Islamic Jihad Movement

Overview

The Islamic Jihad Movement is a Sunni terrorist organization committed to destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. Formed by Arab students in Egypt and organized in the Gaza Strip under Fathi Shikaki and Abdul Aziz Odeh, it made armed jihad against Israel its central purpose. Jihad means struggle or effort; in the movement’s program, it means armed warfare. Its Al-Quds Brigades have carried out bombings, shootings and rocket attacks against Israelis. The organization also maintains cells in Judea and Samaria and has long operated through a command network in Damascus.

The movement belongs to the Iranian regime’s Axis of Resistance and has fought in the Iran–Israel proxy conflict. Iran has supplied it with money, weapons and training, while Hezbollah has helped train its operatives. Islamic Jihad has coordinated attacks with Hamas, another terrorist organization, despite differences in their origins and political reach. It rejected the Oslo Accords, attacked Israeli civilians during the Second Intifada, participated in the October 7 attacks in 2023 and held Israeli civilian hostages in Gaza during the ensuing Gaza war.

Founding and ideology

Fathi Shikaki, Abdul Aziz Odeh and Bashir Moussa developed the movement while studying in Egypt in 1979. Shikaki, a medical student, had encountered the Muslim Brotherhood and its political writings. The founders broke with the Brotherhood’s Gaza branch because they wanted armed jihad against Israel to take priority over its slower program of social and religious organization. They sought an organization that would make attacks against Israel the immediate means of advancing their political and religious aims. Following the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, Egyptian authorities expelled Shikaki and his followers. Shikaki and Odeh then organized the movement in Gaza, where they recruited supporters and built cells.

Shikaki admired Ruhollah Khomeini and treated the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a model for political change through revolutionary action. That admiration created a durable relationship with Iran despite the movement’s Sunni identity and the Iranian regime’s Shia leadership. Islamic Jihad’s objective was the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place. Its armed campaign was therefore part of its founding purpose, not a later departure from an electoral or social program. In contrast with Hamas, which developed a broader network of social and political institutions, Islamic Jihad concentrated its resources on clandestine organization and attacks.

The movement’s political program joins its rejection of Israel to a commitment to armed jihad. Its use of the term describes religiously framed warfare, while terrorism describes tactics it has employed, including deliberate attacks on civilians. That distinction matters to the organization’s history: it has used shootings, suicide bombings and indiscriminate rocket fire, while also maintaining leaders, finances and external relationships that sustain those operations. Shikaki expected attacks to inspire wider mobilization. Iran’s early financial backing helped him develop a military apparatus, and the movement’s later alliance with Hamas and Hezbollah expanded its capacity without changing its objective.

History

Islamic Jihad established its infrastructure in Gaza during the early 1980s. Its operatives attacked Israeli targets during that decade, including a 1986 grenade attack near Jerusalem’s Western Wall that killed one person and wounded dozens. Shikaki spent time in Israeli prison for arms smuggling and was expelled from Gaza in 1988. He moved through Lebanon and established a headquarters in Damascus the following year. The move brought the leadership closer to Iranian officials and Hezbollah’s training network. It also created the external command structure that remained important for decades, linking leaders in Syria to cells in Gaza and Judea and Samaria.

Islamic Jihad opposed negotiations that recognized Israel’s continued existence. After the 1993 Oslo Accords, Shikaki helped organize an alliance in January 1994 that brought together Islamic Jihad, Hamas and eight PLO groups opposed to the agreements. Former rivals Islamic Jihad and Hamas subsequently coordinated attacks. Their cooperation was strengthened by shared access to Damascus and Iranian support. The movement carried out a series of lethal attacks in 1995, including bombings at Beit Lid, Kfar Darom and Jerusalem. Shikaki was killed in Malta in October 1995. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah succeeded him as secretary-general and led the organization from its Damascus network.

The death of Shikaki disrupted the movement but did not end its campaign. In March 1996, an Islamic Jihad suicide bombing at Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff Center killed 20 civilians and wounded more than 75. The organization remained active through the late 1990s and expanded its attacks during the Second Intifada, which began in 2000. Its Damascus leadership distributed orders and money to operatives, including cells centered on Jenin. In August 2001, three members of Islamic Jihad appeared among Israel’s seven most-wanted attackers. The movement claimed a November 2001 shooting at a Jerusalem bus that killed Menashe Regev, 14, and Shoshana Ben-Yishai, 16. It also jointly perpetrated a November 27 suicide shooting in Afula with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, killing two people.

After Israel withdrew its forces and Jewish communities from Gaza in 2005, Islamic Jihad continued attacking Israel from the territory. The movement’s methods shifted after 2007, with small-arms attacks and rocket campaigns becoming more prominent than suicide bombings. That shift coincided with Hamas’s violent seizure of power in Gaza in 2007. Islamic Jihad remained organizationally separate from Hamas, but the two terrorist organizations shared an interest in attacking Israel and repeatedly coordinated their activities. The group retained an independent armed wing, leadership and Iranian sponsorship.

Structure and leadership

The Al-Quds Brigades, formed in 1992, are Islamic Jihad’s armed wing. They have operated in Gaza and Judea and Samaria through local cells and commanders. Their activities have included bombings, shootings, armed incursions and rocket launches. This cell-based structure has allowed the movement to continue attacks despite the deaths or arrests of leaders. It has also meant that its military presence extends beyond a single headquarters. In November 2023, Israeli security forces killed Muhammad Zubeidi, commander of the movement’s Jenin branch, illustrating the continuing importance of that city to its operations.

Shallah’s succession after Shikaki’s death preserved Damascus as a center of command. Funds moved from the Syrian capital to operatives in Jenin; one documented transfer amounted to $127,000. The organization also had an overseas support network. Sami al-Arian served on its leadership council during the 1990s and early 2000s and oversaw audits of its worldwide funds and property. He later pleaded guilty in the United States to conspiring to provide funds, goods or services for the movement’s benefit and received a 57-month prison sentence. His case exposed the movement’s financial administration and its dependence on international contacts as well as local cells.

After Shallah fell into a coma in April 2018, Ziyad al-Nakhalah succeeded him as secretary-general. Al-Nakhalah maintained the movement’s close alignment with the Iranian regime and coordinated with Hamas and Hezbollah. During a 2018 visit to Iran, he threatened rocket fire against Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities in a future confrontation. At an April 2 discussion with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, the two affirmed political and military coordination between their organizations. Damascus remained a long-standing base for senior officials until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime changed the movement’s position in Syria.

Funding and sponsors

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been Islamic Jihad’s principal state sponsor. Iranian financial assistance began under Shikaki and became a central part of the organization’s ability to recruit, arm and direct operatives. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its Quds Force, has armed, funded and trained the movement. Hezbollah provided training and operational contacts in Lebanon. These relationships placed Islamic Jihad within a regional network that also includes Hamas and other Iranian-backed armed groups. Between 2002 and 2014, Israel seized at least four ships carrying Iranian weapons or ammunition intended for Hezbollah, Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Iran’s support has extended from external leadership to local military capacity. In an interview reported in 2023, al-Nakhalah credited Iranian help with the formation of Islamic Jihad armed battalions across cities in Judea and Samaria. Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to the movement. Foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif described support for its cause as a principle of the regime’s foreign policy. On July 29, 2024, Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian met al-Nakhalah in Tehran and pledged continued support. Iran’s sponsorship has given Islamic Jihad resources and external backing while advancing the regime’s campaign against Israel.

The relationship has included financial oversight as well as weapons. Internal disputes over spending in the 1990s led Islamic Jihad leaders to seek audits and discuss their financial decisions with Iranian representatives. Al-Arian’s role in reviewing worldwide funds and property formed part of that process. Shallah later transferred money from Damascus to operatives in Jenin. Such transfers connected the organization’s external leadership to attacks and recruitment inside Israel’s immediate security environment. Syrian territory and Hezbollah training facilities supplied additional logistical depth to the Iranian relationship.

Attacks and operations

Islamic Jihad has deliberately attacked Israeli civilians. The March 1996 Dizengoff Center bombing was among its deadliest attacks in Tel Aviv. During the Second Intifada, it claimed the November 2001 bus shooting in Jerusalem and other assaults. Its Al-Quds Brigades claimed the March 29, 2002 stabbing murders of Tuvya Viesner and Michael Orlanski at Netzarim in Gaza. On June 5, 2002, a suicide bomber attacked a bus at Megiddo Junction in northern Israel, killing 17 people and wounding more than 40; secretary-general Shallah claimed the bombing. In a survey of 128 lethal attacks on civilians through July 2002, Amnesty International recorded 11 claimed by Islamic Jihad. The organization also killed two Israeli Military Policemen guarding the Cave of the Patriarchs in December 2002.

Later operations showed the movement’s shift toward rockets and smaller armed attacks. In June 2007, Al-Quds Brigades fighters used an armored jeep in an unsuccessful assault on Israeli soldiers at the Kissufim crossing. During the May 2021 fighting, Hamas and Islamic Jihad fired more than 4,000 rockets toward Israelis. Under Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Israel launched Operation Breaking Dawn against Islamic Jihad commanders in August 2022; rocket fire from Gaza followed, and Iron Dome intercepted hundreds of projectiles. Islamic Jihad fired more than 1,000 rockets toward Israel during the May 2023 conflict. Iron Dome intercepted 91 percent of the projectiles headed toward populated areas. The Israel Defense Forces reported that approximately one quarter of the movement’s rockets fell inside Gaza and wounded civilians there.

Islamic Jihad participated alongside Hamas in the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. Armed members entered Israeli communities during the assault, while terrorist groups in Gaza launched thousands of rockets toward Israeli towns and cities. The movement subsequently held Israeli civilian hostages in Gaza. Its deputy secretary-general Muhammad al-Hindi confirmed that the Al-Quds Brigades handed over women and children it had held during a November 2023 hostage release. Participation in the attack and hostage-taking made Islamic Jihad a direct party to the Gaza war that followed. Its fighters and rocket units continued to operate in Gaza, while cells in Judea and Samaria remained part of the organization’s broader campaign.

Designations and international status

Israel, the United States and the European Union designate Islamic Jihad as a terrorist organization. Its stated objective of destroying Israel, its attacks on civilians and its hostage-taking distinguish its activity from ordinary political opposition or armed conflict confined to military targets. The United States prosecuted members and supporters involved in the organization’s overseas financial network, including al-Arian. Its designation also reflects the movement’s long record of suicide bombings and other attacks on civilians. Israel has conducted operations against its commanders, cells, launch sites and weapons infrastructure in Gaza and Judea and Samaria.

The organization’s international position has depended heavily on its sponsors and host governments. Assad-era Syria allowed its leaders to maintain a long-standing Damascus presence, which connected them to Iranian officials and Hezbollah. The movement also participated in talks hosted by Egypt with Hamas and other Arab factions, including October 2025 discussions in Cairo on Gaza’s administration and disarmament. Such political contacts did not alter its terrorist designations or its commitment to Israel’s destruction. Its external relationships remain relevant to the movement’s ability to fund, direct and sustain armed cells.

Current status

Al-Nakhalah remained the movement’s secretary-general after the October 7 attack. Islamic Jihad continued to operate in Gaza and Judea and Samaria while receiving Iranian regime support. Its Damascus network faced a major change after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. In April 2025, Syria’s transitional authorities detained Khaled Khaled, who headed Islamic Jihad’s operations in Syria, and Yasser al-Zafari, who headed its organizational committee there. The detentions marked a break in the environment that had sustained the movement’s Syrian command structure for decades.

Islamic Jihad’s continued activity rests on its armed wing, local cells and foreign sponsorship. Its history links the founding decision to prioritize armed jihad in 1981 with later bombings, rocket campaigns and the October 7 attack. Iranian support and coordination with Hamas and Hezbollah have allowed it to remain part of a wider campaign against Israel even as leaders and operating bases have changed. The movement’s declared objective—the destruction of Israel and its replacement with an Islamic state—has remained constant.