Bab-el-Mandeb

Overview

Bab-el-Mandeb is the strait separating Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa. It forms the southern entrance to the Red Sea and links that sea to the Gulf of Aden and, beyond it, Indian Ocean shipping routes. Vessels traveling from the Indian Ocean toward the Mediterranean pass through Bab-el-Mandeb, cross the Red Sea and enter the Suez Canal. The strait is therefore a geographic bottleneck for trade between Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Disruption at its southern entrance can affect traffic throughout the Red Sea corridor, including ships with no connection to any regional conflict.^[1][3][10]

The route carries oil, gas, food, raw materials and manufactured goods. Before the Houthi attacks that began in 2023, the Bab-el-Mandeb–Suez corridor carried an estimated 12 percent of global maritime goods trade. Oil shipments also made the strait important to energy markets: about 10 percent of world oil transited it when the multinational maritime mission Operation Prosperity Guardian was formed. These estimates describe different measures and periods, but both show why a threat to passage has effects beyond Yemen and its neighbors. Ships can avoid the strait by sailing around Africa, at the cost of longer voyages, higher transport expenses and changes to delivery schedules.^[10][11][12]

Bab-el-Mandeb’s importance combines geography with military reach. A force does not have to administer every shore or island to threaten ships crossing a narrow passage. Coastal missiles, drones and other weapons can make transit dangerous from positions some distance away. Control of nearby ports and islands can improve surveillance, logistics and the interception of weapons shipments. This distinction between holding territory and threatening traffic has shaped both Yemen’s war and international responses to attacks on civilian shipping.^[5][15]

Geography

The strait lies between Yemen on its eastern side and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side. Yemen’s Perim Island, also known as Mayyun, divides the passage into two channels. The narrower eastern channel is used mainly by smaller or local vessels, while international shipping generally uses the wider western channel. The Yemeni port of Mocha stands north of the strait along the Red Sea coast. Aden lies to its east, near the Gulf of Aden approach. These places matter because forces based there can observe, supply or threaten traffic entering and leaving the Red Sea.^[5][14]

At the northern end of the same maritime corridor, the Suez Canal provides passage between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Bab-el-Mandeb controls the corridor’s Indian Ocean approach. A ship bound from Asia to a Mediterranean port must pass both points; a threat at either can undermine the route as a whole. The relationship also makes security near Bab-el-Mandeb consequential for Egypt, whose canal depends on vessels continuing to use the Red Sea passage. For Israel, the route serves maritime access to Eilat and connects its trade to wider Red Sea and Indian Ocean shipping.^[3][10][16]

The nearby Strait of Hormuz is another major energy chokepoint. Arab Gulf states have invested in ports and alternative export routes to reduce dependence on Hormuz, including facilities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Those alternatives may still depend on safe passage through Bab-el-Mandeb. For Saudi oil sent to Red Sea ports and then east toward Asian customers, a threat at Bab-el-Mandeb can replace one maritime vulnerability with another. Geography therefore links port development, energy planning and naval security across the Arabian Peninsula and the African coast.^[1][13]

Jewish history

Bab-el-Mandeb entered the history of the modern State of Israel through the security of Red Sea navigation. During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt blockaded the Red Sea near the strait. The episode demonstrated that control or disruption far from Israel’s coast could restrict its southern maritime access. The same geographic concern later shaped attention to threats against Eilat and to the safety of ships using the Red Sea route. Eilat is not Israel’s largest port, but its position gives Israel an outlet toward the Indian Ocean and a southern alternative when other maritime routes face pressure.^[16]

Modern history

Competition over Bab-el-Mandeb intensified with Yemen’s civil war and a wider contest for ports along the Arabian Sea and Red Sea. In March 2015, Egypt joined the coalition supporting Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and sent naval forces to protect the strait. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also became central actors in the conflict. UAE forces played a leading role in securing Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. Control of Aden matters beyond local politics: its port and proximity to Bab-el-Mandeb give a southern government a potential role in limiting maritime influence sought by the Iranian regime and in protecting traffic important to Israel and other states.^[5][8]

In 2015, Houthi forces briefly seized Perim Island before forces aligned with Yemen’s government, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates retook it. The UAE subsequently developed facilities on Perim, including landing strips and small port terminals. Its military presence also extended to Eritrea, Somaliland and Socotra. These facilities formed part of a wider effort to protect navigation, monitor the approaches to the strait and obstruct weapons smuggling into Yemen. Saudi Arabia sought a military foothold in nearby Djibouti, while Turkey pursued a larger presence in Djibouti and Somalia. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt competed with Qatar and Turkey for ports, bases and influence around the waterway.^[5][10]

China developed a separate strategic position beside Bab-el-Mandeb. Its Belt and Road Initiative encouraged investment in ports along routes through the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Red Sea. In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, close to the strait and near facilities operated by the United States, France and Japan. China later upgraded the base with a dock designed to accommodate very large naval vessels, including aircraft carriers. Its growing port network sharpened India’s perception of a direct strategic threat and increased United States attention to the region. China’s base on the African side and the Iranian regime’s support for the Houthis in Yemen placed two powers with interests in the passage on opposite shores.^[1][7][9]

The contest for infrastructure did not begin with the attacks of 2023. It reflected longer concerns about energy exports, food imports, naval access and the reliability of established routes. Gulf investment in East African ports sought to secure commercial channels while reducing exposure to Hormuz. On Yemen’s side, coastal control shifted repeatedly among the Houthis, government-aligned forces and their partners. Each change affected the ability to monitor shipping and smuggling, but territorial gains alone could not guarantee safe transit while armed groups retained missiles and drones capable of reaching the sea.^[1][5][15]

Security

The Iranian regime substantially increased military support for the Houthi terrorist organization in the mid-2010s, during its war with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthis acquired attack drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles with ranges sufficient to threaten ships near Bab-el-Mandeb and attempt strikes against Eilat. Personnel linked to the Iranian regime, including members of the Quds Force, operated in Yemen. Support for the Houthis gave Tehran a means to pressure Saudi Arabia, Israel and international maritime traffic from Yemen’s Red Sea coast.^[6][7]

The danger to naval traffic was visible before the latest Red Sea crisis. In 2016, the Houthis launched unsuccessful missile attacks toward the United States destroyer USS Mason in the Red Sea north of Bab-el-Mandeb. The United States struck coastal radar installations associated with the attacks. The episode showed how weapons based along Yemen’s coast could endanger warships as well as civilian vessels. Radar sites, launch systems and access to islands became important security concerns because they could help identify targets and guide attacks on ships passing through the strait.^[17]

Combined Task Force 153 was established in April 2022 to improve maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. Its creation preceded the surge in attacks after October 2023. During the Gaza war, the Houthis attacked Israel and civilian shipping, concentrating much of their maritime campaign around the Red Sea’s southern gateway. Their drones and missiles disrupted passage through Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, while longer-range weapons threatened Eilat. In December 2023, the Houthis threatened to shut the strait. Operation Prosperity Guardian brought a multinational effort to protect navigation to the same waters, with Combined Task Force 153 taking a leadership role.^[10][11][16]

Houthi attacks were not confined to vessels connected with Israel. Many targeted ships had no Israeli link, and the continuing threat caused shipping companies to divert voyages. By April 2024, additional companies serving Israeli ports were avoiding Bab-el-Mandeb. The attacks threatened freedom of navigation on a route used by Israel and the wider world, while reduced Suez traffic harmed Egypt’s economy. The Houthis’ ability to disrupt a shared commercial passage made the campaign a global shipping problem, not solely an Israeli one.^[10][11][16]

China’s response contrasted with its nearby military presence. During the Houthi campaign, Beijing offered no significant condemnation of attacks on Israel and civilian shipping, declined to join the United States-led task force protecting navigation, and its warships failed to answer distress calls from attacked vessels. Houthi attacks on commercial shipping spared Chinese vessels. A base beside Bab-el-Mandeb thus gave China a strategic foothold without making its navy a dependable protector of other ships using the passage.^[2][4]

Present day

Threats to Bab-el-Mandeb continued in 2026. In July, the Houthis announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, putting shipping through the strait under renewed pressure. Vessels altered course soon after the announcement, and Saudi oil exporters faced difficulty using Red Sea routes to reach Asian customers. The crisis exposed limits of efforts to bypass Hormuz by moving oil to ports on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast: cargo headed east still had to pass the threatened southern entrance. In June, Esmail Qaani had threatened to use the Iranian regime’s Houthi proxies to close Bab-el-Mandeb.^[13][14]

In September 2026, Houthi forces advanced along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and seized Mocha, Perim or Mayyun Island, and other nearby islands, including Zuqar. Government-aligned forces subsequently reported recovering some territory. The advances increased the Houthis’ ability to position weapons and monitor traffic close to the passage, although control of coastline and complete control of navigation are different matters. A force able to fire from land or islands can raise insurance costs, deter voyages and divert ships without stopping every vessel. The resulting pressure bears on Saudi exports, Egypt’s canal traffic, Israel’s maritime access and commerce between Asia and Europe.^[14][15]

Bab-el-Mandeb remains a place where local territorial control and international freedom of navigation meet. Aden and the southern Yemeni coast shape which forces can resist Houthi expansion; Perim and nearby African ports shape surveillance and access; missiles and drones determine how far a threat can extend beyond territory held on shore. Keeping the passage open is consequently a shared concern for states and commercial operators that depend on the Red Sea–Suez route. Its security cannot be measured solely by who holds one port or island: sustained protection also requires preventing attacks on vessels crossing the strait.^[5][14][15]