Kata'ib Hezbollah

Overview

Kata'ib Hezbollah, also called the Hezbollah Brigades, is an Iraqi Shia armed organization and an Iranian regime proxy. Founded during the 2000s, it fought American-led forces in Iraq and later became a powerful component of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Its membership in an Iraqi security institution gives its fighters access to state salaries and facilities, although the organization has conducted attacks and foreign deployments outside Iraqi government authorization. Its patron is the regime in Iran, whose Quds Force has directed and supported the militia. Kata'ib Hezbollah also belongs to the Iran-aligned Axis of Resistance and has participated in the Iran–Israel proxy conflict.

The organization has attacked American personnel, operated in Syria, launched drones toward Saudi Arabia, threatened targets connected to Israel, and challenged Iraqi state authority. Its founder, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was killed with Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani at Baghdad airport on January 3, 2020. His death reduced the group's political agility but did not end its operational role. Kata'ib Hezbollah remained a leading organizer of attacks on American forces as the Quds Force expanded its relationships with other Iraqi factions. Its conduct illustrates the divide between formal inclusion in the PMF and effective control over armed units that receive Iraqi public resources.

Founding and ideology

Kata'ib Hezbollah emerged in the mid-2000s, a few years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad. Al-Muhandis founded and led the militia during the Iraq War, when Iranian-backed Shia armed groups fought American-led coalition forces. The organization grew within militant networks that included the older Badr Organization. The Iranian regime trained and financed Kata'ib Hezbollah and used it, alongside other Iraqi militias, against American forces. Soleimani was directly involved with the organization from its early activities in 2007, and the Quds Force directed it while al-Muhandis commanded its fighters.

The militia's political identity joins Shia religious affiliation to loyalty to Iran's regional project. Its opposition to the American military presence in Iraq and its cooperation with other Iranian-backed factions made it one of the regime's most favored Iraqi armed groups from its formation until al-Muhandis's death. In 2018, al-Muhandis publicly thanked the Iranian regime for supplying weapons and money. He also thanked the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah for training his fighters. These relationships connected Kata'ib Hezbollah to a wider network of armed groups, but the Iraqi organization retained its own leaders, personnel, domestic political interests, and authority over some local operations.

History

During Iraq's first decade under its new government, Kata'ib Hezbollah was among the Shia militias that carried out armed attacks. Its later incorporation into the PMF followed years in which Iranian-backed factions had fought American forces. The militia also expanded beyond Iraq. Soleimani sent al-Muhandis's fighters into Syria during the Syrian civil war, and Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba became major Iraqi volunteer contingents there. PMF and Kata'ib Hezbollah commands initially housed fighters from Liwa Fatemiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun in compounds at al-Qaim and helped move members of those formations. Their Syrian deployments advanced Iranian military interests while extending the Iraqi militia network across the border.

A Kata'ib Hezbollah attack on a coalition base near Kirkuk in December 2019 killed an American contractor. On December 29, American forces struck five Kata'ib Hezbollah bases in Iraq and Syria, killing 25 operatives and wounding more than 50. Militia supporters then besieged the American embassy compound in Baghdad; Kata'ib Hezbollah took part in the siege. On January 3, 2020, an American strike at Baghdad airport killed al-Muhandis alongside Soleimani. Repeated rocket attacks had also compelled American forces to prioritize the protection of Iraqi bases hosting coalition troops. On January 5, U.S. forces paused operations against the Islamic State amid those security demands.

The leadership losses changed Kata'ib Hezbollah's position within Iran's Iraqi network. The group became less politically agile, while stronger counterterrorism pressure increased its reliance on secrecy and deniable operations. The Quds Force broadened its dealings with factions beyond Kata'ib Hezbollah. Nevertheless, the militia continued organizing attacks on American forces. In April 2020, it announced an agreement with prime minister-designate Mustafa al-Kazimi to establish a committee examining the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Kata'ib Hezbollah had opposed al-Kazimi's nomination and accused him of involvement in their killing.

Iraqi counterterrorism forces arrested several Kata'ib Hezbollah operatives in late June 2020 amid preparations for rocket attacks on the American embassy compound. Militia protests included death threats against Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Most of those arrested were released within days. The episode showed the difficulty Iraqi authorities faced when attempting to enforce security decisions against an armed faction embedded in the PMF. The group's armed power also carried political weight after Iraqi elections reduced militia representation: representatives of Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq threatened escalation toward armed conflict if the results excluded them.

Structure and leadership

Al-Muhandis combined command of Kata'ib Hezbollah with a senior role in the PMF, giving him influence over armed formations beyond the group he founded. Its own command structure includes fighters, support cells, and personnel within the PMF. As part of that institution, Kata'ib Hezbollah has benefited from official positions and resources while repeatedly acting outside the Iraqi chain of command. After al-Muhandis's death, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi became a prominent leader and public voice for the organization. Its command has continued to coordinate with the Quds Force, though Iran's officers also developed ties with other Iraqi factions.

Kata'ib Hezbollah's influence has extended through allied and adjacent units. Liwa al-Tafuf drew legitimacy from its association with Karbala's shrines, but increasingly came under al-Muhandis's control. That relationship did not place every shrine-associated militia under Iranian-backed commanders: the Atabat formations answered primarily to the spiritual leadership of Ali al-Sistani. Kata'ib Hezbollah also tasked Qasim Muslih with countering civil society activists in Karbala from 2019 to 2021. Iraqi security forces arrested Muslih in May 2021 over the assassination of activist Ehab al-Wazni, but pressure from Kata'ib Hezbollah secured his release. These episodes connected the militia's national command to coercive power within Iraqi cities.

Other links have involved concealed attack cells. Ahrar Sinjar used Yazidi imagery while serving as a facade for some rocket and drone attacks by cells trained by Kata'ib Hezbollah and assisted by Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Nineveh. Its branding did not make those operations the work of an independent Yazidi force. Kata'ib Hezbollah has also had an interest in Iraqi intelligence institutions: its Hoquq Movement competed with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq over leadership of intelligence services after a new government formed. Such activity shows how the organization seeks influence through armed personnel, political channels, and state offices.

Funding and sponsors

The Iranian regime has supplied Kata'ib Hezbollah with financing, training, weapons, intelligence support, and operational direction. Soleimani's direct involvement tied the organization to the Quds Force from its first activities. Its place within the PMF supplied another resource stream: Iraqi government pay for members and access to facilities attached to a recognized security institution. The combination gave Iran a proxy with an Iraqi institutional foothold. Kata'ib Hezbollah's status in the PMF does not mean its cross-border operations were authorized Iraqi military missions.

Members of Kata'ib Hezbollah operated in Syria while receiving full Iraqi government pay and following the operational control of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The PMF lacked authorization to deploy there. When American aircraft struck Kata'ib Hezbollah-run checkpoints in Syria on February 25, killing one member, militia messaging described the incident as a strike on the PMF. The underlying deployment demonstrated the gap between Iraqi state funding and control of the unit in the field. Exposure of other positions of influence also affected the militia: after its control at Baghdad airport became public, its role there diminished. Its drone launches toward Saudi Arabia likewise sharpened tensions between Kata'ib Hezbollah and Iraq's government.

Attacks and operations

Kata'ib Hezbollah has used rockets, missiles, drones, and armed threats against American forces and other targets. Its leaders conferred with Soleimani before attacks on American bases in remote parts of Iraq, while local commanders held authority to attack bases around Kirkuk and Qayyarah. The December 2019 Kirkuk attack and subsequent embassy siege were decisive episodes in the confrontation that culminated in the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis. After January 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups including Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq carried out more than 180 rocket, missile, and drone attacks on U.S. personnel across Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. That total covers multiple groups; it is not a count of attacks by Kata'ib Hezbollah alone.

The group has also launched drones from Iraq toward Saudi Arabia in May and September 2019 and January 2021. These cross-border launches exposed the consequences of a militia conducting regional operations from Iraqi territory. On December 26, 2023, American forces struck three Kata'ib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq. The militia condemned the January 2, 2024, killing of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri. In January 2024, a drone attack associated with Kata'ib Hezbollah killed three American soldiers at a base in eastern Jordan. The deaths brought renewed American strikes. In late January, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba mocked Kata'ib Hezbollah for temporarily halting attacks on U.S. forces.

On February 7, 2024, an American drone strike in Baghdad killed Kata'ib Hezbollah commander Wissam Muhammed Saber. He had directly planned and participated in attacks on American forces in the region. The strike removed a senior operational figure, but the militia's capacity to threaten American personnel persisted. Its wider network included Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq, linked to Kata'ib Hezbollah, which threatened U.S. targets in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait in October 2023. A Kata'ib Hezbollah official also called for volunteers to conduct suicide attacks against American forces in Iraq.

Kata'ib Hezbollah has operated against civilians as well as military targets. It held Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov for about two and a half years before her release on September 9, 2025. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani credited Iraqi security forces with facilitating her release. The United States had warned his government in March 2025 of political and economic consequences unless she was freed. In May 2026, an American criminal complaint linked Kata'ib Hezbollah to Ashab al-Yamin, a proxy group attacking targets in Europe. The case broadened the documented reach of networks connected to the Iraqi militia beyond the Middle East.

Designations and international status

The United States designated Kata'ib Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2009, citing attacks on Iraqi, American, and other targets. Its incorporation into the PMF did not remove that designation or resolve the question of who controlled its forces. Kata'ib Hezbollah remains both an Iraqi state-paid armed formation and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Its conduct in Syria, where the PMF had no deployment authorization, makes the distinction between formal institutional status and operational allegiance especially clear. The militia's threats against American and Israeli targets have also made it a significant node in Iran's regional armed network.

The organization has opposed Iraqi efforts to restrain militia power and has used the PMF's official position to defend its standing. Its relations with other Iranian-backed groups are cooperative but not identical: those groups maintain separate leaders and interests, and the Quds Force increased its reliance on factions outside Kata'ib Hezbollah after 2020. The American response has included strikes on its facilities and commanders, while Iraqi security forces have attempted arrests that sometimes met militia pressure. These conflicting authorities have remained central to Kata'ib Hezbollah's international status and to Iraq's struggle to place armed forces under government command.

Current status

During 2025, Kata'ib Hezbollah remained among the leading Iraqi Shia militias using armed attacks and military threats against American and Israeli targets. It challenged al-Sudani's policy of keeping Iraq out of regional conflicts. Tensions escalated into a confrontation between Kata'ib Hezbollah operatives and Iraqi security forces in Baghdad; government forces arrested suspects afterward. The group and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq also opposed a proposed visit to Iraq by Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. These disputes showed continuing friction between militia ambitions and Iraqi government decisions.

The militia continued to present itself as a defender of Iranian interests. On January 16, 2026, it threatened U.S. bases in Iraq and the wider region if America struck Iran. Later that month, al-Hamidawi and volunteers signed forms publicized by Kata'ib Hezbollah amid tensions involving Iran. On February 26, 2026, the group warned the Kurdistan Region against cooperation with foreign forces it deemed hostile while Iranian Kurdish groups were based there. Kata'ib Hezbollah thus remained active across Iraqi politics, regional threats, and the PMF despite the loss of its founder. Its continuing reach rests on Iranian sponsorship, armed organization, and access to Iraqi state resources.