Rapid Support Forces

Overview

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a paramilitary force in Sudan commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. Formed from the Janjaweed militias in 2013, the RSF became a major military and political actor before turning against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Their confrontation with the army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, erupted on April 15, 2023, and became the Sudanese civil war. The former allies fought for control of the capital, Khartoum, while warfare spread across the country.

The RSF’s history joins three episodes that cannot be understood separately: its Janjaweed origins and record in Darfur; its rise within Sudan’s security establishment, including its role in the removal of Omar al-Bashir in 2019; and its war against the regular army. Hemedti gained access to foreign governments and grew into a national political figure, but that standing did not erase the force’s involvement in the genocide in Darfur. During the current war, RSF members and allied militias have committed ethnically motivated violence, killing, theft, displacement and sexual violence against civilians. The army has also faced serious accusations of abuses. Sudanese civilians have therefore confronted violence from competing armed forces rather than a transition to accountable civilian government.

Founding and ideology

Sudan formed the RSF in 2013 from Janjaweed militias. The force retained that organizational lineage even as it acquired a more formal place in the state’s military system. Its incorporation gave Hemedti command of a powerful armed organization with resources, political access and a degree of independence from the regular army. The RSF that later fought for Khartoum remained largely composed of former Janjaweed militias. Its conduct in the civil war, including raids and attacks on civilians, repeated methods associated with that earlier period.

Formal military status did not settle the relationship between the RSF and Sudan’s army. The two institutions developed separate leadership, loyalties and sources of power. Hemedti used his command to build influence in Khartoum and to cultivate ties beyond Sudan. Financial benefits offered by the RSF attracted capable army officers who sought assignments within it. Those transfers strengthened the paramilitary force while weakening any clear boundary between the organizations. The resulting arrangement placed two armed centers of power inside the same state.

The RSF has declared that its purpose is to establish and support democracy rather than to rule Sudan. That statement is part of its political message, not a measure of its conduct. Its record includes attacks on civilians, displacement, theft and rape. Hemedti’s pursuit of political authority and the later attempt to create a parallel government further complicate the force’s stated commitment to civilian rule. No single, consistently articulated political ideology accounts for the RSF’s formation, its alliances and its wartime behavior.

History

Under President Omar al-Bashir, the RSF became one of Sudan’s most consequential armed formations. Its growth gave Hemedti influence that extended beyond a conventional militia command. In 2019, as a protest movement challenged Bashir’s rule, the RSF refused his instructions to disperse protest sit-ins and played a pivotal role in removing him from power. That refusal changed the balance of power during the uprising. It did not undo the RSF’s Janjaweed origins or establish that the force would protect civilians in the years that followed.

After Bashir’s removal, Hemedti served as vice president of Sudan’s Military Council while continuing to command the RSF. He cooperated with army leaders and drew supporters from their ranks. His force established itself as a powerful political actor in Khartoum, while foreign engagement increased his standing. Sudan’s transition nevertheless remained under the influence of armed leaders. The junta’s violent suppression of protesters in 2019 and its interruption of communications impeded the movement’s ability to organize and document events. The contest over civilian government continued after Bashir’s departure.

Hemedti and al-Burhan subsequently worked together as leaders of Sudan’s dominant security forces. Their alliance collapsed amid disagreements over the transition to civilian governance and, centrally, over whether and how the RSF would be integrated into the SAF. Integration concerned command, timing and the future balance of military power. Neither leader’s force was a minor auxiliary that could be absorbed without changing who controlled the state. On April 15, 2023, the dispute became open warfare. A struggle between two commanders turned into a nationwide conflict that displaced civilians, disrupted government and drew in foreign backers.

Hemedti also built relationships with actors in Ethiopia, Libya and the Central African Republic, as well as Kenya and Israel. Both he and al-Burhan publicly backed normalization with Israel while fighting each other. Diplomatic contacts increased Hemedti’s reach, but they did not confer a civilian mandate or remove responsibility for the RSF’s record in Darfur and elsewhere.

Structure and leadership

Hemedti, who held the rank of lieutenant general, commands the RSF. Its organization grew from militia networks into a force capable of contesting the national army across several regions. The group combined fighters drawn from its Janjaweed lineage with commanders and recruits attracted by its resources and prospects. After entering Khartoum, Hemedti cultivated relationships among army leaders; some sought RSF assignments because of the financial benefits available there. Such ties helped the force expand its military capability and political influence before the war.

The RSF operates through its own command rather than as a subordinate branch of the SAF. That autonomy was central to the integration dispute. During the war, RSF fighters operated alongside allied militias, particularly in Darfur. The distinction matters when describing individual incidents, but the broader alliance formed part of the force’s military power. Reports of defections also raised fears that former RSF commanders could infiltrate army positions in Port Sudan and Khartoum. Those concerns reflected both the movement of personnel between rival forces and the difficulty of securing command structures during an extended civil war.

Hemedti’s leadership has been military and political. He presented himself internationally as a participant in Sudan’s future and later supported a rival governing project. In March 2025, he announced a parallel Sudanese government in Kenya. RSF members, allied militia leaders and political figures signed its founding charter. The initiative sought governing authority alongside the force’s territorial control, even as its declared commitment to democracy remained at odds with abuses committed by its fighters and allies.

Funding and sponsors

The United Arab Emirates has supported Hemedti and the RSF during the war. Reports of Emirati assistance, including arms transfers, drew scrutiny because of the force’s conduct against civilians. Calls to restrict weapons and other support followed ethnically motivated violence by the RSF and allied militias in Darfur. Al-Burhan sought closer ties with Saudi Arabia as he confronted the backing available to his rival. Regional support has thus shaped the war’s duration and the resources available to each side.

Russia’s Wagner forces supported the RSF after fighting began in April 2023. Wagner also operated a gold processing plant in RSF-controlled territory. Gold and external commercial networks gave the conflict an economic dimension beyond formal state assistance. Hemedti’s foreign connections strengthened his political position, while access to resources helped sustain an armed force that had previously benefited from the Sudanese state.

Foreign involvement has not been limited to the RSF. After Sudan renewed relations with Iran, al-Burhan sought military assistance from the Iranian regime against Hemedti’s forces. Egypt was drawn into the opening phase of the conflict when the RSF captured Egyptian soldiers; they were later returned through the International Red Cross. The RSF accused Egypt of supplying the SAF with weapons, ammunition, training and other support, and accused Egyptian aircraft of bombing its camps. Turkish manufacturers sold weapons to Sudan’s army, while possible sales to the RSF were also reported. These relationships placed Sudan’s domestic power struggle within a wider contest involving neighboring states and outside military suppliers.

Attacks and operations

Khartoum became the center of the struggle between Hemedti and al-Burhan when war broke out on April 15, 2023. RSF units advanced rapidly in the opening battle, demonstrating capabilities that many observers had underestimated. The force’s earlier establishment in the capital and its relationships with army personnel helped it operate there. Control of bridges on three flanks of Khartoum was especially important because the crossings served as RSF supply routes. Fighting for those routes became part of the prolonged battle for the city.

Beyond the capital, civilians fled cities and villages as RSF units approached, fearing for their lives and property. In Darfur, the RSF and allied militias committed grave violations, including ethnically motivated violence. Their conduct prompted demands to cut off weapons and other forms of support. The United States accused the RSF of genocide and human-rights abuses during the civil war and sanctioned Hemedti. The force’s wartime record included killing, displacement, theft and rape. Its claim to favor civilian democracy cannot account for those acts.

Sexual violence has been a severe feature of the war. Women and girls described assaults committed largely by the RSF and allied militias. A reported estimate identified more than four million women and girls at risk of sexual assault. Documented cases captured only a portion of the harm: insecurity, disrupted communications and limited access to reporting bodies impeded survivors from seeking help or having attacks recorded. Sexual violence accompanied the broader destruction of civilian safety, housing and services.

By a reported 2024 estimate, the war had displaced nearly eight million people, 88 percent of them women and children. Those figures described the scale of the crisis at that point, not a final tally. Families fled combat, attacks and the prospect of losing their homes and possessions. Women and children faced both the immediate danger of violence and the longer consequences of displacement, including disrupted care and reduced access to protection. The scale of flight showed how the conflict between two armed establishments had spread far beyond their dispute over military integration.

In March 2025, the SAF advanced through Khartoum after more than 23 months of civil war. As the army pressed toward the presidential palace, Hemedti urged his fighters by video to hold it. The army regained key crossings around the capital. On March 28, it secured the Jebel Aulia Dam bridge, the last Khartoum crossing held by the RSF. By April 1, the SAF had retaken Khartoum. Loss of the capital marked a major reversal for the RSF but did not end its operations elsewhere in Sudan.

Designations and international status

The RSF’s international status reflects the difference between diplomatic contact and accountability for wartime conduct. Hemedti met foreign representatives and built ties across the region while commanding a force descended from the Janjaweed. Those contacts increased his standing, yet the RSF’s involvement in the genocide in Darfur remained central to any assessment of its record. During the current war, ethnically motivated attacks by the force and allied militias renewed demands for restrictions on their access to arms and support.

The United States accused the RSF of genocide and human-rights abuses and sanctioned Hemedti. These actions concern the force’s conduct and its commander; they should not be confused with an established terrorist-organization designation. International human-rights criticism has also addressed attacks on civilians by both the RSF and the SAF. Recognizing violations by the army does not diminish responsibility for RSF abuses, particularly the ethnically motivated violence in Darfur and sexual violence committed by its fighters and allies.

Current status

The SAF’s recapture of Khartoum in March 2025 ended the RSF’s hold on Sudan’s capital, but the civil war continued. The force retained fighters, allied militias and political ambitions beyond Khartoum. Hemedti’s parallel-government initiative signaled an effort to turn military control into governing authority. In 2026, the SAF was based in Port Sudan while continuing its fight against the RSF. Defections and shifting lines of control added uncertainty to both sides’ positions.

The RSF remains a principal party to a war that has uprooted millions of Sudanese civilians. Its history includes service within Sudan’s security system, a consequential role in Bashir’s removal, a failed alliance with al-Burhan and a campaign against the regular army. Its declared support for democracy stands alongside its Janjaweed lineage and documented violence against civilians. The loss of Khartoum changed the military balance; it did not resolve the conflict, the humanitarian crisis or the question of accountability for abuses.