Yemen

Overview

Yemen occupies the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. It borders Saudi Arabia and Oman, faces the Red Sea to the west, and extends along the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Its capital, Sanaa, has been held by the Houthi movement since 2014, while Aden has served as a center for authorities opposed to Houthi rule. Yemen remains a state, but competing governments and armed organizations control different parts of its territory.

The country’s modern conflict draws on divisions between north and south, rival political and tribal networks, economic scarcity, and disputes over the structure of the state. It also has an international dimension. The Houthi terrorist organization receives support from the regime in Iran and has attacked Israel and commercial shipping. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened against the Houthis but developed different aims for southern Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State have also operated in the country.

Geography

Yemen’s western coastal plain rises into densely settled highlands before descending toward arid eastern regions. Its terrain and long coastline have shaped settlement, trade, and warfare. The islands of Socotra belong to Yemen and lie in the Arabian Sea. Inland, Marib has been important for its energy resources and, during the civil war, for the survival of the internationally recognized government’s position in northern Yemen.

Yemen overlooks the Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and routes to the Indian Ocean. Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal pass through this corridor. Control of nearby ports, especially Aden and Hodeidah, therefore affects international trade, humanitarian supplies, and maritime security. Houthi attacks on vessels have demonstrated that armed forces based in Yemen can disrupt traffic far beyond the country’s shores.

History

Ancient Yemen was home to South Arabian kingdoms whose wealth rested partly on agriculture and trade. Saba was among the best known; Himyar later became a dominant kingdom. Himyar’s rulers adopted Judaism by the late fourth century, traditionally dated to around 384, and Jewish rule endured until Christian forces from Ethiopia conquered the kingdom in the sixth century. The arrival of Islam in the seventh century brought Yemen into wider Islamic political and commercial networks, although local dynasties and regional powers continued to compete for authority.

In 897, the Zaydi imam Yahya al-Hadi ila al-Haqq established a ruling line in northern Yemen. The Zaydi imamate became a principal political and religious institution for centuries. Its authority varied by period and locality, and it coexisted with other rulers elsewhere in Yemen. The imamate finally ended in the republican revolution of 1962. The ensuing north Yemeni civil war drew in outside powers: Egypt sent troops to support the republic, while Saudi Arabia supported royalist forces. The confrontation between Cairo and Riyadh became a major regional struggle. Egypt’s military commitment in Yemen also figured in Israeli assessments before the Six-Day War.

Britain took Aden in 1839 and developed it as a port on the route to India. British rule later extended through protectorates in southern Yemen. The south gained independence in 1967 and subsequently became a Soviet-aligned state, while the northern republic maintained a different political orientation. North and South Yemen formally unified in May 1990 under President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Unification did not settle disputes over power and resources: northern and southern forces fought a civil war in 1994, and southern demands for greater autonomy or renewed independence persisted.

Saleh had ruled North Yemen since 1978 and led the unified country from 1990. His government fought successive Houthi rebellions in the north from 2004 to 2010. The uprisings reflected grievances in the Saada area as well as political and religious conflict. During the Arab Spring, protests in 2011 combined with defections among political and military elites to weaken Saleh’s rule. A negotiated transition offered him immunity in exchange for leaving office. His former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, became the sole consensus presidential candidate in 2012.

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference proposed a six-region federal republic, with Sanaa holding autonomous status outside any district. The proposal did not resolve the country’s divisions. After leaving office, Saleh reversed his earlier opposition to the Houthis and joined forces with them against Hadi’s government. Houthi fighters and Saleh-aligned forces seized Sanaa in 2014, beginning the present Yemeni civil war. In February 2015, they replaced parliament with a Supreme Revolutionary Committee. Hadi’s international recognition did not give his government effective control of the capital; he was driven into exile while the Houthis held Sanaa.

Jewish history

Yemenite Jews maintained a distinct religious and cultural life over many centuries. An ancient Sabaean inscription attests to a Jewish presence in the region at least 2,500 years ago, while Yemenite tradition places the community’s arrival as early as the First Temple period. Himyar’s adoption of Judaism made Jewish history part of the country’s pre-Islamic political history. Later Jewish communities lived under Muslim rulers, preserved their traditions, and faced restrictions that varied over time and place.

Under Islamic rule, Jews were subject to special taxes and limits on religious and social life. The first Zaydi imam barred the construction of synagogues, although he allowed Jews to own and purchase land. In 1679, Imam al-Mahdi Ahmad ordered Yemen’s Jews expelled to Mawza, a desert area in the south. About two-thirds died from starvation and disease during the year of exile. Survivors returned to find homes taken and holy books burned. Jews were subsequently confined to quarters outside cities and forbidden to build homes taller than nearby Muslim homes. Their endurance under these conditions is central to Yemenite Jewish history.

Yemenite Jews were among the earliest participants in the modern Jewish return to the Land of Israel. A major wave reached it in 1882, before the first large wave of European Jewish immigration. By 1948, about 40 percent of Yemenite Jews had already immigrated to Israel. In May 1949, Yemen’s imam agreed to let most remaining Jews depart, enabling Israel and Jewish relief organizations to carry out Operation Magic Carpet, which brought almost the entire remaining community to Israel in 1949–1950. A small community remained: an American diplomat encountered Jews in northern Yemen in 1976, and further departures followed insecurity and persecution. In 2009, a Jewish family fled to Israel after a grenade was thrown at its home; a contemporary report estimated that only 280 Jews remained in Yemen.

Government and politics

Since the Houthi seizure of Sanaa, Yemen’s institutions have been divided among authorities with differing territorial reach. The internationally recognized government operated for years under Hadi, at times largely from Riyadh, while its control and legitimacy weakened inside Yemen. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) became a powerful actor in the former South Yemen. It has participated in the internationally recognized governing structure while pursuing southern independence and fighting other forces aligned with that government. Its position does not represent every southern political group; some groups opposed its self-administration declaration, and some residents of Hadramawt have sought autonomy for their own governorate.

Saudi Arabia has favored restoration of a unified Yemeni government. The United Arab Emirates has supported southern forces and independence aspirations associated with the STC. Their competing aims became especially visible after UAE-backed separatist forces strengthened their hold on Aden in 2019. That year’s Riyadh Agreement sought to place the STC and Hadi’s government under one political and military command and envisaged equal northern and southern representation in a new cabinet. It left unresolved which southern groups would receive seats and how opposing forces would be integrated. Implementation stalled. On 25 April 2020, the STC declared autonomous administration in southern Yemen, showing that the agreement had not settled the southern question.

Political competition has continued alongside the war. Islah, Yemen’s principal party associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, has held influential roles in governments and military forces opposed to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia cooperated with Islah against the Houthis while exempting it from its terrorism list. At its June 2024 meeting, the Gulf Cooperation Council backed a settlement framework based on the GCC Initiative, National Dialogue outcomes, and UN Security Council Resolution 2216. Negotiations have nevertheless faced the unresolved questions of Houthi control, southern representation, and the future shape of the state.

In December 2025, STC-aligned forces seized Hadramawt and Al Mahrah, extending their control across the governorates of the former South Yemen. On 30 December, Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashid al-Alimi ordered Emirati forces to leave within 24 hours and instructed Saudi-backed Homeland Shield Forces to take camps in the two governorates. Three southern council members and STC-aligned Tariq Saleh rejected the order, arguing that it lacked the council’s required collective approval. The confrontation exposed divisions within the recognized government as well as between its Saudi- and UAE-backed partners.

Military and security

The Saudi-led intervention began in 2015 after the Houthis and Saleh-aligned forces attacked Hadi’s government and expanded beyond Sanaa. The coalition initially closed Yemeni airspace and imposed a naval blockade to restrict arms deliveries to those forces. The UAE later drew down much of its military presence, leaving Riyadh greater responsibility for managing disputes among coalition partners; Emirati special operations personnel continued to work with Yemeni and international partners against AQAP. Saudi Arabia opened direct talks with the Houthis after the September 2019 attacks on its Abqaiq oil facilities, seeking to protect its territory and find an exit from the war.

Iran’s regime has supplied and assisted the Houthi terrorist organization. Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers have aided Houthi missile, drone, tunnel, and logistics units, including work near front lines. Intercepted shipments have included rifles, ammunition, anti-tank missiles, and rocket components. On 1 December 2022, the U.S. Navy stopped a vessel in the Gulf of Oman carrying more than one million rounds of ammunition and rocket components from Iran toward the Houthis, following another seizure in November. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States also pressed Oman over suspected trafficking through its territory and coastal waters. Suspected routes require care in description: limited inspections made Salalah a possible transit point for Burkan-2H missile components, but passage through that port was not established.

Sunni jihadist organizations constitute a separate security threat. Al-Qaeda cells bombed the USS Cole in Aden on 12 October 2000, killing 17 U.S. sailors, and attacked the French tanker Limburg in 2002. AQAP emerged from the merger of Yemeni and Saudi al-Qaeda branches in 2009; its ranks included local fighters, Saudi nationals, veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and former Guantanamo detainees. The United States began targeted drone strikes in Yemen in 2002 and expanded them after 2009. A U.S. strike killed AQAP bomb-maker Ibrahim al-Asiri in 2017. The Islamic State established a Yemen branch amid the country’s breakdown and competed with al-Qaeda, including through attacks on its doctrinal legitimacy. Yemen has also seen violence between Zaydi and Salafi communities, after a longer history of generally amicable relations between Zaydi Shia and Shafa’i Sunni communities.

Relations with Israel

Yemen sent forces against the newly established State of Israel in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and has never established diplomatic recognition of it. The history of Yemenite Jewish immigration and rescue links the two countries through people even in the absence of state relations. The modern Houthi threat adds a direct military dimension. The movement’s slogan calls for death to Israel and curses Jews; its hostility toward Israel and Jews cannot be reduced to Yemen’s domestic contest for power.

During the war that followed the October 7 attacks, the Houthis launched missiles and drones toward Israel and attacked international shipping in the Red Sea. Their weapons reached Israeli territory, including Tel Aviv, and threatened traffic approaching Eilat. On 8 July 2024, the Houthis and an Iran-aligned organization in Iraq jointly claimed a drone attack on Eilat; an Israeli fighter jet intercepted the incoming target before it entered Israel. Israeli strikes later that month were Israel’s first military response to persistent Houthi attacks on its territory since the Gaza war began. The Houthis’ conduct places Yemen within a wider network supported by Iran’s regime, alongside armed organizations operating from Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq.

Economy

War, weak institutions, and scarce resources have damaged Yemen’s economy. Before and during the conflict, the country depended on imports for about 90 percent of its food and fuel. Coalition restrictions on shipping and Houthi taxation raised prices, while fighting disrupted transport, employment, and public services. Control of ports has therefore brought both revenue and influence over the delivery of essentials. Hodeidah remained the United Nations’ primary aid-entry port; about 80 percent of humanitarian assistance entered through Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis charged shippers substantial fees to berth and unload food or fuel at Hodeidah and placed donor projects under a body that selects Yemeni partners for relief organizations in areas they control. In the public sector, employees unaffiliated with the Houthis went more than seven years without salaries while senior movement-associated officials received monthly payments. Energy resources around Marib made control of that governorate a military and economic objective. These pressures compounded shortages for households and made access to food, fuel, wages, and aid dependent on the decisions of rival authorities.

Society and religion

Yemen’s population includes Zaydi Shia communities concentrated largely in the north and Shafa’i Sunni communities found widely elsewhere, alongside smaller religious and linguistic minorities. Zaydi and Shafa’i communities historically maintained generally amicable relations, although sectarian violence increased as Salafi Sunni teaching spread and the Houthi movement became more radicalized. Political and military loyalties do not follow a single religious or tribal boundary. Some northern tribes fight under Houthi command, while the movement has displaced traditional leaders, appointed its own supervisors, and strengthened the authority of Bani Hashim figures over some tribal structures.

Armed authorities have restricted expression and personal freedom. In government-held Marib, prosecutors issued arrest warrants against five journalists investigating judicial corruption in June 2023; authorities there arrested writer Manea Suleiman that month over his social media opinions and held him through year’s end without family contact. STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces arrested journalist Fahmy al-Alimi in July 2024 after he criticized the council. Courts under government and STC authority sentenced five public figures to death in Marib without publicly specifying their charges. Under Houthi rule, officials announced plans to try detained United Nations personnel on accusations of assisting Israel. Such cases show that abuses and constraints on civil life extend across Yemen’s competing zones of control.