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Overview
Naim Qassem is a Lebanese leader of Hezbollah, an Iran-backed terrorist organization with armed, political and social institutions in Lebanon. He became deputy to Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi in 1991. After Israel killed al-Musawi in 1992, Hassan Nasrallah became secretary-general and Qassem remained deputy for more than three decades. Hezbollah had groomed Hashem Safieddine as Nasrallah’s successor, but Qassem took the leadership after Israel killed Nasrallah on September 27, 2024. His long service gave him institutional experience at a moment when Hezbollah had lost much of its senior leadership in its war with Israel.
Early life
Qassem worked as a chemistry teacher before rising through Hezbollah’s leadership. His work in religious education began well before he became deputy secretary-general. In 1974, he founded Lebanon’s Hezbollah-affiliated Mustafa schools and began heading the Association for Islamic Religious Education, their umbrella organization. He led the association until 1988 and retained a supervisory role over the schools afterward. Qassem also took part in launching Islamic religious teaching in Lebanon in 1977 and developing modern Islamic schools. These activities placed education among his enduring responsibilities within Hezbollah’s network.
Career
As deputy secretary-general, Qassem represented Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and in its relationships with the Iranian regime and allied organizations. During a parliamentary campaign in Lebanon, he addressed a large rally in the Beqaa Valley, presenting Hezbollah’s program of resistance and development and promising social and health insurance. His public role extended beyond electoral politics. On May 16, 2018, the United States Treasury Department sanctioned Qassem, Nasrallah and four other members of Hezbollah’s ruling Shura Council. All six Gulf monarchies joined the counterterrorism measures through the Terrorist Financing and Targeting Center.
Qassem maintained direct contact with senior figures of the Iranian regime. In April 2019, during a meeting with Iranian parliamentarian Amir Khojasteh, he credited support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with enabling Hezbollah to fight Israel. He traveled to Tehran for ceremonies marking the third anniversary of the killing of Qasem Soleimani and met Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, on January 4, 2023. In May 2024, Qassem attended a meeting of leaders from Iran-aligned organizations that included Hamas representative Ismail Haniyeh. He later appeared with Haniyeh and Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah at Iranian presidential ceremonies.
Nasrallah’s death made Qassem Hezbollah’s principal public voice. He delivered his first speech in that capacity on September 30, 2024, and spoke again on October 8, the anniversary of Hezbollah opening its front against Israel in support of its allies in Gaza. After becoming secretary-general, he drew on Nasrallah’s legacy to reinforce his leadership. In February 2025, Qassem met Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Beirut; Iranian ambassador Mojtaba Amani also attended.
Ideology and statements
Qassem has declared that Hezbollah makes no distinction between its military and political wings. That position connects his work in the organization’s schools and political leadership to Hezbollah as a whole. In remarks to religion teachers, he invoked Ruhollah Khomeini while identifying Israel as an enemy. He also promoted antisemitism by describing Jews, regardless of Zionism, as a people whose ideas are evil. His statement targeted Jews as a people, beyond any position on Israeli policy or Zionism.
Qassem rejected indirect negotiations with Israel while Israeli operations continued in Lebanon. In a November 6, 2024 speech, he vowed that Hezbollah would keep fighting for as long as necessary and threatened attacks throughout Israel, declaring that no area was off limits. He called the United States a primary partner in what Hezbollah described as crimes during the war. His statements treated the battlefield, rather than diplomacy, as the means of ending the fighting on Hezbollah’s terms.
Role in attacks or conflicts
Qassem became secretary-general during the 2024 Lebanon war. After the fighting, he acknowledged that armed organizations can sometimes lose, while continuing to defend Hezbollah’s military position. He said Hezbollah had supplied amendments to the 2024 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire agreement before accepting it. He argued that the arrangement governed only territory south of the Litani River and denied that it restricted Hezbollah’s weapons elsewhere in Lebanon or its relationship with the Lebanese state and army. His account of the ceasefire made clear that Hezbollah’s acceptance did not amount to disarmament.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 removed a close Hezbollah partner in Syria and disrupted its overland connection to Iran. Qassem responded by offering an opening to the Syrian groups that he had described the previous week as terrorists acting for Israel. During Iran’s 2025 war with Israel, he continued to align Hezbollah publicly with the Iranian regime. On June 19, 2025, he declared support for Iran without threatening to bring Hezbollah into the fighting.
Death or current status
Qassem remained Hezbollah’s secretary-general in 2026. At the first anniversary of senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr’s death in July 2025, he reiterated Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm under any conditions. Lebanese political figures challenged the prospect of renewed war; in January 2026, Gemayel rebuked Qassem over the risk of drawing Lebanon into another regional conflict. In an April 2026 address, Qassem said Hezbollah would remain on the battlefield and threatened Israeli soldiers and northern towns.
Legacy
Qassem’s tenure links Hezbollah’s schools, electoral activity, relations with the Iranian regime and armed campaign against Israel. At events commemorating Nasrallah, he pledged to continue his predecessor’s path and resist efforts to force Hezbollah to disarm. On September 27, 2026, the second anniversary of Nasrallah’s death, he again defended Hezbollah’s arsenal while announcing a housing project for villages devastated by war. His leadership has been marked by efforts to preserve Hezbollah’s weapons and its Lebanese support base after the losses of 2024.
Kaynakça
- 1‘We are Prepared, No Matter How Long It Takes’: New Hezbollah Leader Naim Qassem Boasts of Terror Group’s Endurancefdd.org
- 2Naim Qassem: Hezbollah’s New and Subdued Voicefdd.org
- 3Naim Qassem on Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon and about-face on Syriafdd.org
- 4Hezbollah’s New Leader Naim Qassem Is No Hassan Nasrallahfdd.org
- 5Hizbullah Secretary-General Naim Qassem: We Will Stay On The Battlefield Until Our Last Breath, Never Surrender; We Will Capture Enemy Soldiers; Northern Israeli Towns Will Never Be Safememri.org
- 6Teaching Antisemitism and Terrorism in Hezbollah Schoolsadl.org
- 7Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (February 19 – 26, 2025)terrorism-info.org.il
- 8The Israel-Hamas War: Hezbollah Joins the Fightjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 9Spotlight on Iran (April 18 – May 5, 2019)terrorism-info.org.il
- 10After the Israel–Iran War: Hezbollah’s Decline and Israel’s Opportunityinss.org.il
- 11Lebanon after the Doha Agreement of 2008: The Birth of the Undeclared Shiite Republic in Lebanoninss.org.il
- 12Hezbollah: History & Overviewjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 13Spotlight on Iran (December 29, 2022 – January 12, 2023)terrorism-info.org.il
- 14High Stakes, High Anxiety: Campaigning in Lebanonwashingtoninstitute.org
- 15Hezbollah 2.0—One Year After Nasrallah’s Eliminationinss.org.il
- 16Disarming Hezbollah: Much Talk, Little Actionwashingtoninstitute.org
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