official foreign visit as president to Pakistan. The visit concerned relations across Iran’s eastern border, where security tensions and prospects for economic cooperation had shaped the two countries’ recent dealings. After Israel struck Hamas leadership in Qatar in September 2025, Pezeshkian spoke with Qatar’s ruler, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. In October, he publicly raised the need to move Iran’s capital out of Tehran. His June 2026 memorandum with Trump then placed the nuclear issue at the center of a direct diplomatic development involving the two presidents.^[8][10]

Legacy

Pezeshkian’s rise illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of electoral change within the Iranian regime. He brought a medical and parliamentary career to the presidency, spoke in support of the Women, Life, Freedom movement and sought economic relief through nuclear negotiations. His election also occurred after most eligible voters boycotted the first round and at least half boycotted the runoff. The Guardian Council had controlled who could stand, while Khamenei retained a decisive role in appointments to sensitive ministries. Pezeshkian’s cabinet choices reflected those constraints and his preference for economic reform over broad political change.^{[1][2][3][14]}

His foreign-policy record likewise resists treatment as a general turn toward Israel. Pezeshkian excluded Israel from Western détente, reaffirmed support for Hezbollah, met the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad around his inauguration and pledged continued backing for the regime’s regional network. At the same time, he pursued negotiations with Western governments over Iran’s nuclear program, culminating in the June 2026 memorandum with the United States. These positions define the central distinction of his presidency: a willingness to seek economic and diplomatic arrangements with Western governments within a political system still directed by Khamenei and committed to supporting armed organizations opposed to Israel.^{[1][4][5][6][7][8]}