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Overview
Hodeidah is a city and port on the Red Sea coast of Yemen. Its port is Yemen’s largest and a vital route for imported food, fuel and humanitarian supplies. It handled 47 percent of Yemen’s food imports in the first quarter of 2018, when the city had about 700,000 residents. That dependence made uninterrupted shipping through Hodeidah a national concern during the Yemeni civil war. Fighting over the city threatened both the supply of essential goods and control of one of Yemen’s most valuable sources of port revenue.[1]
The Iranian-backed Houthi movement, a terrorist organization, held Hodeidah and its port during the war. Port fees and customs receipts provided income to the organization, while control of the coast gave it access to maritime routes used for weapons transfers. The port remained under Houthi control after the 2018 Stockholm Agreement halted an offensive against the city. Hodeidah consequently remained both an import hub for civilians and a military asset in the Houthis’ attacks on international shipping and Israel.[2][3]
Geography
Hodeidah stands on Yemen’s western coastal plain, facing the Red Sea shipping route that connects the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal through Bab-el-Mandeb. Its position makes the city a gateway between maritime trade and Yemen’s inland population centers. Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa are the three ports covered by the Hodeidah Agreement. Their importance extends beyond the city: food and fuel entering Houthi-held ports serve areas far from the coast, and interruptions can affect supply across much of Yemen.[1][4]
Control of this stretch of coast also has military consequences. Access to the Red Sea helped the Houthis obtain modern weapons and training from the Iranian regime and Hezbollah. During the civil war, the Houthis held both the capital, Sanaa, and Hodeidah. Losing the coastal ports would have cut a major maritime route for supplies and revenue. Houthi positions around the city therefore formed part of a wider struggle over Yemen’s western coast and the safety of Red Sea traffic.[2][3]
Modern history
After forces loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi retook Aden, coalition maritime operations shifted toward the Red Sea ports of Mokha and Hodeidah. The United Arab Emirates and its Yemeni partners had been preparing an operation against Hodeidah from 2016. An earlier plan centered on an amphibious assault, which required protection from anti-shipping missiles, mines and explosive drone boats. The proposed operation sought to weaken the Houthis, restrict Iranian arms deliveries, improve the government side’s negotiating position and restore port capacity for humanitarian imports. Objections from the United States, the United Nations and aid agencies delayed the assault because prolonged disruption of imports could deepen Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.[1][15]
In 2018, UAE-backed Yemeni forces advanced toward Hodeidah from the south and reached positions about eight kilometres from the city. Roughly 25,000 advancing Yemeni troops faced about 2,000 Houthi fighters in and around Hodeidah. Yemeni brigades also moved around the city’s northeastern side, threatening the port and the Houthis’ remaining road for reinforcement or withdrawal. As fighting approached, commercial shippers stopped delivering food to Hodeidah, although aid agencies continued their deliveries. The prospect of a lengthy battle raised fears that reduced imports would worsen hunger across areas dependent on the port.[1][2]
UN-led talks in Sweden produced the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. Its Hodeidah Agreement imposed an immediate ceasefire in the city, its governorate and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa, halting the offensive against Houthi positions on the west coast. It called for mutual redeployment of forces and for local security forces to secure the city and ports under Yemeni law. It also provided for port revenue to help pay public-sector salaries in Hodeidah and elsewhere in Yemen. The United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement, or UNMHA, was established to monitor the ceasefire and redeployments and help the parties implement those provisions. UN Security Council Resolution 2505 later extended its mandate through July 15, 2020.[3][4][13]
The ceasefire stopped the advance but did not transfer control of the port. The Houthis retained Hodeidah’s strategic ports, revenue and Red Sea access, while effective external oversight of port operations and revenue did not take hold. Public-sector salaries frequently went unpaid even as the organization kept port profits. International funding through the UN Development Programme paid for repairs and improvements at Houthi-controlled ports despite continuing noncompliance with the agreement. The United Nations continued to use Hodeidah as its primary aid-entry port; about 80 percent of humanitarian assistance entered through Houthi-controlled ports. These circumstances kept humanitarian access dependent on facilities controlled by a party to the war.[3][12]
Security
Houthi control of Hodeidah provided substantial income. During the 2018 advance, the organization charged shippers around $100,000 for each vessel allowed to berth and unload food or fuel. A UN expert panel later documented roughly $4 billion in customs revenue from fuel imports through Houthi-controlled ports over two years; a significant share was diverted to military purposes. Port fees and the diversion of incoming aid and resources helped finance Houthi operations. The Hodeidah Agreement’s salary provision was intended to direct port income toward public employees, but the Houthis’ continuing control left that objective unfulfilled.[1][3][12]
Hodeidah’s ports also figured in the Houthis’ maritime campaign. Houthi forces diverted a captured ship and its crew to al-Salif, a port under their control in Hodeidah governorate. Weapons supplied by the Iranian regime entered through Hodeidah for use in Houthi attacks against Israel, while control of the Red Sea coast supported attacks on international shipping. Hodeidah’s role as an aid gateway did not remove its military significance: the same port network handled civilian imports, generated revenue for the Houthis and provided access for weapons transfers.[3][5][6]
After months of Houthi drone and missile attacks on Israeli civilian targets, a Houthi drone killed an Israeli civilian in Tel Aviv on July 19, 2024. Israel struck Hodeidah port the next day. The Israeli Air Force struck the port again on July 21 and September 29, 2024, following further Houthi attacks on Israel. Israeli forces identified the port as a route for advanced weapons supplied by the Iranian regime. The Houthis vowed to continue their attacks after the July strike.[5][6][9]
Present day
Hodeidah remained a target as the Houthis continued attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping. In April 2025, anti-Houthi factions considered a ground offensive to retake Hodeidah or Sanaa while American airstrikes against Houthi targets continued. On July 21, 2025, Israeli drones struck Houthi military targets at Hodeidah port after the Houthis attempted to restore infrastructure damaged in earlier attacks. The targets included engineering vehicles, fuel tanks, vessels and other port infrastructure. A rebuilt pier was destroyed. In August, Yemeni government counterterrorism authorities reported intercepting drones and communications equipment destined for the Houthis after a merchant ship diverted from Hodeidah to Aden.[7][12]
On September 16, 2025, Israeli Air Force planes again struck Hodeidah port. Reports counted 12 airstrikes against three docks and other port infrastructure. The strike targeted facilities used to move Iranian-regime weapons to the Houthis for attacks against Israel. Hodeidah thus remained at the intersection of Yemen’s humanitarian needs and regional security: its port was essential to food and aid deliveries, while Houthi control of its facilities and revenues sustained military activity affecting Israel and shipping through the Red Sea.[8][3]
Bibliografia e fonti
- 1No Going Back: The UAE's Strategic Move in Hodeidah Should Bring to a Close the First Phase of Yemen's Warwashingtoninstitute.org
- 2Is the Yemen War Really Deadlocked? Think Again.washingtoninstitute.org
- 38 UN Failures in Yemenfdd.org
- 4UN Security Council Resolutions: Resolution 2505jewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 5All eyes on Iran’s reaction to Hodeidahfdd.org
- 6HRW vs. HRW: The Contradictions in Condemning Israel’s Yemen Strikengo-monitor.org
- 7Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (July 16—23, 2025)terrorism-info.org.il
- 8Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 10—17, 2025)terrorism-info.org.il
- 9The Israel-Hamas War: Iran-Backed Houthis Launch Attacksjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 10Somaliland and Israel—Considerations Regarding Recognition and Cooperationinss.org.il
- 11Haniyeh’s Elimination Damaged Iran’s Sovereignty and Honor, Challenging Its Restraintinss.org.il
- 128 UN Failures in Yemenfdd.org
- 13UN Security Council Resolutions: Resolution 2505jewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 14The Israel-Hamas War: Iran-Backed Houthis Launch Attacksjewishvirtuallibrary.org
- 15حملة الحديدة (الجزء الثالث): ردع العمليات الحوثية الانتقاميةwashingtoninstitute.org
Gli argomenti non riguardanti il Medio Oriente rimandano all'Encyclopaedia Britannica.