Anwar Sadat

Overview

Anwar Sadat was president of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981. He succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser, under whom he had served as a senior official and vice president. Sadat’s presidency encompassed war with Israel, a decisive change in Egypt’s foreign relations, and the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. His decision to travel to Jerusalem in 1977 broke a longstanding political taboo and opened direct negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Their diplomacy led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Egypt–Israel peace treaty in 1979.

Sadat’s achievement rested on choices by both governments. He committed Egypt to peace after more than 25 years of war with Israel. Begin offered negotiations without preconditions and agreed to withdraw Israel’s forces and communities from the strategically important Sinai Peninsula. U.S. mediation, first through Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and later through President Jimmy Carter, helped turn military disengagement into a treaty. Sadat and Begin shared the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. His record remains complex: peace endured after his death, while economic strains, political unrest, and his imprisonment of thousands of domestic opponents remained central to assessments of his rule.

Early life

Sadat was born on December 25, 1918, in Mit Abu al-Kum, a village north of Cairo. He grew up in a large family during a period when British power strongly shaped Egyptian affairs. Anticolonial politics influenced his generation of officers. After entering military training in the 1930s, he met Nasser, beginning an association that would define much of his career. Sadat participated in underground activity against British influence and was imprisoned during the 1940s. His experiences in the army and in prison strengthened his commitment to Egyptian independence and to a political role for the armed forces.

Sadat later joined the Free Officers movement. On July 23, 1952, the group overthrew Egypt’s monarchy, and Nasser emerged as its dominant figure. Sadat helped communicate the new regime’s decisions and managed aspects of King Farouk’s abdication. He remained part of the government as it consolidated power. During Nasser’s presidency, Sadat edited the government newspaper al-Gumhuriyya, held cabinet responsibilities, and served as speaker of parliament. Those positions kept him close to the center of Egyptian politics even when he appeared less prominent than other members of Nasser’s circle.

Career

The Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Six-Day War of 1967 shaped the strategic circumstances Sadat inherited. Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal brought Egypt into conflict with Britain, France, and Israel in 1956. In 1967, Israel defeated Egypt’s forces and took control of Sinai. The defeat imposed military and economic costs on Egypt and left recovery of Sinai at the center of its policy. Sadat became vice president in Nasser’s final years. After Nasser died in September 1970, Sadat assumed the presidency and established his own authority within a state long identified with his predecessor.

Sadat sought greater freedom of action abroad. His government’s relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated as he pursued military support and reconsidered Egypt’s strategic dependence on Moscow. He expelled Soviet military advisers in 1972, a conspicuous shift that preceded a closer relationship with the United States. At home, he advanced economic opening and some political liberalization. These changes did not resolve Egypt’s economic difficulties: inequality, unrest, and public criticism persisted. Sadat’s domestic policy combined promises of a more open political and economic order with continued presidential control.

Sadat also pursued recovery of Sinai through diplomacy and war. In July 1972, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir appealed to him to open negotiations. No settlement followed. On October 6, 1973, Sadat ordered Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal in coordination with an attack on Israel by Syria, beginning the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian crossing challenged the military position established in 1967 and gave Sadat new standing at home. The war also demonstrated the cost and danger of continued conflict. Its aftermath created an opening for negotiations in which Egypt and Israel each made significant concessions.

Kissinger mediated the first Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement after the 1973 war. The agreement, signed in January 1974, separated forces along the canal and provided a practical step away from renewed fighting. On January 16, Sadat sent Meir a message through Kissinger proposing an indirect dialogue about peace. Meir replied on January 18 that she hoped contact would build trust and advance peace. Their exchange reflected diplomacy already underway before Sadat’s later visit to Israel. Israel’s failures before the Yom Kippur War remain a separate subject of scrutiny; Meir’s pursuit of talks and her response to Sadat’s overture are also part of that history.

A second Sinai agreement followed in 1975. It did not return all the territory Egypt sought, and Sadat remained dissatisfied. Other Arab leaders sharply criticized his willingness to continue negotiations with Israel. He continued them nonetheless. Sadat increasingly treated a direct Egyptian–Israeli agreement as a means to secure Egyptian interests and end a costly state of war. His choice required a break with expectations that Egypt would defer peace until a wider Arab settlement had been reached.

In November 1977, Sadat accepted Begin’s invitation to Israel. He landed at Ben Gurion Airport on November 19, becoming the first Arab leader to visit the Jewish state. On November 20, he addressed the Knesset in Jerusalem and called for an end to war. Begin responded in the same chamber, praised Sadat’s courage in making the journey from Cairo, and offered negotiations on every issue without preconditions. He proposed direct talks in Jerusalem or Cairo, a conference in Geneva, or discussions on neutral ground. Their public exchange gave direct diplomacy a political force that earlier indirect contacts had lacked.

Contacts continued through the end of 1977, including Begin’s visit to Ismailia, Egypt. Nessim Gaon served as a conduit and mediator between the two leaders. Progress remained difficult. Sadat and Begin differed on permanent borders between Israel and its neighbors, and Sadat at one point became frustrated enough to consider ending direct contact with Israeli representatives. Questions concerning Egyptian forces, defensive airfields, Israeli security, and Sinai’s future required detailed negotiation. Sadat’s visit had made peace possible, but it had not settled its terms.

Carter personally intervened in 1978. He brought Sadat and Begin to Camp David, Maryland, where they met from September 5 to September 17. The resulting accords established frameworks for an Egyptian–Israeli treaty and for further regional negotiations. Sadat insisted that Israel dismantle all its communities in Sinai. Begin accepted withdrawal from the peninsula despite its strategic value and the political cost of removing Israeli residents. Ariel Sharon advised Begin to accept the removals to secure peace and later oversaw their implementation, including removals carried out by force.

Under the agreement reached at Camp David, Israel would withdraw from Sinai within three years and dismantle military facilities there. Egypt would establish full diplomatic relations with Israel and permit Israeli passage through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and the Gulf of Aqaba. Sadat and Begin received the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their joint work. On March 26, 1979, they signed the peace treaty at the White House with Carter present. Sadat visited Beersheba that May as the new relationship began. The treaty replaced decades of war with recognized borders and formal diplomatic commitments.

Ideology and statements

Sadat presented his diplomacy as an exercise of Egyptian sovereignty. He pursued the return of Egyptian land and argued that Egypt had to decide its future for itself, despite pressure from other Arab governments. His approach joined Egyptian national interests to a willingness to recognize and negotiate directly with Israel. He described the outcome in pointed terms, saying that Egypt had received land while Israel had received a piece of paper. That remark expressed his emphasis on Sinai, though Israel’s gains under the treaty included an end to war, diplomatic recognition, and security commitments.

Sadat’s policy also marked a broader change from Nasser’s international alignment. He moved Egypt toward the United States and away from Soviet dependence. His government openly opposed the revolution that brought Iran’s new regime to power in 1979. Egypt gave refuge to the deposed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; after the shah died in 1980, Sadat attended his military funeral in Cairo. These decisions reflected Sadat’s readiness to pursue a foreign policy that angered other regional leaders when he judged it useful to Egypt.

At home, Sadat associated his presidency with economic development and a measure of political liberalization. His peace initiative promised relief from the burden of repeated wars and an opportunity to redirect resources toward civilian needs. Those ambitions coexisted with persistent hardship and coercive government power. Political opening under Sadat had limits, and his treatment of opponents became harsher in the final period of his rule. His statements about national independence and peace therefore form one part of his record, alongside the domestic consequences of his decisions.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Sadat was Egypt’s president and commander during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He chose military action after years without an agreement returning Sinai to Egypt. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal on October 6, initially gaining ground against Israeli positions. Israel subsequently fought back, and the war ended through a ceasefire followed by disengagement talks. The conflict did not itself produce peace, but it changed the political setting in which Sadat, Israeli leaders, and U.S. mediators negotiated. It also became a defining event in Sadat’s account of his presidency: the military parade at which he was later killed marked the anniversary of Egypt’s 1973 crossing.

The movement from war to negotiation required separate decisions. Sadat accepted postwar agreements that left some of Egypt’s territorial aims unmet, then continued talking. Begin accepted the return of all Sinai and the dismantling of Israeli communities there. Kissinger’s mediation reduced the immediate risk of renewed war; Carter’s sustained engagement helped Sadat and Begin reach final terms. Sadat’s November 1977 visit was a decisive public break with the old relationship, while Israel’s longstanding pursuit of peace and Begin’s concessions were essential to the treaty that followed.

Death or current status

Opposition to Sadat intensified after his peace with Israel and his turn toward the United States. Other Arab leaders condemned his initiative, while Egyptian opponents challenged his domestic and foreign policies. Sadat responded to dissent with arrests that reached thousands of political opponents. His repression did not eliminate the networks committed to violence against him. Members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a group that emerged from the milieu of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, carried out the assassination of Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981.

Sadat was killed during a military parade in Cairo. Egyptian authorities arrested Ayman al-Zawahiri after the assassination. Followers of Omar Abdel Rahman launched an uprising in Assiut in its aftermath, killing police officers. Vice President Hosni Mubarak, whom Sadat had appointed in 1975, succeeded him as president. Sadat’s death ended his presidency but did not end the peace treaty he had signed with Israel.

Legacy

Sadat’s most durable international achievement was Egypt’s peace with Israel. The treaty survived his assassination and remained the foundation of relations between the two states. Their border remained peaceful even as broader public relations were often described as cold. The agreement demonstrated that an Arab state and Israel could end a state of war through direct negotiation, territorial compromise, diplomatic recognition, and security arrangements. It also established a precedent for later agreements involving Israel and other Arab governments.

Egyptian assessments of Sadat have remained divided. His supporters emphasize his willingness to challenge political conventions, recover Sinai through a treaty, and seek a less costly future for Egypt. Critics point to unmet economic expectations, persistent inequality, and his repression of domestic opponents. His economic opening and political liberalization were consequential but incomplete. Those debates concern the same presidency that produced the 1973 war, the Jerusalem visit, and a lasting peace agreement; no single episode accounts for his full record.

Sadat and Begin remain closely associated in accounts of the peace process. An Egyptian school textbook introduced for the 2015–2016 year depicted them together and presented Israel as a partner in peace, illustrating the treaty’s continued place in Egypt’s public institutions. Their shared Nobel Peace Prize recognized negotiation by both leaders. Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem made direct talks politically possible, while Begin’s decision to return Sinai made agreement attainable. Together, those choices changed the relationship between Egypt and Israel beyond either man’s lifetime.