Turkey

Overview

Turkey occupies Anatolia and a smaller area of southeastern Europe, joining the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits. Its capital is Ankara; Istanbul is its largest city. The republic emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and was founded in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Its location gives it influence over routes between Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and remains important to the alliance, even as disputes with other members and an increasingly independent regional policy complicate its partnerships.

Atatürk established a secular republic and pursued sweeping changes to law, education and public life. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), political power has become more concentrated in the presidency and religion has gained a more prominent public role. Turkey has also projected military power into Syria and Libya, challenged maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and supported the Hamas terrorist organization. These policies place Ankara at the center of several issues affecting Israel and its neighbors.

Geography

Most of Turkey lies on the Anatolian peninsula, with East Thrace forming its European territory. It borders Greece and Bulgaria to the northwest; Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to the northeast; Iran to the east; and Iraq and Syria to the south. Its Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean coasts connect it to several distinct political and economic regions. The Euphrates and Tigris rise in Turkey and flow toward Syria and Iraq. Turkish dams affect downstream water supplies, adding to shortages caused by drought and war damage. Control of Euphrates flow gives Ankara leverage over communities and farms in Syria.

Eastern and southeastern Turkey contain part of Kurdistan, a historic homeland spanning several present-day states. The area has long shaped Turkey’s relations with Kurdish communities and with Iraq and Syria. On the Mediterranean coast, Turkey’s proximity to Cyprus places it near maritime routes and prospective energy projects involving Cyprus, Israel, Greece and Egypt. Ankara’s offshore claims and naval activity have consequently become matters of regional security as well as resource development.

History

Turkey inherited the political and cultural legacy of an Ottoman state that ruled much of southeastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Constantinople, now Istanbul, had earlier been the capital of the Byzantine Empire. A major Muslim siege began on August 15, 717, when Caliph Sulayman sent a force under his brother Moslema against the city; it ended in defeat on August 15, 718. Ottoman conquest in 1453 made the city an imperial capital. The conversion of Hagia Sophia from a Byzantine church into a mosque became one of the most visible changes in its religious landscape.

During the First World War, the Ottoman government carried out the Armenian genocide through arrests, deportations, death marches and massacres. Contemporary witnesses, including the United States ambassador in 1915, warned of the campaign’s exterminatory character. Turkey’s later diplomatic opposition to recognition delayed action by other governments, including Israel and the United States, but did not change the historical record.

After the Ottoman defeat, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres proposed a severe reduction of Ottoman territory and envisaged a path to Kurdish autonomy. Turkish nationalists rejected the settlement. Atatürk’s national movement secured the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, replacing Sèvres and defining the borders of the new Republic of Turkey. Atatürk became its first president. The memory of Sèvres nevertheless survived in political life. Researchers use the term “Sèvres syndrome” for a recurring fear that foreign powers seek to weaken Turkey by exploiting divisions within the country and surrounding region.

Turkey remained neutral during most of the Second World War. During the Cold War, its position beside the Soviet Union made it a significant Western ally, and it joined NATO in 1952. In the 1991 Gulf War, President Turgut Özal broke with a cautious approach to Middle Eastern disputes: Turkey closed an Iraqi oil pipeline across its territory and allowed United States aircraft to use Incirlik Air Force Base. Özal subsequently called for a more active foreign policy. Ankara’s refusal in March 2003 to host United States forces for the invasion of Iraq strained relations, although geography and shared interests kept cooperation necessary.

Jewish history

Jewish communities have lived in Anatolia since antiquity. Ottoman lands became a refuge for Jews expelled from Spain in 1492, and Jewish institutions remained part of urban life for centuries. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, the republic recognized minority rights for its principal non-Muslim communities, including rights involving schools and communal institutions. Atatürk invited German Jewish scholars fleeing Nazi rule to work in Turkey from 1933; they contributed to the development of its universities. Before the Kurdish Jewish exodus of 1950–51, 11 Jewish communities were recorded in Turkish Kurdistan, compared with 146 in Iraqi Kurdistan and 19 in Iranian Kurdistan. Most of Turkey’s Jews now live in Istanbul.

Antisemitism has remained a concern. During periods of heightened hostility toward Israel, Turkish newspapers blamed Turkish Jews for Israeli government actions. The Anti-Defamation League warned Erdoğan that holding a Jewish minority responsible for another state’s policies was antisemitic. It also documented conspiracy theories blaming Jews and Israel for the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkish media. These accusations concern political rhetoric and prejudice; they do not describe the conduct or views of Turkey’s Jewish community.

Government and politics

Atatürk’s republic placed secularism at the center of state institutions. The AKP’s rise brought a lasting change in political direction. Erdoğan has dominated Turkish politics since the early 2000s, and critics have documented the concentration of authority in his office and weakening of institutional checks. Opposition parties nevertheless retain substantial support. Following the AKP’s 2011 election victory, the Republican People’s Party and Nationalist Movement Party remained in parliament. In a later election, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party crossed the 10 percent national threshold while Erdoğan won the presidency with 52 percent of the vote. In municipal elections on March 31, 2024, the AKP failed to finish first nationally for the first time since it came to power.

Relations between the state and Kurds remain a central issue. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has waged an insurgency against Turkey. Its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, declared a unilateral ceasefire on March 21, 2013, and called for PKK fighters to withdraw from Turkey to Iraq. Negotiations continued during the Gezi Park protests that year. Turkey’s authorities imprisoned about a dozen members of the pro-Kurdish party from 2016 onward, including former co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, on charges involving terrorism and alleged PKK connections. During renewed talks, Erdoğan raised the possibility of restoring the death penalty; Öcalan’s death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment in 2002.

Öcalan called in 2025 for the PKK to disarm and dissolve, and the organization announced a withdrawal from Turkey. Its longstanding bases in northern Iraq, including the Qandil Mountains, remained central to subsequent talks. Turkey sought to extend the implications of the announcement to Kurdish forces in Syria, but Syrian Democratic Forces commander Mazloum Abdi said it did not govern his forces’ activities there. The distinction matters because the status of those forces must be settled through separate negotiations.

Erdoğan’s government has also altered the public role of religion. A June 2020 survey commissioned by the pro-government newspaper Yeni Şafak found roughly 73 percent support for converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Bill Warner argues that Sharia, the Islamic legal and governing system, can replace inherited laws and customs over time; he uses Turkey’s religious transformation as one example. That broad interpretation concerns historical and political change, not the beliefs or conduct of individual Muslims.

Military and security

Turkey maintains a large NATO military and has expanded its domestic defense industry. Its purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense systems led to its removal from the United States F-35 program. Ankara has considered American, European and domestically developed aircraft to renew its fighter fleet as Israel and other regional states expand their air capabilities. Erdoğan has also questioned why some states possess nuclear-armed missiles while others do not. A Turkish nuclear-weapons capability would have far-reaching consequences for NATO, regional security and the nonproliferation system; discussion of that possibility is distinct from an established Turkish weapons program.

Turkish operations in northern Syria combine action against the Islamic State with efforts to prevent Kurdish self-rule along Turkey’s border. Ankara views the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as connected to the PKK. The YPG fought alongside the United States against the Islamic State. Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 to drive the Islamic State from its border and prevent Kurdish-held territory east of the Euphrates from linking with Afrin. By March 2017, it had established a Turkish-influenced zone west of the river separating Kurdish-held areas.

In January 2018, Turkey launched an offensive against Kurdish-held Afrin. President Donald Trump urged Erdoğan to limit the operation and avoid harming civilians or United States personnel. Syrian Democratic Forces fighters left the Euphrates Valley to defend Afrin, slowing their campaign against the Islamic State. Turkish-supported factions subsequently committed abuses in and around Afrin, including torture, rape, looting and seizure of property, particularly in Kurdish and Yazidi communities. Turkish authorities also detained the chair and ten other senior members of the Turkish Medical Association after it criticized the operation. For Israel, a Turkish presence near Afrin could constrain the Iranian regime’s reach in Syria, while a clash between Turkey and the United States could weaken efforts to stop the regime’s planned corridor toward the Mediterranean.

Turkey’s later northeastern Syria campaign failed, at the time of a Washington Institute assessment, to achieve its stated aim of removing the YPG from its border. A strong United States reaction made Ankara wary of further operations because of potential sanctions. Turkish shelling and bombardment damaged the Aluk Water Station twice in late 2019, interrupting supplies to approximately 400,000 people in Hasakah Province. From December 23 to 27, 2023, Turkish strikes around Hasakah, Kobani and Qamishli killed ten civilians and damaged hospitals and factories. The strikes followed PKK attacks on Turkish military outposts in Iraq that killed 12 Turkish service members. Turkey’s opposition to continued Syrian Democratic Forces autonomy also increased pressure on Damascus during later negotiations over integration of the force.

Turkey intervened in the Libyan civil war on the side of the Tripoli-based government and its allies, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates supported forces under Khalifa Haftar. Turkish military intervention helped force Haftar’s Libyan National Army and allied Russian mercenaries to abandon their offensive against Tripoli in June 2020. The intervention strengthened Ankara’s prospects for influence in Libya and its ability to press maritime claims affecting Israel and other Eastern Mediterranean states.

Relations with Israel

Turkey recognized Israel in 1949, becoming an early Muslim-majority state to establish diplomatic relations with it. Its first mission in Israel opened in January 1950. Relations fluctuated during later Arab–Israeli wars, but the two states developed significant diplomatic, military and intelligence cooperation. Israeli President Shimon Peres addressed Turkey’s parliament in 2007. Relations deteriorated from 2008 onward as Erdoğan sharpened his criticism of Israel. They collapsed during the 2010 flotilla incident, when Israeli forces boarded a Turkish ship attempting to breach the blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza. The confrontation and its diplomatic aftermath continued into 2011.

Ankara’s support for Hamas, a terrorist organization, became a persistent Israeli security concern. The AKP supported a flotilla aimed at breaking Israel’s Gaza blockade after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza in 2007. Following the October 7 massacre, Turkey’s continued support for Hamas, Erdoğan’s threat to enter Israel and Turkish pursuit of military positions in Syria gave Israel grounds to assess Ankara’s capabilities and intentions when making defensive decisions. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called Israel “a burden humanity can no longer bear”; Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar condemned those words as “clear incitement to genocide.” Turkey also submitted an intervention at the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide. The filing expressed Turkey’s accusation; it did not establish the accusation as fact.

Maritime disputes add another source of friction. Turkey has asserted offshore rights in waters treated internationally as part of Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone and has sent drilling ships and military vessels into waters claimed by Cyprus. Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Egypt and the European Union have opposed Ankara’s claims. Turkey’s 2019 maritime memorandum with Libya’s Government of National Accord proposed zones that would interrupt direct maritime connections between Israel, Egypt and Cyprus on one side and Greece and the rest of Europe on the other. Greece objected that the agreement disregarded the maritime rights of islands including Crete and Rhodes. Libyan leader Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh later said Libya would honor the agreement, which threatened proposed EastMed pipeline plans involving Israel and its partners. Turkey’s growing military strength and presence in Syria make Eastern Mediterranean friction a continuing Israeli concern, although diplomatic involvement by the United States can help both states avoid direct confrontation.

Cyprus remains a separate, longstanding dispute. Turkey invaded the island in 1974 and continues to occupy its north. The Republic of Cyprus is the island’s legitimate government; Turkey alone recognizes the northern entity’s declaration of independence, which UN Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 declared unlawful and invalid. Reunification talks at Crans-Montana stalled in 2017 over security and governance, including Greek Cypriot demands for Turkish troop withdrawal. In 2021, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders announced civilian access to part of Varosha’s closed military zone, despite earlier Security Council calls for the town’s properties to be returned to their original owners and placed under UN administration.

Economy

Turkey’s economy connects European and Middle Eastern markets through manufacturing, trade, transport and energy infrastructure. Its geographic position makes pipeline access politically significant. The Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline carries crude from Iraq toward Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. In May 2014, Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization began arbitration against Turkey over the transport, storage and loading of Kurdistan Region crude at Ceyhan without authorization from Iraq’s federal Oil Ministry. After the 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Turkey and discussed replacing the damaged pipeline.

Energy policy also drives Turkey’s disputes with Cyprus and other Eastern Mediterranean states. Offshore claims could affect Cypriot development and Israeli export routes, while the Libya maritime agreement challenged plans for an EastMed pipeline. Turkey’s financial system and defense industry have expanded under Erdoğan, but political control over institutions and contested economic policies have drawn criticism. The Anti-Defamation League documented Erdoğan’s false conspiracy theory of a pro-Israeli “interest rate lobby” targeting Turkey. That theory is antisemitic scapegoating, not an explanation of economic conditions.

Society and religion

Turkey’s population includes Turks, Kurds, Alawites, Circassians, Jews and several Christian communities. The state’s relationship with minority languages, political movements and religious institutions has varied sharply across the republican period. Turkish Alawites became especially wary of the AKP’s Syria policy after Ankara sheltered Syrian opposition groups and armed rebels in 2011. A poll cited by a Republican People’s Party parliamentarian found that 83 percent of Turkish Alawites supported that party in the 2011 election.

Turkey’s Syriac Orthodox heritage includes Mor Gabriel monastery, founded in 397. In 2011, the state took land belonging to the monastery, depriving its monks of income from it. In 2012, neighboring Muslim villages sued the community over the property and accused it of anti-Turkish activity for educating young people. The disputes illustrate pressures faced by a historic Christian minority. A Catholic bishop and prominent figure in Middle Eastern Christian communities was stabbed to death at his home in southern Turkey on June 3, 2010; police arrested his driver in connection with the killing.

Turkey has also been a major destination and transit country for refugees from Syria. A March 2016 agreement with the European Union provided for Greece to return irregular arrivals to Turkey, while Turkey could send one legally admitted Syrian refugee to Europe for each refugee returned. The arrangement made Turkey central to European migration policy while leaving questions about rights, capacity and political leverage. Across these issues, Turkey’s secular republican inheritance, religious diversity, Kurdish politics and active foreign policy remain closely connected to the country’s domestic debates and regional role.