Druze in Syria

Overview

The Druze are a long-established religious community in Syria. Their principal population center is As-Suwayda and the surrounding Suwayda Governorate, including Jabal al-Druze. Other Druze communities live in Damascus and nearby Jaramana, Sahnaya and Jdeidat Artouz, as well as villages elsewhere in the country. About 250,000 Druze lived in Damascus and its surrounding communities in 2010. Population estimates for Syria have varied, including approximately 600,000 in 2018 and a higher estimate of roughly 800,000 during the civil war.

Syrian Druze have generally sought security and political participation within the Syrian state rather than an independent Druze state. Their leaders and armed factions have nevertheless differed over cooperation with successive governments, local control of security, and relations with neighboring Israel. Those differences became especially consequential after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 and the rise of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Violence in Druze areas during 2025 sharpened disputes over disarmament, constitutional guarantees and the ability of the central government to protect minority communities.

Origins

The Druze religious community emerged from a movement in Cairo around the beginning of the eleventh century. Its early followers were associated with Isma'ili Islam. After the movement faced suppression in Egypt, followers spread through Syria and established communities that endured for centuries. The Druze became a distinct religious community with strong family and communal ties across the Levant, including present-day Syria, Lebanon and Israel.

In Syria, settlement became especially important in the mountainous area known as Jabal al-Druze. Its villages and the city of As-Suwayda remained central to Druze communal life through Ottoman rule, French colonial rule, Syrian independence and the civil war. Damascus and nearby towns formed another substantial center. This distribution placed Syrian Druze in several different local political and security settings, even as religious leadership and family networks connected communities across them.

History

Druze leaders took a prominent part in resistance to French colonial rule in the 1920s. Sultan al-Atrash, a leader from Jabal al-Druze, became a leading figure in the Great Syrian Revolt. The uprising linked resistance in Druze areas with a broader struggle against French authority and became part of the history of Syria’s formation as an independent state. Druze political life subsequently developed largely within Syrian institutions, although local leaders retained considerable influence over communal affairs.

The Syrian civil war exposed divisions within the community. Many Druze supported Assad’s regime because they feared attacks by rebel groups, including religious extremists. Others refused service on distant war fronts, organized local defense, opposed the regime or sought to avoid taking sides. Assad reached an informal arrangement with Druze spiritual leaders that kept Druze conscripts serving in Suwayda province. Local loyalty was never uniform: an autumn 2012 offensive led by Jabhat al-Nusra against Jabal al-Druze encouraged residents to form a militia with Syrian army assistance, while other Druze continued to resist recruitment into the army.

Local armed movements also challenged the regime’s authority. A faction associated with the al-Balous family supported families who refused to send sons to Assad’s war fronts. Laith al-Balous later led the Sheikhs of Dignity Forces, an opposition offshoot formed after his father’s death. By July 2024, Druze residents of Suwayda had protested the Assad regime for a year, demanding better services and security. Their positions reflected both opposition to state failures and concern that a collapse of order could expose Druze civilians to armed extremists.

Assad’s overthrow in December 2024 brought a new debate over the relationship between Druze forces and the Syrian state. Druze defectors led by Tareq al-Shoufi formed an al-Suwayda military council days after the regime’s fall and sought a decentralized Syria. Major Druze factions distanced themselves from that council. Other armed groups offered to join a new national army while retaining their weapons until a constitution and representative government provided safeguards. Syrian government representatives and Druze leaders signed a memorandum in March 2025 addressing Suwayda’s administration and security, but control of weapons remained unresolved.

Persecution and survival

Jihadist attacks placed Druze communities under severe pressure during the civil war. On June 10, 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, killed at least twenty Druze in Qalb Loze in Idlib province. Six days later, two Assad regime soldiers stationed at the Druze town of Khadr killed their Druze commander before defecting to Jabhat al-Nusra. Islamist militants and other rebel forces then seized a hilltop near Khadr and surrounded the town. Reports that Islamic State fighters had forcibly converted Druze in Idlib added to fears for the community’s survival.

On July 25, 2018, Islamic State attacked Druze communities in Suwayda province, killing more than 250 people and abducting at least 36. Before the attack, Assad’s regime had made a deal allowing several hundred Islamic State fighters to leave Damascus for territory extending toward the Druze stronghold. The attack led to negotiations involving the regime and Suwayda representatives over the release of more than 30 hostages. Islamic State executed 19-year-old Muhannad Dhuqan Abu Amar, from Shabki village east of As-Suwayda, on August 2. On October 20, it released two Druze women and four children in exchange for 17 wives of its operatives and eight of their children. Druze residents also demonstrated against Assad’s regime during efforts to free the abducted women.

In 2025, insecurity returned to majority-Druze areas after Assad’s fall. Violence in Shahba and near Damascus intensified fears about protection under al-Sharaa’s government. A fabricated recording insulting Muhammad helped trigger clashes in Jaramana and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya. Government and allied armed factions killed Druze militia members in those areas and Suwayda in April, while the central government failed to stop the violence. Talks with Druze leaders produced an agreement concerning entry of Syrian security forces, partial disarmament, compensation for damaged civilian property and broader integration of young Druze fighters into the security apparatus. The agreement did not settle the underlying dispute over local security.

Fighting erupted around Suwayda on July 13, 2025, between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribal fighters. Syrian security forces and other armed groups entered the conflict, and attacks on civilians followed. Documented abuses included executions, kidnappings, humiliation and other violence by government forces, Bedouin fighters, Druze militias and independent armed groups. The violence killed more than 2,000 people, included at least 817 executions and displaced an estimated 192,000. Druze women and children were among those kidnapped. Online anti-Druze hate surged alongside the fighting, including claims portraying Druze collectively as foreign agents or traitors, although their leaders held sharply different political positions.

A ceasefire and the withdrawal of Syrian security forces did not immediately restore normal life in Suwayda. Residents faced siege conditions, hunger, repeated attacks and shortages of electricity, food and basic aid. Al-Sharaa transferred responsibility for the province’s security to local Druze factions and religious elders after the July ceasefire. The crisis demonstrated the limits of a settlement that ended major fighting while leaving civilians vulnerable and questions of authority unresolved.

Religion and culture

The Druze faith and its communal institutions have helped sustain connections among families separated by national borders. In Syria, spiritual leaders exercise influence alongside local armed factions and civic figures, but no single leader speaks for every Druze resident. Around As-Suwayda, three senior sheikhs—Hikmat al-Hijri, Yusuf al-Jarboa and Hammoud al-Hinnawi—became especially prominent during the political transition. Their differing approaches to Damascus illustrate how religious authority does not produce a single political program.

Syrian and Israeli Druze have close family and communal ties. During the civil war, Druze residents around Majdal Shams, in the Golan Heights, part of the State of Israel and historic Bashan, feared for relatives across the border. In 2013, Druze leaders there asked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to offer their relatives safe haven in Israel. That October, Israeli Druze spiritual leader Muwaffaq Tarif raised concern for Syrian Druze with President Shimon Peres.

In 2015, thousands of Israeli Druze demonstrated in Isfiya and Majdal Shams against threats to their Syrian coreligionists. Majdal Shams lies in the Golan Heights, part of the State of Israel and historic Bashan, most of which lies in Syria and is today occupied by Syria. Israeli Druze also sent more than $2.6 million through Jordan to help Syrian Druze purchase weapons and other supplies. Tarif urged restraint while leaving open a stronger response if Jabhat al-Nusra and other foreign fighters placed Syria’s Druze in grave danger. These efforts reflected cross-border solidarity as well as concern that attacks in Syria could affect the wider Druze community.

Present day

After Assad’s fall, al-Sharaa’s effort to centralize authority divided Druze leaders. Al-Hijri initially paired support for Syrian unity with demands for local authority and constitutional safeguards. As attacks continued, he pressed for decentralized government, said trust in Damascus had collapsed and called for consideration of international protection. In May 2025, he declared that Israel was no enemy of Syria’s Druze. Hinnawi and Jarboa remained more willing to engage Damascus through dialogue and favored preservation of Syrian unity. Laith al-Balous, whom al-Sharaa’s government treated as a preferred contact in Suwayda, also favored local dialogue and rejected Israeli intervention. He had traveled to Jaramana in March to mediate during clashes. Disagreement over Druze weapons persisted in talks with Syria’s defense ministry.

Israel pledged to protect Syria’s Druze after Assad’s fall, reflecting security concerns and its commitment to its own Druze community. After February 2025 clashes in Jaramana, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz ordered the Israel Defense Forces to prepare to defend the town. On April 30, Israeli forces struck armed elements preparing further attacks on Druze in Sahnaya, while Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir directed preparations for strikes against Syrian regime targets if violence continued. Israeli Druze blocked highways during demonstrations on May 1, and Israel facilitated delivery of 1,500 boxes of humanitarian aid on May 1 and 2. On May 2, Israel struck near the presidential palace in Damascus as a warning against threats to Druze communities. Israeli forces also activated a mobile triage facility near Khadr in May.

As the July 2025 fighting threatened civilians around Suwayda, Israel warned Syria’s government that it would act to protect them. Israeli strikes began on July 14 against Syrian military targets in Suwayda and Damascus. On July 16, Israel struck Syrian military headquarters and a military site near the presidential palace in Damascus. The strikes targeted forces and command sites involved in operations toward Suwayda; Israel also supplied humanitarian aid. Syrian security forces subsequently withdrew from Suwayda under a ceasefire. The intervention was supported by many Israeli Druze, while Syrian Druze leaders remained divided over the role Israel should play in their future security. Their dispute with Damascus continued to center on protection of civilians, local authority, constitutional guarantees and the terms under which armed Druze groups would join national institutions.