Badr Organization

Overview

The Badr Organization is a Shia political and armed organization based in Iraq. Founded in Iran by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), it became one of the Iranian regime’s most enduring Iraqi allies. Hadi al-Amiri has long led Badr as secretary-general. Its electoral organization, militia forces and patronage networks have given it influence in parliament, government ministries and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Badr’s participation in elections has coexisted with its military role and continuing ties to the IRGC.

Founding and ideology

The IRGC founded Badr in Iran during the 1980s as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Originally called Failaq Badr, or the Badr Brigades, it recruited Iraqi Shia prisoners of war held in Iran and opponents of Saddam Hussein. Iran’s military trained and funded its fighters. During the Iran–Iraq War, al-Amiri’s forces fought alongside Iran against Iraq. Badr continued its campaign against Hussein’s Baathist regime for roughly twenty years, using guerrilla and terrorist tactics.

Badr adheres to a form of political Islam rooted in velayat-e faqih, the doctrine of guardianship by an Islamic jurist. As a young commander, al-Amiri declared that Ruhollah Khomeini’s decisions on war and peace governed his own. Badr’s walai allegiance recognizes Iran’s supreme leader as a higher authority than Iraq’s prime minister when their demands conflict. This commitment remained central after al-Amiri separated Badr from SCIRI’s successor party.

History

Following Saddam Hussein’s removal in 2003, Badr expanded its political presence and entered Iraqi security institutions. It adopted the name Munadhamat Badr, or Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development, in 2004. In 2005 it claimed to have surrendered its weapons and become exclusively political. The claim met widespread disbelief, and a 2006 religious freedom report still identified Badr as an armed militia. Sunni Arab leaders accused it of assassinating Sunni clerics in 2005; Badr rejected the accusation, for which the accuser presented no evidence.

In 2012, al-Amiri led Badr out of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the successor to SCIRI, to contest elections independently. The split followed Ammar al-Hakim’s distancing from certain Iranian regime policies and from velayat-e faqih. Badr retained its pro-Iranian orientation. It won 22 of Iraq’s 328 parliamentary seats in 2014. Al-Amiri subsequently led the Conquest Alliance in the 2018 parliamentary election; as of October 2021, Badr held nine of the alliance’s twenty seats, making it its largest party. Armed strength and electoral gains allowed Badr to seek influence over provincial councils, parliament and the cabinet.

After the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum, a reported agreement between Bafel Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and al-Amiri concerned PUK forces and Kirkuk. Iraqi Kurdish parliamentarian Masoud Haydar published details after Kurdish forces withdrew from the city. The episode illustrated Badr’s role in the politics and security of northern Iraq.

Structure and leadership

Badr comprises political and military wings with multiple subfactions. Al-Amiri is its secretary-general. Its shura council has included al-Amiri, Qasim al-Araji, Abu Muntadher al-Husseini, Mohammed al-Ghabban and Abu Ali al-Basri. Senior commanders have included Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. Badr’s older ranks and networks also helped generate younger armed factions, including Kataib Hezbollah; some former Badr figures later built power outside al-Amiri’s control.

Badr integrated members into Iraq’s security forces and, after 2014, into the PMF. Al-Araji served as interior minister and later as national security adviser. Badr’s influence inside the Interior Ministry expanded while al-Amiri associate Mohammed al-Ghabban ran it. Its electoral victories, armed forces and appointments embedded the organization in Iraqi state institutions.

Funding and sponsors

Iran and the IRGC trained, funded and sponsored Badr. Iraqi state funding also supports its PMF units: Badr operates at least ten, and possibly as many as seventeen, PMF brigades. Under Iraqi law those brigades are state organs, and Badr personnel in ministries and security forces must obey lawful orders from Iraq’s prime minister. Badr brigades nevertheless refused an order to join the Battle of Tikrit if coalition airpower supported the operation. Its Iranian allegiance and that refusal demonstrate limits on effective Iraqi command.

Attacks and operations

Badr sent fighters to Syria to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Its force there operated as the Badr Military Wing in Syria and the Forces of the Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The IRGC directly commanded that military wing. Within Iraq, Badr expanded its armed presence in Diyala, where its control placed parts of the province beyond effective state authority. Camp Ashraf, formally a government-controlled PMF base in Diyala, was run by Badr; personnel from Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun were reported there.

In Basra, Badr controlled local PMF security offices. Jaber Sayyed Dagher al-Musawi, a Badr official, headed the PMF Central Security Directorate and commanded its 7th Brigade and marine forces. Another Badr figure, Abu Mahmoud al-Badran, controlled the provincial PMF office. A January 2024 armed confrontation with Kataib al-Imam Ali at a commemoration ceremony exposed that local security control. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Badr’s powerful partner in Basra and national politics, backed it during the dispute.

Designations and international status

Badr has avoided United States government sanctions despite decades of ideological and operational ties to the IRGC. Members of Congress began calling for sanctions in 2020. Israel has named Badr a belligerent in the Gaza conflict since 2023. Badr operates alongside Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba within the Iranian regime’s network of Iraqi armed groups, although their United States designation status differs.

Current status

Badr remains both an Iraqi political force and an armed organization with state-funded brigades. On January 26, 2026, it publicly backed the Iranian regime amid threats of confrontation with the United States. Its Ideological Guidance Office pledged support for Iran if war broke out with the United States and Israel, presenting such a conflict as one requiring supporters to take sides. That position continued Badr’s longstanding alignment with Iran’s supreme leader while its personnel held formal positions in Iraq’s state.