Muslim Brotherhood

Overview

The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational movement of Sunni Islam and political Islam founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. It seeks to shape public life and government according to sharia, the Islamic legal and governing system. Its slogan, “Islam is the solution,” presents religious law and institutions as answers to individual, social and political problems. The Brotherhood has pursued this program through preaching, welfare provision, education, elections and, at different points in its history and across distinct branches, armed activity. It is neither a single political party nor an organization whose national branches have always followed one command structure. Its Egyptian parent movement, foreign branches and ideologically aligned groups differ in leadership, legal status and methods. [1][2][3]

The movement’s importance lies in the combination of a durable Egyptian organization and a wider network of institutions and political currents. It built constituencies through mosques, schools, charities, health services and other forms of da’wah, or outreach and preaching. Long membership vetting strengthened internal discipline. Its most consequential offshoot for Israel is Hamas, the terrorist organization formed by Brotherhood figures in Gaza during the First Intifada. Hamas’s 1988 charter identified it as a Brotherhood wing. Other branches have entered parliaments, joined governments or fought in regional conflicts. Their different conduct makes branch-specific evidence essential when describing the Brotherhood’s operations and legal status. [2][4][5]

Founding and ideology

Al-Banna founded the Brotherhood on 22 March 1928, amid debate in Egypt over British influence, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the place of Islamic law in modern government. The organization expanded from its Egyptian beginnings into cities including Alexandria. It presented Islam as both religion and basis for political order. Its proposed path to power began with educating individuals, then families and society, before establishing a government guided by sharia. This gradual approach gave everyday religious and social work a political purpose. The Center for the Study of Political Islam places the Brotherhood within a longer history of Islamic political doctrine; that interpretation does not change the organization’s founding date in 1928. [1][2][6]

Da’wah institutions became central to the Brotherhood’s growth. Charities, hospitals, schools, mosques, sports activities and tutoring offered services while introducing recruits to its teachings and social networks. Recruitment at Egyptian universities could begin with ordinary student activities. Becoming a full member was a prolonged process: interviews with current and former members described vetting lasting five to eight years, during which candidates were observed for loyalty and taught the Brotherhood’s curriculum. This process helped leaders mobilize committed supporters even when the movement faced state restrictions. The organization’s strength therefore rested on sustained social organization as well as election campaigns. [2][4]

Al-Banna also authorized a secret apparatus that trained members for violence. Brotherhood volunteers fought in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, while the apparatus attacked British interests and Egyptian officials. Brotherhood publications under al-Banna combined hostile depictions of Jews from Islamic texts with European antisemitic stereotypes; one newspaper column published names and addresses of Jewish proprietors. These writings formed part of the early convergence of Arab opposition to the Jewish national movement and European Jew hatred. Zionism is the Jewish people’s national movement for self-determination in their historic homeland, the Land of Israel. [3][6][7]

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s repression later gave prominence to Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb. In Ma’alim fi al-Tariq, published in English as Milestones, Qutb portrayed modern secular society as a new jahiliyyah, or age of ignorance, and called for replacing its leadership with Islamic rule. His analysis also applied to Muslims whose societies failed his standard of Islamic life. Qutb’s revolutionary ideas influenced later jihadist movements, although Brotherhood factions disagreed over whether armed struggle should be immediate or reserved for circumstances in which social activity had been suppressed. Jihad means struggle or effort; Qutb’s discussion of warfare concerns armed jihad specifically. [1][8]

History

The Brotherhood grew into a mass movement during the 1930s and 1940s. Its secret apparatus carried out bombings and assassinations, including the murder of Egyptian prime minister Mahmoud an-Nuqrashi Pasha on 28 December 1948. Egypt banned the organization after the killing. Al-Banna was killed in 1949, and the movement entered a period of internal crisis. Relations with the officers who overthrew Egypt’s monarchy in 1952 were initially cooperative. They collapsed after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Nasser on 26 October 1954. Nasser’s government arrested Qutb and thousands of Brotherhood members, outlawed the movement and sharply curtailed its public activity. [1][3][6]

Repression did not end Brotherhood organizing. Members and sympathizers continued religious and social work in Egypt and established networks abroad. During the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Islamic universities recruited Brotherhood members to faculties and student bodies, extending the movement’s intellectual reach. Under President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian Brotherhood participated in politics despite legal restrictions and recurrent arrests. Before the November 1995 parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s government accused it of aiding violent groups and detained many members. The Brotherhood kept its contacts with Hamas limited during this period because Egyptian security authorities feared threats arising from Gaza. [1][3][5]

The Arab Spring brought the Egyptian movement its greatest electoral opportunity. Authorities arrested Brotherhood leaders, including Mohamed Morsi, during the January 2011 protests against Mubarak. After his fall, the Brotherhood won a plurality in the 2011–2012 People’s Assembly election and a majority in the January 2012 Shura Council election. It nominated Morsi for the presidency after election officials disqualified its first choice, Khairat al-Shater. Morsi won the June 2012 election and became Egypt’s first civilian president. Before taking office, he had served as the Brotherhood’s principal contact with Egypt’s State Security apparatus during Mubarak’s final years, negotiating the movement’s participation in political activity. [9][10]

Morsi’s presidency exposed the conflict between the Brotherhood’s political program and demands for inclusive constitutional government. A 2007 Brotherhood party platform that he co-authored proposed a role for Islamic clerics in reviewing legislation and excluded women and Christians from the presidency. On 12 August 2012, he removed senior generals and issued a constitutional declaration concentrating executive, legislative and constitution-writing powers in his office. His government drafted a constitution reflecting Brotherhood views without accommodating other Egyptian political forces. Large protests preceded his removal by the military in 2013. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became Egypt’s leader, and his governing camp banned the Brotherhood and designated it a terrorist organization. The crackdown left about 2,500 Egyptians dead and approximately 16,000 Brotherhood members imprisoned; nearly 1,000 supporters were killed when security forces cleared Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square on 14 August 2013. [3][9][11]

Structure and leadership

Egypt’s Brotherhood historically described itself as a society governed through internal consultation rather than a party directed by one elected chairman. Its Supreme Guide and senior officials coordinated religious, organizational and political work. Leaders including Muhammad Badie remained influential during Morsi’s rise. The movement’s careful recruitment, local networks and welfare institutions allowed it to survive repeated bans, but repression after 2013 and later leadership disputes weakened its Egyptian organization. By 2021, rival leadership currents had emerged. Ideological affiliation outside Egypt does not, by itself, establish formal membership, direct funding or control by the Egyptian parent. [4][9][11][12]

National branches have developed distinct roles. The Brotherhood’s Jordanian movement dates to 1946 and has operated within a different relationship with the monarchy; internal divisions later produced competing factions. In Lebanon, the Islamic Group, also known as al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah, is the local Brotherhood branch. In Sudan, the Sudanese Islamic Movement emerged from Brotherhood organizing and became influential under Omar al-Bashir; Sudanese Brotherhood organizations and Islamist armed networks have also taken part in the country’s civil war. These cases show why the Egyptian movement’s history cannot be applied unchanged to every branch. [5][13][14]

In Yemen, al-Islah is the principal party associated with the Brotherhood, but it also includes tribal and Salafi currents. It has held influential political and military positions, including within governments internationally recognized during the Yemeni civil war. Al-Islah supported the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis, and Saudi Arabia exempted the party from its terrorism list while cooperating with it. Its place in Yemen’s governing coalitions differs from Hamas’s armed rule in Gaza and from the Egyptian Brotherhood’s position after 2013. [5]

Yusuf al-Qaradawi rose through the Brotherhood and became one of the most influential religious figures associated with its wider current. His writings reached millions, and he co-founded the World Association of Muslim Scholars in 2004, leading it until 2018. His public rulings and broadcasts linked Brotherhood thought to audiences far beyond any formal membership roll. The Brotherhood’s spread thus involved leaders, publications, scholarly networks and locally rooted parties, rather than identical subsidiaries in every country. [5]

Funding and sponsors

Membership networks and da’wah institutions have long supplied the Brotherhood with organizational resources: schools, charities, health services and religious centers connect donors, volunteers and beneficiaries. Outside Egypt, support varies by branch and period. Qatar sheltered Brotherhood leaders after Morsi’s removal, while Al Jazeera gave some of them airtime. Qatar has no native Brotherhood chapter, yet its government has supported Brotherhood-linked movements, including Hamas. Such patronage should be distinguished from evidence that Doha directs every national branch. [2][5]

After 2013, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey became another leading supporter of Brotherhood leaders and Sunni political Islam movements. Ankara hosted figures displaced from other countries and backed Brotherhood-aligned governments and parties. Turkey has no formal Brotherhood chapter. Its Milli Görüş movement is an ideological counterpart that helped shape Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party; shared ideas and political support do not make Milli Görüş a registered Brotherhood branch. These relationships helped sustain the movement’s regional reach after the Egyptian parent lost power. [15]

A 1991 memorandum associated with Brotherhood work in North America described a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” aimed at eliminating Western civilization from within. Written by Muhammad Akram and found by the FBI during a 2004 search, it identified preaching, media, political participation, education, security training and legal institutions as fields of work. The document records the objectives of its authors and the institutions they proposed to build; it does not establish that every Muslim organization in North America belonged to, or followed instructions from, the Brotherhood. Distinguishing documented organizational ties from shared ideas is necessary when assessing claims about its wider network. [6][16]

Attacks and operations

The Brotherhood’s record includes both its own historical violence and attacks by movements that arose from its networks. Its Egyptian secret apparatus attacked British interests and assassinated government figures in the 1940s. The attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954 produced a sweeping confrontation with the state. Later jihadist organizations drew on Brotherhood-era ideas or personnel, but their acts should not automatically be assigned to the parent organization. Ayman al-Zawahiri had belonged to the Brotherhood before his later jihadist career. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, whose members assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 after his peace with Israel, arose in Egypt’s broader Islamist milieu. [1][3][8]

Ahmed Yassin and other Brotherhood figures established Hamas during the First Intifada; the terrorist organization was formally founded in December 1987. Its 1988 charter identified it as a Brotherhood wing and opened with a statement attributed to al-Banna predicting Israel’s destruction. Hamas’s origins make the Brotherhood’s ideology and regional connections directly relevant to Israeli security. After Hamas violently seized power in Gaza in 2007, it developed an armed governing apparatus. Brotherhood leaders publicly supported Hamas and called for money, weapons and equipment for armed groups in Gaza. Al-Qaradawi issued a ruling permitting suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, arguing that women and children could be treated as future soldiers; Hamas followed his writings and rulings. Hamas also carried out the October 7 attacks in southern Israel in 2023. [5][7][17]

Relations between Hamas and Egypt’s Brotherhood changed with political circumstances. Under Mubarak, their public contacts were limited. Following his fall, senior figures met in Cairo, and a Brotherhood delegation visited Gaza in October 2011. Hamas sought closer ties in part to reduce Egyptian operations against weapons-smuggling tunnels. In March 2016, spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri denied that Hamas had political or organizational ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood while acknowledging ideological affiliation. That statement followed Egyptian pressure on Hamas and did not erase the organizations’ documented historical relationship. [18][19]

Other branches have used force in different conflicts. Lebanon’s Islamic Group fought alongside the terrorist organization Hezbollah against Israel in 2023–2024. In Sudan, Islamist armed networks tied to the movement have fought alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in the ongoing civil war. These operations are attributable to the relevant branches and armed groups; the evidence does not make every Brotherhood member or national party a participant in them. [5][14]

Designations and international status

Governments have treated Brotherhood branches differently. Egypt banned the parent movement after Morsi’s removal and designated it a terrorist organization. In the United States, a November 2025 presidential order directed consideration of specified branches in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon for terrorist designations. Subsequent United States measures designated the Lebanese Islamic Group as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, while applying the latter designation to the Egyptian and Jordanian branches. The United States designated Sudan’s Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2026. These are branch-specific measures, not one universal legal designation covering every movement with Brotherhood roots. [16][20][21]

The distinctions matter for groups operating in elected politics. Jordan’s Brotherhood has faced internal splits and pressure from its government. Yemen’s al-Islah has served within internationally recognized governing coalitions while remaining associated with the Brotherhood. The United Arab Emirates convicted defendants in the UAE 94 case of managing a secret Brotherhood organization, but public records in that case showed no evidence of seditious activity beyond a confession obtained under torture and later retracted. Legal decisions, ideological affinity and proof of violent conduct therefore require separate examination. [5][13]

Current status

The Brotherhood remains influential as a political current despite the severe weakening of its Egyptian parent after 2013. Morsi died in 2019; el-Sisi’s government limited coverage of his death and contained Brotherhood calls for demonstrations. Egyptian leaders have since faced imprisonment, exile and internal division. At the same time, branches and aligned movements continue to operate within different national settings: through parties in Yemen, factions in Jordan, Islamist networks in Sudan and the Islamic Group in Lebanon. Qatar and Turkey have provided important external support, while Hamas retains its own leadership and terrorist organization in Gaza. [5][11][12][15]

The movement’s history joins gradual institution-building to an ambition for government under sharia. Its branches have not followed one uniform course: some competed in elections, some entered governing coalitions, and others carried out or supported armed attacks. Egypt’s short-lived Brotherhood presidency, Hamas’s war against Israel and the activity of national branches show both the reach of its ideas and the importance of identifying the organization, leaders and conduct at issue in each country. [2][5][12]