HESA Shahed 136

Overview

The Shahed-136 is an Iranian one-way attack drone: it carries an explosive warhead into a target and destroys itself on impact. It belongs to a class of loitering munitions that can fly toward a designated area before making a final attack. Russia uses the name Geran-2 for its Shahed-136-based drones. The Houthis, the Iranian regime’s terrorist allies in Yemen, operate the long-range design under the name Waid. Although the entry’s conventional title includes HESA, the Shahed-136 is produced by Shahed Aviation Industries, a distinct enterprise within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps drone program.^[8][10]

The weapon combines long reach, a relatively small warhead and low unit cost. Estimates place its warhead near 40 kilograms, its maximum flight range near 2,500 kilometers and its cost near $20,000 per drone, although estimates vary by configuration and production arrangement. A single impact has less explosive power than a large cruise missile strike. Repeated launches, however, can threaten civilians, power facilities and other fixed targets while forcing defenders to detect and engage many aircraft. A launcher carrying five drones illustrates how the system supports attacks in groups rather than isolated launches.^[7][8][13]

The Iranian regime placed Shahed-136 drones with the Houthis in Yemen by 2021 and began supplying them to Russia in summer 2022. Russian forces first employed Shahed-series drones against battlefield targets, then made them part of a sustained campaign against Ukrainian cities and electricity infrastructure. On April 14, 2024, the regime launched about 170 loitering munitions toward Israel, most likely Shahed-136 drones. The Israeli Air Force and its allies intercepted the drones before they reached Israel.^[1][5][6]

Development

Iran’s drone industry developed through several institutions rather than a single manufacturer. Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries, commonly known as HESA, is located in Shahin Shahr. Shahed Aviation Industries operates south of Isfahan and belongs to the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ separate drone research and production program. Shahed Aviation Industries produces the Shahed-136. Distinguishing the firms matters because the established name “HESA Shahed 136” can suggest that HESA itself manufactures this model, obscuring the organization identified with its production.^[8]

The regime developed the Shahed-136 as a long-range precision-attack munition within a larger family of drones. The smaller Shahed-131 preceded it; the later Shahed-238 uses jet propulsion. The regime displayed the Shahed-136 in military exercises on a modified dump truck carrying five drones. This mobile arrangement allows several aircraft to depart in a short period and gives a launching force flexibility in choosing positions. It also reduces dependence on a conventional airfield, an important feature for a system intended to reach distant targets from dispersed sites.^[6][8]

Manufacture and supply expanded beyond Iran as the regime strengthened its military partnership with Russia. Russian-made versions appeared in photographs published in July 2023, after Iranian deliveries had already supported Russian operations in Ukraine. A fragment recovered after an October 2023 strike bore the Russian name Geran-2 and serial number “Ы421.” Its markings indicated that Russia had likely produced at least 400 Shahed-136-based drones by that point. The fragment provides evidence of production, while the number remains an inference from the serial marking rather than a complete count of finished aircraft.^[3][4]

Russia subsequently developed domestic production at Alabuga under a license agreement with the Iranian regime. Its plant became Russia’s main producer of Geran-2 drones. Alabuga Polytech trained young people in drone assembly, and some students received instruction in Tehran on manufacturing Shahed airframes. The production program also recruited young foreign women through advertised work and study opportunities; arrivals were assigned to Shahed-136 production without alternatives. These arrangements made the Geran-2 a Russian industrial program built around an Iranian design, rather than a weapon supplied only as completed imports.^[9]

Design and capabilities

The Shahed-136 is a propeller-driven aircraft built to deliver its own explosive payload. It typically flies toward predetermined coordinates, making static facilities such as electricity infrastructure suitable targets. Its estimated 40-kilogram warhead is far smaller than the warhead of many cruise missiles, but an accurate strike on a vulnerable component can still disable equipment or start a damaging fire. Russian use showed how a relatively small explosive charge could become consequential when directed repeatedly at power generation and distribution sites.^[2][5][13]

Range estimates differ across analyses and operating conditions. An estimate of about 2,500 kilometers makes launches from Iran or deep inside Lebanon relevant to Israel’s air defense planning. Other assessments describe shorter practical ranges. The aircraft’s relatively low flight altitude complicates radar detection, especially when many small targets approach at once. Low altitude does not make the drone invisible; defenders still use radar, aircraft and other sensors to find and engage it. Range, launch location and flight path together determine how much warning a defending force receives.^[7][14]

A standard launcher can send five Shahed-136 drones into flight in a short time. That capacity, combined with an estimated unit cost near $20,000, makes repeated barrages more affordable than comparable attacks using expensive cruise missiles. The cost estimate describes the drone itself and does not account for every expense of manufacturing, transport or operation. Its military value comes from quantity as well as reach: several drones can approach different targets, or a group can force air defenses to commit attention and interceptors to multiple incoming aircraft.^[7][8][13]

The drone can fly toward a programmed location without continuous manual control. Direct radio control of a low-flying aircraft becomes harder as distance and terrain obstruct the link; without a relay, contact with a ground station may be lost after a few dozen kilometers. Another aircraft, such as a Mohajer-6, can relay communications and extend the distance at which an operator controls a Shahed-136. The ability to use predetermined coordinates remains central to long-range attacks, particularly when an aircraft is sent toward a fixed target beyond a direct control link.^[5][11]

Use in combat

Before Russia deployed the Shahed-136 in Ukraine, Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 drones were used in hostile operations against Saudi Arabia, Israeli-connected cargo ships and U.S. bases in Iraq. The regime had based Shahed-136 drones with the Houthis in Yemen by 2021. The Houthis’ Waid name placed the same long-range design within their own arsenal. These uses show that the system’s spread preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine and crossed land, maritime and military theaters.^[1][8]

The Iranian regime began training Russian drone operators in July 2022 and supplied Shahed-136 drones that summer. Shahed-series drones appeared in Ukraine in August, with visual evidence of Shahed-136 use emerging in mid-September. Russian forces initially employed the aircraft chiefly against Ukrainian artillery and other battlefield targets. The drones added an attack option as Russia’s stocks of conventional cruise missiles dwindled. Their arrival did not make each drone equivalent to a cruise missile; it gave Russia another means of reaching targets at considerable distance.^[2][5]

In October 2022, Russia shifted the Shahed-series drones into coordinated strikes against Ukraine’s electricity distribution grid and power generation. Shahed-136 drones reached Israel’s attention in part through the attack on Kyiv, where strikes killed civilians, including a woman who was six months pregnant. Russia used the Shahed-136 chiefly against predetermined static targets, a role suited to the known locations of substations, generating equipment and other infrastructure. The campaign demonstrated that a small warhead could have severe civilian effects when directed at essential services or homes.^[5][7][15]

The scale of Russian launches grew quickly. By October 2023, Ukrainian military data recorded more than 2,000 launches of Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 drones, including 500 in September alone. These figures combine the two models and therefore do not constitute a count of Shahed-136 launches alone. Russia also introduced Gerbera decoy drones shaped like Shahed-136s. The decoys were intended to confuse and saturate Ukrainian air defenses, increasing the number of objects defenders had to assess during attacks.^[3][6]

On April 14, 2024, the Iranian regime launched about 170 loitering munitions toward Israel, most likely Shahed-136 drones. The Israeli Air Force and allied forces intercepted the barrage before its drones reached Israel. The attack demonstrated both the regime’s ability to launch a large number of long-range munitions and the value of coordinated interception. It also showed why assessing the threat solely by the size of an individual warhead misses the operational effect of a mass attack.^[6]

Proliferation and supply

The regime’s supply network connected its domestic drone program to allied armed groups and states. In Yemen, it based the Shahed-136 with the Houthis, who operate it as the Waid. In Russia, Iranian transfers began in summer 2022 and were followed by local manufacture of the Geran-2. These relationships allowed the same underlying design to appear under different names and within different command structures. A drone identified as a Waid or Geran-2 can therefore belong to a wider Shahed-136 lineage even though its operator and place of manufacture differ.^[1][8][9]

Russia’s Alabuga program changed the scale and character of supply. Local production reduced reliance on deliveries of complete drones from Iran while preserving access to the Iranian design through a license agreement. Alabuga Polytech’s assembly training and instruction in Tehran connected Russian workforce development to Iranian manufacturing knowledge. Recruitment of foreign women for advertised study and work opportunities, followed by assignments to drone production without alternatives, formed another part of the labor system behind Russia’s output. The plant also produced other drone types, including Gerbera decoys used alongside attacks on Ukraine.^[9]

Iran continued to display and promote the Shahed series after its battlefield use became widely documented. At a military exhibition in Baghdad in April 2025, the regime displayed the Shahed-136 with other Iranian drones. The exhibit highlighted a weapon already present in Russian operations and the arsenals of Iran-aligned groups. Its prominence reflects the regime’s broader investment in long-range one-way attack aircraft as tools for reaching distant military, civilian and infrastructure targets.^[8][11]

Countermeasures

Defense against Shahed-136 attacks begins with detecting aircraft that are relatively small and fly at low altitude. Defenders then have to identify genuine attack drones among other aerial objects, track their routes and intercept them before impact. Aircraft and ground-based air defenses can engage incoming drones, while cooperation between forces expands the area in which an attack can be met. During the April 2024 barrage, the Israeli Air Force and its allies intercepted roughly 170 Iranian loitering munitions before they reached Israel.^[6][12]

Ukraine also used electronic warfare against Russian loitering munitions, mainly Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones. Such systems can disrupt satellite-based navigation and command communications, interfering with a drone’s ability to reach its intended target. Electronic warfare complements physical interception: its effectiveness depends on the aircraft’s guidance equipment and on the defender’s ability to cover the threatened area. A drone flying toward preset coordinates can still pose a danger after losing a direct control link, so disrupting one communication path does not by itself guarantee protection.^[6]

Mass attacks complicate every stage of defense. Shahed-136 launches can be grouped, and Russia’s Shahed-shaped Gerbera decoys increase the number of apparent threats. Defenders must distinguish decoys from explosive aircraft without allowing a real drone to pass through. Protecting electrical equipment and other critical sites also requires preparation for damage and rapid restoration when interception fails. The experience of Ukraine and Israel shows that successful defense combines early warning, interception, electronic warfare and coordination across forces rather than relying on any single measure.^[6][7][15]